Russian Foreign Policy-Making

Structural and Procedural Characteristics of Policy Networks during Putin's Tenure

Thesis

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by

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Prof. Dr. Andreas Wenger and Prof. Dr. Dieter Ruloff and Dr. Dmitri Trenin

for my parents.

“Подойти к разгадке тайны,
скрытой в душе России,
можно, сразу же признав
антиномичность России,
жуткую ее противоречивость.“

Николай Бердяев, ‚Судьба России’, 1915

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Acknowledgements

Three years and one month ago I started evaluating the topic of my dissertation. Out of three different options, I chose - for some unaccountable reasons - the one with the least prospects of success: Russian foreign policy-making. To be honest, I got aware of the whole dimension of my undertaking only upon my arrival in Moscow. Many experts smiled compassionately when I told them about my project. Then, they took their leave and mumbled *udachi*, good luck, or *beregi sebja*, watch out. Today, I do not regret my choice – on the contrary. Retrospectively, the investigation of Russian foreign policy decision-making is not only an exciting and rewarding task. First and foremost, it provided me insights into the huge and fascinating Russian world inhabited by countless warm hearted and straightforward people.

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List of abbreviations

ABM	Anti Ballistic Missiles
CEES	Common European Economic Space
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CST	Collective Security Treaty
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organisation
EurAsEC	Eurasian Economic Community
EU	European Union
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
FSB	Federal Security Service (Federalnaja Sluzhba Bezopasnosti)
GUUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova
IR	International Relations
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MEDT	Ministry of Economic Development and Trade
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental organisation
NMD	National Missile Defense
NRC	NATO-Russia Council
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EU-Russia)
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PJC	Permanent Joint Council (NATO-Russia)
PM	Prime Minister

PPA	Public Policy Analysis
RAO UES	United Energy System of Russia
SES	Single Economic Space
SNA	Social Network Analysis
SVR	Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshnej Razvedki)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Introduction

Russian foreign policy-making under President Vladimir Putin has amounted to a *black box with unpredictable outcomes.*[1] Moscow's decision-making processes with regard to NATO enlargement, Georgia and the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the US military presence in Central Asia, Moldova and the Transnistria dispute, the Middle East conflict, the U.S. war against Iraq, presidential elections in the Ukraine, the energy conflicts with Kiev and Minsk, talks with Hamas, Kosovo's legal status or Iran's nuclear ambitions - only to name the most thorny issues – have regularly astonished observers. Three structural and procedural aspects in particular appear to be ambiguous and vague: firstly, it is unclear which *actors* are involved in the decision-making networks. Secondly, it is nebulous what kinds of *interaction mechanisms* between network-members are in place. And thirdly, it is unknown whether decision-networks in Russian foreign policy are similarly shaped, or if significant *variations* exist depending on the policy problem.

There is hardly an observer, who is able to say with a reasonable amount of certainty which *actors* are behind Moscow's foreign policy decisions. Putin's position and role in particular has been assessed again and again from different perspectives and with different verdicts: Some critical – often Western - observers concluded that Putin has to be perceived as an aspiring dictator on top of a massive nation state, trying to regain world power status.[2] As a matter of fact, since the presidency was handed over to Vladimir Putin on December 31st 1999, the former KGB-agent managed to gradually discipline, centralise and rationalize decision-making after years of chaos under Yeltsin.[3] This development may be explained by a rising number of *siloviki*[4] and a concurrent declining influence of

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1 This statement corresponds with conventional wisdom. See, for instance, Federation-Council (2004) or Carnegie (2004).

2 See, for instance, Fischer (2004), Kagan (2004), Lucas (2006).

3 Representatively, see Fischer (2003), Sapper (2004) and Lo (2003).

4 This is a Russian expression for people, who have their roots within the security sector (army, police, intelligence services, border guards and other security-related units). As an illustration, in 2002, 26,6% of Putin's team had a military background compared to 6,7% in 1993 Kryshtanovskaja (2005: 269). Further illuminating contributions have been provided by Lo (2003), Mukhin (2002), Shevtsova (2005).

liberal-economic actors within Russia's political elite.[5] Additionally, Putin's consolidation of power is caused by an enlargement of the St. Petersburg-Clan around the president.[6] One by one, he expelled members of the 'Yeltsin Family' from the Kremlin and surrounded himself with trusted comrades.[7]

At the other end of the spectrum, Putin is sometimes described as a puppet, controlled by 'people in grey', who define the Kremlin's course of action.[8] Proponents of this view believe that Putin only fulfils a marketing function to mask a gigantic administration managed by a network of powerful *apparatchiki*[9] and *polittekhnology*.[10] Yet, in between those two poles – dictator and puppet - there exist literally hundreds of interpretations.[11] Reduced to the smallest common denominator, Russian foreign policies are supposed to be made by restricted decision-making networks of actors that are inscrutable and unstable with regard to their size, composition and distribution of power.

A lot of uncertainties have remained with regard to *interaction mechanisms* that affect the preparation, taking and implementation of foreign policy decisions. On the one hand, some experts believe that such procedures do not exist at all.[12] In their view, a complete lack of institutions is accountable for many unpredictable foreign policy outcomes. Decisions seem to be dependent on the moods of a super-president possessing most of the constitutional powers. On the other hand, it may be argued that strong institutions do exist in terms of informal rules of interaction between members of decision-making networks. These kinds of institutions are supposed to be deeply rooted in Russian culture.[13] Since nearly every single foreign policy decision has caused a battle

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5 See, for instance, Kononenko (2005), Miljutenko (2003).
6 This stand point has been convincingly and representatively outlined by Makarkin (2003), Borisov (2004), Bernstein (2002), Mukhin (2002), Shevtsova (2005).
7 Representatively, see Primakov (2001). Even if a comparison between Yeltsin's and Putin's clan is hardly feasible, the expression "Putin Family" has appeared lately. See Sudin (2004).
8 See, for instance, Dresen (2004), Shipitsyna (2004).
9 This Russian term stands for the classic bureaucrat as inherited from the Soviet times.
10 This Russian expression describes Kremlin-affiliated political advisors who have the task to literally construct political reality.
11 See, for instance, Bernstein (2002), Edwards, Kemp, et al. (2006), Feifer (2002), Rivera and Rivera (2006).
12 Representatively, see Carnegie (2004), Federation-Council (2004), Korobeinikov (2005).
13 See, for instance, Steen (2003).

between competing elite groups, a Russian way of checks and balances is somehow constantly provided.

On top of these confusing interpretations, *network variations* are a constant focal point of political analysts. It is uncertain whether decision-making networks are more or less similar, or if actors and their interaction mechanisms vary depending on the policy problem. Some observers interpret current developments in Moscow as a reversion of Czarist court rule.[14] They estimate that all of the important domestic and international issues – be it health care, unification of regions, the stabilization fund, oil pipeline routing, talks with North Korea or arms exports – are decided by an invariable handful of individuals around Putin. However, there is also strong evidence that foreign policy making in Moscow is by no means different than in any other capital around the world: the fields of foreign and security policy are considered to be high politics and thus an executive reserve by nature (Keck and Sikkink 1998). But this fact does not exclude the involvement of interested governmental, parliamentary, economic or societal actors in decision-making. Additional, non-executive actors may be included in decision-making on a case-by-case basis according to the issue or policy area addressed.

Question

The present study aims at taking a closer look at the above-described aspects by reconstructing, analyzing and comparing Russian foreign policy networks. The overarching question shall be formulated as follows: *what types of decision-making networks define Russia's foreign policies under Putin and to what extent, how and why do they vary depending on the policy problem?*

This query triggers a sequence of sub-questions. *With regard to theory and methodology:* on what theoretical, methodological and practical grounds can networks be used to further enhance an understanding of Russian foreign policy-making? *With regard to the contextual background of Russian foreign policy-making:* what kinds of political

[14] See, for instance, Schumatsky (2004), Kryshtanovskaja and White (2005).

settings influence the form of decision-making networks? *With regard to the analysis of networks:* what kinds of network appearances and qualities emerge in terms of specific Russian foreign policy issues? *With regard to the comparison and embedding of networks into a larger context:* to what extent do decision-making networks vary and fit into a greater structural and procedural setting of Russian foreign policy-making?

Theory and hypothesis

The focus of the present study may be located on the interface between two subdisciplines in political science: international relations (IR) and public policy analysis (PPA). It identifies with IR insofar as a respectable amount of neo-liberal and constructivist literature in this field has addressed the genesis of foreign policy within the domestic political arena. The present study also refers to PPA, since most theoretical approaches about policy-making have been formulated in this field.[15] In fact, traditional boundaries between IR and PPA have been gradually blurred over the last years (Coles 2000, Klöti, Hirschi, et al. 2005: 45-49, Rosenau 1989, 1990, 2000). This development reflects profound qualitative changes in politics caused by increased globalisation processes in recent times. In contrast to the previous clear distinction between high and low politics[16] in former decades, foreign and domestic politics have become highly intertwined (Goetschel, Bernath, et al. 2002). Today, foreign policy-making is a relatively open, flexible, dynamic and complex process including executive, legislative and non-state actors at multiple levels.

In light of these circumstances, this paper adopts an alternative research perspective by relying on *social network theories and methods* inspired by, and rooted in, sociology and mathematics. This choice has two major advantages over traditional IR or PPA approaches: on a theoretical level, it adds an important dimension to classic state theories such as elitism, pluralism and Marxism: it considers the relationships between state and

[15] See, for instance, Dunn (1994), Prittwitz and Wegrich (1994), Schubert and Bandelow (2003), Von Beyme (2000) and John (1998), who comprehensively outline a wide range of PPA approaches.

[16] This distinction is often used to describe the differences between foreign and domestic politics.

interests within civil society (Daugbjerg and Marsh 1998: 55) by focussing on links between actors from all spheres and levels. On a methodological level, social network analysis (SNA) quantitatively combines two basic components of social reality, i.e. structure and process. It allows the identification of organisational or individual actors with their specific positions and attributes as well as the relationship between them (Jansen 2003: 58-68). Thus, from a SNA perspective, state as well as non-state actors on multiple levels are supposed to be part of the Russian foreign policy-making process. Also, actors and interaction mechanisms are not viewed as two separate entities, but as two inherent elements of decision-making networks. Most scholars in the field of PPA refer to such networks as *policy networks*. A policy network may be defined as "(more or less) stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes" (Kickert, Klijn, et al. 1997: 6).

This study is based on the analytical concept according to David Knoke and Franz Urban Pappi et al. (1996). The basic unit of analysis in the organisational state[17] is the *policy domain*. A policy domain is a complex social organisation "identified by a substantively defined criterion of mutual relevance or common orientation among a set of consequential actors concerned with formulating, advocating, and selecting courses of action (i.e. policy options) that are intended to resolve the delimited substantive problems in question" (Knoke and Laumann 1982: 256). They also assume that every policy domain contains several specialized *subfields* that allocate policy interests to particular actors. Subfields can be specified according to technological, geographical, economic or social cleavages running across policy domains. Finally, every subfield contains different issues and events.

Knoke and Pappi's model further suggests that each domain, subfield, issue and event attracts the interest of a specialized audience (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 83). Therefore, one might expect that policy networks vary depending on the domain,

[17] The organisational state approach is an orienting analytic framework that views modern state-society relationships as "increasingly blurred, merging into a mélange of interorganisational influence and power relations". See Knoke, Pappi, et al. (1996: 3).

subfield(s), issue(s) or event(s) involved.[18] This assumption stands in line with Lowi's (1964, 1972) observation that policies define politics. Furthermore, it has been confirmed by other authors, who adapted Lowi's theory for the purposes of SNA (Serdült 2002, Smith 1993). Therefore, this study does not exclusively use networks as a tool to analyse actors and their interactions in decision-making; policy networks are also considered as a dependent variable.

In order to analyse and compare policy networks as a dependent variable, this study addresses the theoretical concept of Marsh and Rhodes (1992). It treats policy networks as generic constructs encompassing all types of networks ranging from *policy communities* to *issue networks* as the end points of a continuum. According to their typology of policy networks, a policy community is characterised by a limited number of participants, frequent interaction between all members, consistent values and a balance of power among members. In contrast, issue networks are described as large entities with many actors representing a wide range of interests, maintaining only fluctuating relations with each other.

There exists a long series of policy network analyses. Case studies investigated different policy domains and their networks: U.S. energy (Laumann and Knoke 1987), British agriculture (Smith 1992), German chemical legislation (Schneider 1988), British civil nuclear power (Saward 1992), German telecommunications (Schneider and Werle 1991), British sea defence (Cunningham 1992), British tobacco (Read 1992), Swiss energy (Jegen 2002) - just to name a few. They were all able to identify the existence of policy networks. The concept of policy network has turned out to be a useful tool for understanding policy-making (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 189). Also with regard to foreign policy-making, the network approach has already been applied; Klöti, Serdült, Hirschi et al. (2005, 2000) demonstrated that it is possible to reconstruct foreign policy networks in detail based on case studies.

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[18] Smith (1993: 58) confirms that relationships in policy networks vary from one policy sector to another policy sector.

However, a number of key questions remain unanswered. In particular, it is unclear how and why networks change over time and which interests are dominant in the networks. Moreover, how networks affect policy outcomes has never been convincingly proven (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 188). The present study will neither address nor answer these questions. It only considers the above-mentioned basic and less-disputed theoretical approaches. With adjustment, they become pertinent to the analysis of Russian foreign policy-making.

The described analytical concept is applied as follows: the Russian foreign policy field does indeed correspond to a policy domain according to Knoke and Pappi's approach. It encompasses a diversity of controversial policy matters and numerous claimant groups and public authorities, each seeking to influence decisions (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 9). Also, diverse basic, overlapping and specialized subfields may be identified within Moscow's foreign policy domain: *near abroad,*[19] *far abroad,*[20] *security* and *economy*. In fact, participants of these subfields adopt diverse socially constructed world views. They may be differentiated along the two major cleavages running perpendicularly throughout the Russian foreign policy domain.

First, the near and far abroad spheres in Moscow can still be considered as two separate planets (Pravda 2001: 215). Although 17 years have passed by since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation continues to perceive, to assess and to qualitatively handle the post-Soviet space in a different way than other world regions and states. The character of the relationships between Moscow and CIS-member states can be described as rather emotional, direct, informal, instant, personal and sometimes even irrational. Russia's bi- and multilateral interactions with CIS-members seem to have kept a certain domestic character. In contrast, Moscow's relations to far abroad countries are based on a stable and long-lasting Soviet foreign policy tradition. They could be labelled as rather business-like, diplomatic, formal, planned, institutionalized and rational.

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[19] The term 'near abroad' stands for the former Soviet Republics, who gained independence after the breake-up of the USSR. Except the Baltic's, they are united within the CIS since January 22, 1993.

[20] The notion 'far abroad' describes other world nations or international organisations.

Second, security and economy seem to constitute two poles apart within the political arena (Alexandrova 2001: 464-465). Even if these matters often merge, Moscow seems to treat security and economic-related issues in a different way. As Putin continues to securitize its foreign policies (Lo 2003), economic issues or aspects are ultimately handled as a second priority. With the rising influence of *siloviki* and the weakening position of economic and liberal forces since the year 2000, security-related, strategic and geopolitical deliberations have clearly returned to the top of the Kremlin's agenda.

In light of these cleavages within the Russian foreign policy domain, this study hypothesizes that Russian foreign policy networks significantly vary depending on the involvement of the four subfields: near abroad, far abroad, security and economy. It thereby argues that the often-postulated view of Putin as an unchallenged super-president in foreign policy is overrated. Rather, he plays the role of a mediator between different actors and interests. He is constantly forced to take into account a varying group of actors, depending on the subfields involved. Whereas security-related far abroad issues tend to be addressed by small and homogenous networks with a strong position of the executive authority, the decision-making patterns of economic-related near abroad affairs are large and less centralised. Apparently, the picture that foreign policy decisions in Moscow are undertaken by an established handful of individuals around Putin has to be differentiated.

Methodology

Based on the above-described theoretical concept, four case studies have been selected. Each case study involves two subfields, since the geographical cleavage (near and far abroad) and the sectoral cleavage (security and economy) perpendicularly span the Russian foreign policy domain. In addition to this criterion, the cases fulfil a temporal and a formal requirement: all four cases represent multilateral issues involving one single decision taken during Vladimir Putin's first term between 2000 and 2004:

- Far abroad & Security:
  The establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC, 2001-2002)
- Near abroad & Security:
  The transformation of the Collective Security Treaty into an international organisation (CSTO, 2001-2003)
- Far abroad & Economy:
  The development of the Common European Economic Space (CEES, 2000-2003)
- Near abroad & Economy:
  The formation of the Single Economic Space between Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus (SES, 2000-2004)

Indeed, the selected case studies are neither salient nor prominent at all. They do not represent milestones in Russia's foreign affairs, nor did they bring about major changes with regard to specific issues. The cases have been chosen deliberately as they clearly reflect everyday, and therefore, average decision-making in Moscow.

The case analysis is based on instruments and approaches frequently used in SNA.[21] It proceeds in four steps: initially, the network is delimitated by identifying the most important players involved in decision-making. This selection is carried out with the help of a reputational approach.[22] Thereby, five experts (bureaucrats, scientists, journalists etc.) provide their assessment on the influence of organisational actors.[23] Focussing on organisational, rather than on individual network members is the result of the following deliberations: the making and implementation of foreign policy is fundamentally

[21] These tools are described in detail by Wasserman and Faust (1994).
[22] This procedure has been described in detail by Serdült (2006). See also VonBeyme (2001).
[23] The involved actors are selected from a greater 'population' encompassing all potential players of the Russian foreign policy domain. The basic 'population' can be determined with the help of various manuals and documents. Maximov (2003), for instance, provides a detailed overview of governmental units. Trenin and Lo (2005) assess the influence of various actors.

conceived as 'a group or organisational enterprise' (Yetiv 2004: 13). Individuals participate as agents of formal organisations, since they lack the resources to follow and effectively influence the policy-making process (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 12). In fact, numerous interviews conducted by the author in Moscow have shown that individuals usually cover-up their personal activities and prefer to act on behalf of an official organisation. Conversely, any Russian organisation and its activities depend, to a large extent, on the individual on top of it. This study perceives policy-making as an interplay of organisational units, which serve as formal façades of their leading exponents.

In a second step, network interactions are specified. Another five experts assess the interaction frequency and intensity between the most influential actors. Hence, 10 interviews are required to determine the policy network actors and their ties. In a third step, the network parameters are calculated. These indices are needed in order to classify and compare the networks in accordance with the theoretical model. Finally, the resulting decision-making procedures and structures can be visualised. The SNA software UCINET 6 and its accessory NetDraw support the illustration of networks.

The reconstruction of the four policy networks is performed with the help of 40 standardised interviews (see Appendix II) conducted in Moscow by the author of this study. This quantitative analysis is useful as it provides a detailed snapshot of decision-making structures and procedures between 2000 and 2004. In particular, it allows comparing the four case studies in terms of important data such as number of actors, network density or quantity of resources. However, pure quantitative data does not reveal crucial aspects about foreign policy-making. Namely, concrete case-related activities of network-members, specific relationships or major decision-making events cannot be traced. Therefore, quantitative data is complemented by a qualitative analysis of decision-making patterns. With the help of open source information, the four policy networks are embedded into the larger context of the issues. Moreover, the qualitative investigation contributes to a better understanding of Russian foreign policy-making in general. By tracing the four different decision-making processes, specific features and common characteristics of Moscow's policy-formulation can be highlighted.

In order to collect qualitative data about the case studies, this study's author conducted another 60 non-standardised face-to-face interviews (see Appendix II) in Moscow. At the request of most interviewees, their names are not published in the present study. Nonetheless, the institutional affiliation of the experts and the interview dates are always indicated. In addition to the interviews, the author has carried out a comprehensive study of Russian, English as well as German documents and literature in order to bring together the required information.

State of research

In the field of Russian international relations, foreign policy outcomes have always been soundly analysed and discussed. However, post-Soviet studies have so far – in contrast to academic research between 1960 and 1991 - paid only little attention to the genesis of foreign policy. The question of how policies are generated and developed within the Russian domestic sphere has mostly been avoided after the fall of the USSR. Nonetheless, very limited literature has been produced. Probably the most recent and concise study in this area is 'The Landscape of Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making' by Dmitri Trenin and Bobo Lo (2005). They provide accurate insights on institutions, ideas, interests and external factors.

Although research performed by Russians is scarce in this field, some experts have contributed instructive material. Very precious information can be extracted from the three expert round table discussions about mechanisms in foreign policy decision-making, held in Moscow 2004 (Carnegie 2004, Federation-Council 2004) and 2005 (Carnegie 2005). O. Kryshtanovskaja's study (2005) about the anatomy of the Russian Elite provides an up-to-date and concise overview of the core decision-makers and their environment. Further insights into Putin's political system are provided by L. Shevtsova (2005), A. Mukhin (2002), A. Makarkin (2003), A. Migranjan (2005) and R. Medvedev (2004). A. Degtjarev (2004) covers theoretical aspects of decision-making, whereas E. Tregubova (2003) reveals some entertaining insider stories about activities behind the Kremlin walls.

The larger portion of literature in English has been enriched by Lo, who contributed "Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy" (2003) and "The

Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin" (2003) – two analyses, which inter alia carefully track changes in decision-making over the past few years. Andrew Jack (2004) describes the general ambience "Inside Putin's Russia", whereas Donald Jensen (1998) focuses on Yeltsin's presidency. Jensen argues in "How Russia is ruled – 1998" that Russian decision-making is dependent on the potential costs and benefits of the actors involved. Earlier, N. Malcolm, A. Pravda, R. Allison and M. Light (1996) have contributed an analysis about "Internal factors in Russian Foreign Policy".

In Germany, a small number of experts have dominated the subject: M. Mommsen (2004) describes actors as well as their changing roles and identities, whereas E. Schneider (1998, 2001, 2002) mainly focuses on institutional aspects of decision-making. H. Pleines and H.-H. Schröder (Pleines and Schröder 2003, Schröder 2001) have both conducted numerous studies, usually with regard to the Russian business elite and their impact on policy-making. Earlier, K. Segbers (2001) explained post-Soviet 'patchworks' of actors and institutions.

The quoted existing literature is marked by two shortcomings: firstly, it lacks detailed empirical and comparative studies based on specific cases.[24] So far, the analysis of Russian foreign policy-making has been conducted on a more abstract and superficial level, investigating only the surface of a deep ocean. This metaphor extends beyond the prevailing dark waters. Apparently, it seems to be unrewarding, useless or even dangerous to delve into. Secondly, Russian decision-making has hardly been systematically analysed based on existing political theories and methods. Studies by and large remained descriptive and policy-oriented.

Ambitions and limits of this study

This study aims at filling the above-mentioned gaps by systematically, empirically and comparatively analyzing Russian foreign policy-making, in the light of specific political

[24] VonBeyme (2001) also observes a lack of case studies tracing the genesis of foreign policy decisions. So far, only few case studies are available. See, for instance: Schmedt (1997), Grinevsky (1998), Baev (2005).

theories and with the help of case studies. Above all, it aspires to expand knowledge about foreign policy decision-making in contemporary Russia. The analysis of policy-making structures and processes leads to a better understanding of Moscow's behaviour within the international community, because activities beyond national boundaries are deeply anchored within the domestic sphere. Additional knowledge in this field may also lead to a clearer identification of shortcomings and of the potential measures necessary in order to improve the decision-making mechanisms.

Furthermore, this study seeks to contribute towards an academic discourse that has recently fallen silent. Scarce literature and a general lack of data make the analysis of foreign policy-making under Putin a complex venture. As G. Allison (1971: 184) stated in his ground breaking analysis about U.S. decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis, the use of public documents, newspapers, interviews of experts and participants to piece together the bits of information available is a difficult task. It is additionally complicated by the fact that research activities in this field have become a politically delicate undertaking within Russia. As soon as domestic politics is concerned, the Kremlin reacts decisively to public criticism, be it articulated through media or research. Russian citizens daring to openly disagree with the official opinion may face, at least, serious discomfort.[25] Nevertheless, the assessment of Russian foreign policy-making is a task that cannot be left out or ceded to intelligence agencies.

Finally, by applying theories and methods of SNA, new insights might emerge. The frequent ratings of the most influential politicians in Russia[26] as well as research based on the network idea in theoretical terms[27] may not suffice. Identifying and comparing actors and their interactions with regard to specific foreign policy issues may reveal or confirm general patterns in decision-making.

This study definitely has its limits. There is little hope that the Russian foreign policy black box can be completely cracked. Decision-making processes – especially with

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[25] This opinion has been informally advanced to the author by different Russian researchers (Feb 2006).
[26] Various press products like Vlast, Politicheskii Klass and Nezavisimaja Gazeta regularly publish such ratings.
[27] See, for instance, Pleines (2002), Segbers (2001).

regard to the behaviour of individual actors - ultimately remain enigmatic. The reconstruction of policy networks constitutes an approximation to the real world. Moreover, the analysis will not allow tracing any changes of policy networks over time. Hence, a comparison between Putin's first and second term, or the assessment of today's Kremlin decision-making from a historic perspective is not possible. Apart from that, no answers can be given to the impact of policy networks on policy outcomes, as this correlation has remained disputed and insufficiently discussed in theory. The present study therefore only cursorily touches upon this matter within the framework of the concluding remarks. Last but not least, there is always the flipside of the coin when using theoretical concepts: the analysis runs the risk of being a prisoner of its two-dimensional hypotheses. The real world is far more complex.

Contents

Part I defines the theoretical and methodological framework of this current study. It first focuses on general characteristics of the foreign policy-making process and discusses the usefulness and implications of SNA to analyse Moscow's decisions. Subsequently, the analytic concept, its application on Russian foreign policy-making, hypotheses and the methodological arrangement is outlined.

Part II describes the contextual background. An overview of Russia's foreign policies during Putin's first term is provided in order to allow a more accurate location of the case studies. The four issues – the NRC, the CSTO, the CEES and the SES - have its origins in Russia's jeopardised influence within the post-Soviet space and in considerable institutional changes within the far abroad. Part II also analyses the potential players of the Russian foreign policy domain. In particular, it explains and discusses the positions and roles of presidential, governmental, parliamentary, economic and other actors.

In Part III, the four different case studies and their policy networks are reconstructed and analysed one-by-one. The calculation of network parameters and the visualisation of decision-making procedures and structures constitute the centre pieces of each chapter. Additionally, all four issues and their major events are presented in a qualitative manner to provide the policy-formulation context.

Finally, Part IV aggregates empirical findings and closes the research cycle. First and foremost, hypotheses are verified based on the comparison of network patterns. These results are complemented by a qualitative assessment of Moscow's activities in global affairs. Beside the discussion of the main characteristics of Russian foreign policy-making, great importance is attached to policy-relevant statements. Therefore, concrete consequences for Russian policy-makers as well as for international actors are outlined and explained at the end of Part IV.

Part I. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The present study aims at investigating Russian foreign policy-making with the help of network-related theoretical approaches and methodological tools. This first part sets up the framework for analysis by posing the following question: *on what theoretical, methodological and practical grounds can networks be used to further enhance an understanding of Russian foreign policy-making?*

There exist good reasons to take advantage of existing academic models and proceedings instead of analysing Russian foreign policy-making without theoretical and methodological reference. The fields of IR and PPA offer a wide range of useful concepts that may contribute to new insights. As most of these approaches have emerged from Western traditions in political science, they have rarely been applied to Russian politics. This opens up promising prospects to view the object of investigation from different angles and to gain new insights.

The adoption of a network-oriented perspective creates additional possibilities. It has many advantages over more traditional IR and PPA approaches. As mentioned in the introduction, it allows investigating actors including their interactions from various social spheres and levels. This comprehensive approach ultimately makes it possible to determine, visualise and compare structural and procedural patterns of decision-making networks.

Part I of this study consists of four chapters. The first one defines the foreign policy-making process, its distinctive features and common characteristics with domestic policy-making. The second chapter presents the network perspective more in-depth and explains the independent and dependent variable. Chapter 3 shows the application of the analytical concept to the Russian foreign policy domain. In particular, it introduces the case studies and formulates the hypotheses of this study. Finally, the methodological approach is presented in Chapter 4.

1. The Foreign Policy-Making Process

The first chapter of this study is dedicated to the theoretical aspects of foreign policy-making. Thereby, the term 'foreign policy-making process' will be defined and discussed. Obviously, foreign policy-making cannot be treated as an isolated category. Reference has to be made to public policy-making in general and to domestic policy-making in particular. Therefore, the sections 1.2 and 1.3 will focus on differences and similarities between foreign and domestic policy-formulation. The clear definition of the foreign policy-making process will lay the ground for further theoretical and methodological deliberations.

1.1 Definition

At first glance, it appears to be misleading to refer to *the* foreign policy-making process. It suggests that there exists only one single and unitary process. In fact, foreign policy-making varies in three ways: first, decision-making depends on the nation state, its historic traditions and cultural features. This point is essential for this study because Russian foreign policy-making has its idiosyncrasies and may only partially be compared to other decision-making styles. Second, processes may also differ according to the policies addressed. Actors and patterns of interaction can significantly change depending on geographical or sectoral factors. This study focuses exactly on this variation. As argued in Chapter 3, Russian policy-making differs as Moscow addresses near or far abroad issues, security or economic issues. Third, the foreign policy-making process also varies over time. As a wide range of investigations about the U.S. decision-making processes has shown, every president has his own personal style of management (Mitchell 2005). Different political leaders or simply different political eras have an impact on the making of foreign policy.

For the above-mentioned reasons, it is feasible to regard foreign policy-making as manifold with many highly dynamic processes. Yet, from a theoretical point of view, it is also justified to conceive foreign policy-making as a single construct. It has certain characteristics which remain constant irrespective of nation, policy area or time period. The present study adopts this perspective and identifies common, theoretically less disputed aspects. To begin with, the term foreign policy-making process shall be clarified. Joshua Goldstein (1996: 176) suggests the following definition:

> The Foreign Policy process is the set of procedures and structures that states use to arrive at foreign policy decisions and to implement them.

The key elements of this useful definition are the expressions *procedures* and *structures*. Procedures may encompass a variety of aspects: institutions in the form of written and unwritten laws, rules, norms, behaviour of organisations or individuals, interactions, mechanisms, actions, relations. Briefly, a procedure is a formal or informal order or way of doing things. In contrast, structures describe the way in which something is organised, built or put together. They may be understood as certain systems or patterns containing elements in a specific order. The elements have particular characteristics and attributes, which are essential parts of structures. Even if a structure may change over time, it is conceived as a fixed situation at a given moment. For the purpose of this study, these two cardinal dimensions of the foreign policy-making process provide a useful tool to categorise the main characteristics of decision-making.

Goldstein also conceives foreign policy-making as a *process* and hence a series of actions over time, which ends with a decision and its implementation. Apparently, Goldstein's definition refers to the policy-cycle concept initially elaborated by Harold Lasswell (1956). He distinguishes different stages of the public policy-making process and creates an ideal model of rational decision-making. Brewer (1974) adjusts Lasswell's proposition and suggests six phases of decision-making: initiation, estimation, selection, implementation, evaluation and termination. Even if the concept of the policy-cycle was

repeatedly criticised for being too simplistic, ideal and descriptively invalid,[28] it has, nevertheless, the advantage of providing an analytical framework (Klöti, Serdült, et al. 2000: 39-40, Widmer and Serdült 1999: 22-24). In this study, Russian foreign policy-making is analysed only with regard to the phases of *initiation, estimation* and *selection*. Processual elements like problem framing, agenda setting, formulation of objectives, acquisition of information, elaboration of policy options, comparison and assessment of options as well as the final selection do matter, however the phases of implementation, evaluation and termination are disregarded. Decision-making shall encompass the whole process until the adoption of a framework agreement.

Based on this definition, the main characteristics of foreign policy-making will subsequently be discussed. Thereby, the profile of foreign policy-making can be more clearly drawn and clarified if it is contrasted with the domestic policy-making process. In section 1.2, differences between high and low politics are traced, whereas section 1.3 focuses on similarities and on the convergence of the two fields.

[28] See, for instance, Jann (1998), Schreyögg (1996).

1.2 Distinctive features and demarcation from domestic policy-making

Table 1 outlines differences between foreign and domestic policy-making processes. These opposed particularities collected from a wide range of literature have to be understood as stereotypes. However, in reality, they cannot be consistently confirmed. Rather, they represent tendencies, qualitative poles at both extremes.

	Foreign policy-making	**Domestic policy-making**
Procedure	reactive policy-making	proactive policy-making
	unpredictable policy environment	predictable policy environment
	short time frames available	long time frames available
	interactions not institutionalized	interactions highly institutionalized
	confidential interactions	public interactions
	intense and frequent interactions	fluctuating and occasional interactions
Structure	dominant executive bodies	dominant legislative bodies
	few actors involved	many actors involved
	small range of represented interests/values	broad range of represented interests/values
	Enhanced competition among actors for access to decision-making	Lower competition among actors for access to decision-making
	fluctuating roles and influence of actors	constant roles and influence of actors

Table 1: Stereotypical differences between foreign and domestic policy-making

With regard to *procedures*, foreign policy-making is mostly reactive (Coles 2000: 11). It often responds to events happening outside of national boundaries, whereas domestic policy-making may sometimes actively address not yet urgent problems. Also, unpredictability is more dominant in foreign policy-making than in most other areas of

government (Coles 2000: 11). There are more exogenous variables, which often render foreign policy-making an adventurous guessing. In addition to that, high politics is characterised by relatively short time frames available for a response. As a British senior diplomat put it: "Our difficulty was largely a matter of available time. We had little enough time for policy-thinking itself let alone for considering at any length the criticisms of outsiders" (Coles 2000: 15). In contrast, less serious consequences are to be expected if a domestic policy is delayed, or sometimes even postponed for years. Furthermore, the policy-formulation process is usually less institutionalized in terms of written rules and laws.[29] Often, a few constitutional articles delegate international relations to the state's executive without defining the policy-making process further in detail (Hess 2001).

These characteristics have serious consequences concerning interactions between foreign policy actors. Often, policy-formulation happens by random-like processes or can be heavily dependent on the personality and management capacities of a nation's leader (Mitchell 2005). Hence, domestic policy-making is more institutionalized than its counterpart (Klöti, Serdült, et al. 2000: 18). Also, interactions between foreign policy actors are mostly confidential (Klöti, Serdült, et al. 2000: 16). This may be explained by frequent negotiations on the international level, implicating strict coordination and secrecy. And last but not least, interactions are often intense and frequent in light of the short time frames and required quality of policies. In comparison, domestic policy-making processes might tend to involve more institutionalized, public, fluctuating and occasional interactions.

Differences between foreign and domestic policy-making can also be identified with regard to *structures*. Thereby, policy-making structures are understood as actors' constellations within the political arena. The most striking feature of foreign policy-making is the dominance of executive bodies (Hess 2001, Klöti, Serdült, et al. 2000: 16). Foreign affairs have remained more or less an executive reserve (Keck and Sikkink 1998) with exceptional powers held by the president (Lentner 2006: 173). Non-state and

[29] Gürbey (2005: 364-368) refers to this fact as constitutional defects in decision-making. See also Yetiv (2004: 129-146).

particularly parliamentary actors usually have no substantial influence on foreign policy formulation, since they could endanger international negotiations (Linder 1999: 203-204) or remarkably prolong the decision-making process. This distinctiveness of foreign policy-making stands in stark contrast to domestic politics. The terms 'high' and 'low' politics[30] definitely reflect this fact.

As Table 1 further illustrates, fewer actors are involved in foreign than in domestic policy-making. This assumption is based on previously mentioned deliberations. Even if popular and elite support for the president is highly important (Hess 2001), closed networks seem to define a country's foreign policies (Kevenhörster 2003: 414). Consequently, actors involved in decision-making represent a smaller range of interests and values than within the domestic sector. This again leads to enhanced competition for access to foreign policy-making processes. Actors do have an interest in placing their imprints on the nation's conduct abroad (Yetiv 2004: 247-380). Indeed, political factors are very important in making foreign policy decisions (Mintz 2003: 6). Accordingly, the roles and influence of foreign policy actors fluctuate (Coles 2000: 83).

Given the above-stated differences, it may well be argued that the *foreign and domestic spheres constitute two separate worlds*. Baylis and Smith (2001: 9) for instance point out that globalization is a myth. According to their view, these processes have been existent all through history. Also, it might be stated, that the nation state has not lost its useful functions in terms of jurisdiction, problem solving and democracy. Therefore, domestic politics will and shall continue to play an important and different role than foreign affairs (Wolf 2002). Additionally, the traditional and ongoing gap between high politics and low politics has conceptual reasons. In contradistinction to the domestic field, foreign policy can only be effective if it is unitary, coherent, confidential, flexible and dynamic (Goetschel, Bernath, et al. 2002: 27, Williams 2004: 911). The same holds true for policies that have always played a special and crucial role for nation states: security and defence matters. These issues are usually detached from the domestic arena and located within the foreign policy sphere (Seidelmann 2001: 21). Often enough, security

[30] This distinction is often used to describe the difference between foreign and domestic politics.

and defence policies are treated as integral elements of foreign affairs (Gürbey 2005: 364-368). Therefore, it is assumed that security and defence policy-making accounts to foreign policy-making. However, contrary to all these reasons, it may just as well be argued that *foreign and domestic policy-making have merged* over the past few years. This point of view will be dwelled on in the next subchapter.

1.3 Common characteristics and convergence with domestic policy-making

With good reasons, it might also be assumed that foreign and domestic policy-making have a lot in common and that the two fields have gradually converged over the last decades (Rosenau 1980, 1989, 2000). Every internal issue contains a global dimension and cannot be treated in isolation from the outside world. Synchronically, foreign affairs are progressively more dependant on the domestic political landscape. Citizens have become increasingly aware of international and global issues (Klöti, Hirschi, et al. 2005: 20). They have noticed that foreign policies are significant as an important tool to shape their external environment. Thus, the traditional distinction between domestic and foreign policy-making may also be considered as void (Goetschel, Bernath, et al. 2002, Rosenau 1987).

	Foreign policy-making & Domestic policy-making
Procedure	Management & presentation have become most important
Structure	Actor's involvement expanded on a vertical scale
	Actor's involvement expanded on a horizontal scale

Table 2: Stereotypical similarities between foreign and domestic policy-making

In Table 2, some stereotypical, procedural and structural similarities between foreign and domestic policy-making are listed. It does not claim that the mentioned common characteristics are exhaustive. Definitely, management and presentation have become important in both fields. The scope of governmental responsibility has expanded and the

complexity of public affairs has increased (Campbell, Baskin, et al. 1989: 86). As Coles (2000: 10) puts it with regard to foreign policy, "time spent on management, on presentation, on digesting information, on responding to the day-to-day and often unpredictable demands of government is time lost for policy-thinking, for planning, for the formulation and orderly pursuit of policy objectives." This point has far reaching implications on capacities of various ministries. Another similarity between foreign and domestic policy-making can be unearthed in connection with the composition of decision-making actors. The range of actors involved in policy formulation has expanded in the vertical as well as in the horizontal direction. Vertically, decision-making today involves organisations or individuals from various levels (Smith 1993: 65). With the rise of international organisations and supranational communities, actors range from local political arenas and administrations to international and global actors. This vertical expansion has also been labelled as 'multi-level governance' (Wallace and Wallace 2000: 31-32). On a horizontal scale, policy-making processes nowadays include diverse state and non-state actors and interests (Heclo 1978). The distinction between state and civil society has become blurred (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 4-9). Especially through NGO's, civil society seems to have an enhanced direct influence to political processes. Also, economic actors are more largely represented compared to earlier times (Risse 2002). Thus, the vertical and horizontal expansion of actor's participation has made foreign, as well as domestic, decision-making circles less homogenous. They have therefore also become more complex and supposedly more conflictive.

What kind of intermediary conclusions can be drawn from these theoretical deliberations? Obviously, the differences between foreign and domestic policy-making outweigh the similarities. Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to continue treating high and low politics as two different worlds. Even if they have converged over the last few years, foreign and domestic policy-making processes seem to follow their own specific logics. Evidently, political mechanisms, their traditions and cultures have evolved in two dissimilar spheres over past decades. They seem to persist today and possibly will continue to do so in the future.

This subchapter has traced major characteristics of the foreign policy-making process by contrasting it with domestic policy-formulation. Thereby, differences and

similarities between high and low politics have been described in order to contribute towards achieving two aims: first, by differentiating the two fields, the definition of the foreign policy-making process has become more transparent and clear-cut. It has served as a tool to comprehensively circumscribe foreign policy-making. Second, the delimitation has laid the primary theoretical ground for this study. Subsequently, reference will often be made to dissimilarities and similarities between the two political areas. The next chapter heavily depends on these deliberations as it introduces the analytical concept of this study.

2. Analytical Concept: Policy Domains and Policy Networks

The last chapter has defined and described the foreign policy-making process. It provides the theoretical fundament for this chapter, in which the analytical concept of this study will be elaborated and explained. It has to be stated here, that this chapter will exclusively discuss theoretical aspects. The translation of the analytical concept into a practical framework will only be performed in Chapter 3. It will then be demonstrated how the analytical concept can be applied to Russian foreign policy-making during Putin's first presidential term.

This chapter first outlines the theoretical focus of this study. It explains to what extent and why a social network perspective is useful for the analysis of foreign policy-making. Subsequently, the independent and dependent variables will be introduced. How policy networks depend on policy domain subfields and their characteristics will be pinpointed. Whereas some elements of existing theoretical approaches may be directly integrated into the concept, others will have to be adjusted.

2.1 The network perspective

Motivation to adopt a network perspective

Based on the previous chapter, the theoretical orientation of this analysis will here be laid out and explained. Goldstein's definition of a foreign policy process (see 1.1) has proved to be useful, because it distinguishes between procedural and structural aspects of policy-making. In fact, the two dimensions – procedures and structures - do not only provide a convenient analytical tool. It is of utmost importance to analyse both dimensions in order to fully understand foreign policy-making. Therefore, *the main criterion for the*

theoretical focus of this study is that it simultaneously considers procedures and structures. This restriction a priori excludes traditional institutional approaches[31] understanding decision-making processes in terms of constitution and law or theories. It also rules out rational actor's approaches focusing on individual behaviour and centralised power structures.[32]

Another criterion emerges from previous discussions. As has been noted, the actor's participation in decision-making processes has expanded on a vertical and horizontal scale. Governance today is no longer conceived as an exclusive state matter, but integrates civil society and economy. Hence, *the theoretical orientation needs to take into account societal and economic actors.* This criterion implies that classic state theories like corporatist approaches are not appropriate for this analysis. Rather, the focus has to be shifted to modern governance theories involving societal integration mechanisms (Schneider 2005: 32).

A third criterion takes into account the specific characteristics of foreign policy-making reflected above. It is obvious that policy-making, understood as an interplay between different actors, cannot be analysed on a macro level.[33] *Thus, the theoretical approach has to concentrate on the micro or meso level of analysis.* Macro-analysis like system theories or realist approaches in international relations would not be suitable to investigate decision-making processes.

Given these three criteria, one theoretical focus seems to be especially promising: the network perspective, which conceives public policies as results of web-like human interactions. The term *network perspective* has been deliberately chosen because it has two meanings.[34] In political science, it stands for a variety of theories and methods (Knill 2000, Pappi 1993, Serdült 2002: 127-128). Used in a rather metaphorical manner (Van Waarden 1992: 30), the network view has become popular in contemporary state

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[31] See, for instance, Friedrich (1950) or Schneider (1998)
[32] Von Beyme (2000: 136-150) provides a good overview over different rational choice approaches.
[33] See also Schneider (2005).
[34] Serdült (2002: 127) even identifies a third meaning. Network approaches adopt a constructivist view of social reality.

theories.[35] They qualitatively identify 'nerves of governance' by tracing interactions between different actors. Those are manifold, omni directional and they run through different levels, sectors and units (Von Beyme 2000: 289). Used as a method, social network analysis (SNA) offers various quantitative instruments allowing to empirically reconstruct networks (Scott 2000: 37, Wasserman and Faust 1994). This study is based on specific network-related theories (see Chapter 2) and methodologically takes advantage of instruments developed within the field of SNA (see Chapter 4).

Potential of the network perspective on public policy-making

Numerous research projects have been performed in the past to answer the ever-attracting question of 'who governs'. Whereas decision-making processes have been analysed in different contexts such as corporate governance and associational governance for instance (Schneider 2004) - the focus here shall be turned towards public policy-making. In this specific sector, the network perspective has three major assets.

First, many authors have referred to networks as social structures (Jansen 2003, Knoke 1990, Schneider 1992). However, networks describe social structures in a different way than traditional approaches in sociology did. Social structures are not conceived as a bundle of intuitive natural ideas and concepts about behaviour in social relations among people. Rather, they are understood as social patterns (Brown 1965) including a dynamic component that is simultaneously the result and origin of human action (Burt 1982). The main characteristic of networks is their ability to seize interactions between social units – be it administrational units, organisations, companies, groups, families or individuals. Consequently, networks do not only reflect social structures but also procedures. Actors and their individual choices, relations and behaviours are embedded in a larger context of social structures (Granovetter 1985). Networks encompass the characteristics of the actors involved as well as the interactions between them with regard to a specific issue. The linkage between structures and procedures provides a favourable precondition for the analysis of public policy-making which is unmatched by traditional state theories.

[35] See, for instance, Héritier (1993), Mayntz (1993) and Pleines (2002).

Secondly, the network perspective conceives policy decisions as the result of interactions between numerous and manifold actors (Schneider 2005). It thereby clearly distinguishes itself from two other theoretical strands. On the one hand, it rejects the assumption that public policy is centrally created by a single, monolithic state. On the other hand, the network perspective also discards the view of a multi-actor, bottom-up policy-formation (Kickert, Klijn, et al. 1997). Pluralist approaches seem to neglect the fact that in contemporary policy-making, oligopoly has replaced the competition in the political marketplace (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 201). A network-related view implies that public policy-making includes a wide range of diverse actors from all levels and sectors. In fact, as public and private spheres gradually blur (Wilensky and Turner 1987: 10), new forms of governance arise. Organised societal and economic interests become increasingly represented in public policy-making. As a result, networks become highly heterogeneous actor communities (Heclo 1978).

Thirdly, the network perspective allows the analyses of complex and dynamic structures and processes in detail. Unlike traditional state theories, network approaches trace the interactions of the social units at any desired level. According to the researcher's needs, actors may be individuals, groups, organisations or any other social entity. Due to this flexibility, network approaches have become highly popular among political scientists (Von Beyme 2000). Particularly with regard to public policy-making, network perspectives have helped to reconstruct decisions and their genesis at a micro level. Thereby, the term policy network has become a popular construct to describe "(more or less) stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes." (Kickert, Klijn, et al. 1997: 6). During the past two decades, a remarkable number of studies have quantitatively identified and reconstructed policy networks from specific national policy areas:[36] in the U.S., the two sectors energy and health have been compared (Laumann and Knoke 1987), whereas in Germany, decision-making networks in the areas of chemical legislation (Schneider 1988), videotext introduction (Schneider 1989) and telecommunication reform

[36] Schneider (2005) provides a nice overview of policy-making network analysis.

(Schneider and Werle 1991) have been revealed. Intersectoral comparisons have identified network differences with regard to US agriculture, energy, health and labour (Heinz 1993), British agriculture (Smith 1992), civil nuclear power (Saward 1992), sea defence (Cunningham 1992), tobacco (Read 1992) and more. Also within the field of foreign policy-making, the network approach has already been applied. Klöti, Serdült, Hirschi et al. (2005, 2000) demonstrated that it is possible to reconstruct foreign policy networks in detail based on case studies.

Shortcomings of the network perspective

The adoption of a network perspective also has its disadvantages. Primarily, network approaches are derived from quantitative methods originally founded in sociometry.[37] Therefore, the pure network view provides essentially no more than a metaphorical picture of social reality. Whereas a theory usually explains a relationship between two variables, the genuine network view rather delivers a tool to describe and formalize specific circumstances. Network concepts alone basically operate in a vacuum. Hence, if networks are used as either a dependent or an independent variable, network approaches have to be theoretically embedded and used in conjunction with social theories (Jegen 2002: 17-25, Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 202, Serdült 2002: 130).

Another problem is that policy change can hardly be described and explained by network concepts. In fact, most scholars compare networks across different sectors and consider policy networks as a source of policy inertia, not innovation (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 196). There exists a general lack of investigations following dynamic changes within networks over time.[38]

An additional weakness of network approaches investigating public policy-making is particularly unsatisfactory. It seems as if any scholar so far has been able to convincingly prove and thoroughly explain the effects of policy networks on policy-outcomes. Findings that policy networks foster incremental outcomes and reinforce the

[37] Moreno (1953) has further developed basic deliberations of Simmel.
[38] One of the rare studies in this respect has been provided by Doreian and Stokman (1997).

status-quo (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 197-198) have for the most part remained on the surface. The question about how patterns and shapes of networks may translate into policy outcomes has ultimately remained unanswered.[39]

Nevertheless, the network perspective seems to be the most suitable for the purpose of this study. The next subchapter introduces the analytical concept that shall be applied in order to examine Russian foreign policy-making.

[39] See also Smith (1993: 77).

2.2 Independent variable: policy domain subfields and specialized audiences

As stated in Chapter 1, the foreign policy making process has become gradually more dynamic and complex. Accordingly, policies tend to be made within increasingly fragmented and specialized arenas with a limited number of participants (Campbell, Baskin, et al. 1989). It seems as if in reality, different group or government relationships exist depending on the policy arena (Smith 1993: 76). These developments have led to the creation of the notion of a *subgovernment* in the United States (Ripley and Franklin 1980). It was assumed that most decisions on non-controversial issues are made within small groups, that are "clusters of individuals that make decisions in a given substantive area of policy" (Ripley and Franklin 1980: 8). British scholars preferred the expression *policy communities* (Jordan and Richardson 1987, Richardson and Jordan 1979). According to their view, policy is made between a myriad of interconnecting and interpenetrating organisations.

On the basis of these concepts, Laumann and Knoke apply the term *policy domain*. It is defined as a complex social organisation "identified by a substantively defined criterion of mutual relevance or common orientation among a set of consequential actors concerned with formulating, advocating, and selecting courses of action (i.e. policy options) that are intended to resolve the delimited substantive problems in question" (Knoke and Laumann 1982: 256). In short, a policy domain is "a set of actors with major concerns, whose preferences and actions on policy events must be taken into account by other domain participants" (Laumann and Knoke 1987: 10).

This study's analytical concept adopted and adjusted a theoretical framework that further clarified the policy domain concept:[40] Knoke and Pappi (1996) proclaimed that every complex industrial society gives rise to numerous and relatively autonomous policy domains "…organised around some central substantive concerns or set of societal

[40] Knoke, Pappi, et al. (1996) comprehensively analysed and compared the labour policy domains in the US, Germany and Japan.

problems and their proposed solutions, with which the domain's participants must deal on a continuing basis" (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 9). A policy domain's boundaries are not synonymous with formal state ministries. Rather, "all domain boundaries are more or less fuzzy and porous, allowing various participants, problems, and policy proposals to enter and leave in disorderly fashion" (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 10). According to Knoke and Pappi, a policy domain consists of four components: policy actors, policy interests, power relations and collective actions.

Policy actors

Policy actors constitute the first component of a policy domain (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 11-13). Similarly to previous studies (Laumann, Heinz, et al. 1991, Laumann and Knoke 1987), Knoke and Pappi focus on public and private organisations and not on individual persons. They believe that only organisations can mobilise sufficient resources to follow and influence the policy-making process. Individuals are considered to be agents of formal organisations such as interest groups, peak associations or government institutions. Knoke and Pappi also stress that only influential organisations shall be taken into account, as "perhaps thousands of organisations express some interest in a given domain's policy outcomes, but far fewer make discernable impacts" (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 13).

This study shares Knoke and Pappi's conceptual deliberations. The making and execution of foreign policy is fundamentally conceived as "a group or organisational enterprise" (Yetiv 2004: 13). As will be shown in Chapter 3, these theoretical thoughts stand in line with circumstances within the Russian foreign policy arena.

Policy interests

As a second component of a policy domain, Knoke and Pappi analyse policy interests as nested sets at three levels: subfield, issue and event (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 13-17). According to their view, any domain affaire is surrounded by a specialized audience (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 83):

> Constrained by narrow mandates and limited resources, most organisations cannot afford to devote extensive attention to many concerns at one time. Consequently, the spatial arrangement of labour policy subfields and issues should resemble donuts – rim or circle structures with hollow centres – indicating that most domain affairs attract the interest of specialized audiences. Each segment along the circumference consists of topics closely resembling one another in the kinds of organisations that express passion or indifference about them.

Every policy domain may contain several *subfields*. There are actors concentrating on one subfield according to cost-benefit calculations or their ideological orientation. But actors may also be specialized in two or more specific subfields and have an interest in others. Therefore, subfield boundaries are permeable, overlapping and changing over time. It is not easy to clearly identify subfields. A policy domain may show up one or more cleavages with regard to technology, economy, geography, population, history or other factors.

On a lower level, every subfield again contains several *issues*. An issue can be defined as a "set of substantive matters that attract the attention of some domain actors" (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 14). Issues are framed and followed by interested domain/subfield actors in a highly dynamic process (Kingdon 1995). Issues may be linked with each other, brought to the attention of other actors, addressed by formulating concrete policy proposals, delayed or even deleted on the agenda.

Finally, the domain subfield actors, engaged in an issue, may have an interest in specific *events*. An event is a "critical, temporally located decision point in a collective decision-making sequence that must occur in order for a policy option to be finally selected" (Laumann and Knoke 1987: 251). An event can be of a judicial, executive or legislative nature or may also be classified according to the policy-cycle scheme (Lasswell 1956). Events can take the form of crises or disasters and attract the complete and immediate actor's attention (Kingdon 1995).

It is noteworthy that the actors may be tentatively interested in a specific subfield, issue or event. Therefore, such communities or networks feature a core and a periphery (Smith 1993: 81):

> A policy community tends to have a core and periphery (Laumann and Knoke 1987) or, in other words, a primary and secondary community. The primary core contains the key actors who set the rules of the game, determine membership and the main policy direction of the community.

This study will fully apply Knoke and Pappi's policy interest concept as recapitulated and visualised in Figure 1. Subfields, issues and events attract a specialized audience, which leads to variations in policy networks. This argumentation stands in line with Theodor Lowi's (1972) proposition. He observed that policies determine politics by distinguishing distributive, redistributive and regulative policies. Depending on these categories, he characterised political processes as consensual, conflictive or as marked by changing coalitions (Lowi 1972: 299). For these reasons, this study treats policy networks as a dependent variable.[41] It assumes that even in the small and restricted world of foreign policy-making, policy networks vary depending on the specialized subfield actors. Chapter 3 will explain how this relationship suits Russian foreign policy-making. It prepares the ground for the main hypotheses (see 3.3).



Figure 1: Subfields, issues and events

[41] See also Jegen (2002).

Power relations

The third component of a policy domain concerns power relations. According to Knoke and Pappi (1996: 17-19), it is a critical objective to observe power relations in a policy domain. For them, information (scientific, legal, political or other knowledge) and resources (money, labour power, facilities and more) are the most important factors for organisational actors to successfully participate in policy-making processes. In order to exercise power, actors are required to interact within networks of exchange relations (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 18).

> The emergence of stable exchange networks in a policy domain reflects the differing capacities of actors to gain access to resources essential for participating in and shaping policy decisions. […] Access to resources and their exchange confer unequal positional advantages, which can be represented as the actors' locations either near the centres or on the peripheries of resource networks' social space.

For this present study, power relations are of utmost importance. Based on Knoke and Pappi's concept, that focuses on exchange networks of information and resources. However, it does not treat these factors as two separate networks. Rather it assesses the intensity of the relationship between organisational actors in terms of information and resources within one network.

Collective actions

As a fourth component, Knoke and Pappi define collective action as "three or more organisations working together in an effort to obtain their preferred policy event outcome" (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 20). Thereby, they distinguish three different types of collective action: mobilisation, publicity and lobbing. Furthermore, they focus on coalition building by identifying jointly occupied positions within networks. Whereas an *issue public* consists of all organisations expressing similar interest in all policy domain issues, an *event public* expresses interest only in a specific event. Even more rigorous are *advocacy circles*, which are represented by three or more formal organisations closely cooperating in order to achieve certain policy event outcomes. The most stringent

coalitions are *action sets* consisting of advocacy circle members consciously working together.

As this study treats a rather sensitive topic, it only partially takes into account collective actions. The types of collective action will not be traced, as particularly mobilisation and lobbying processes in foreign policy-making are highly difficult to uncover. Also, Knoke and Pappi's categories of jointly occupied positions cannot be applied in full. Three of four nested positions are defined in relation to events (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 21-22). This study, however, focuses on issues (see 3.2) that stretch over a longer period of time. It treats events as single and short happenings that have a certain impact on the final policy-decision. Therefore, coalitions within networks will be considered as a result of actor communities interested in subfields, which may take the form of Knoke and Pappi's issue publics. Even if tighter coalitions cannot be excluded, this study considers collective action only at the level of issue publics (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 21):

> […] an issue public is very likely to encompass many organisations that take opposing sides on specific policy proposals relevant to the issues in which they are interested. Hence an issue public resembles a 'social circle', whose members also share a common orientation toward some substantive matter without necessarily agreeing about what is to be done.

2.3 Dependent variable: policy networks and their characteristics

In the previous subchapter, the independent variable has been described. It has been stated that subfields, issues and events attract a different community of actors, which may lead to variations of policy networks within one and the same policy domain. In this subchapter, the dependent variable – the shape of policy-networks - shall be portrayed in-depth. It is specified to what extent and how policy networks may change.

In the past, policy networks have been characterised and categorised in various ways. The advantage of these classifications is that they may be used as a diagnostic tool to compare different policy areas or countries. Particularly, four concepts have influenced research in this field. Rhodes (1986) suggests five types of networks ranging from stable and stringent policy communities to loose issue networks.[42] However, Rhodes characterisation is not detailed enough. Wilks and Wright (1987) offer an alternative concept, which distinguishes three different levels: policy universe, policy community and policy network sector. But unfortunately, their terminology is pre-empted (Jordan 1990: 335). A third typology of policy networks is provided by Van Waarden (1992) who describes not less than eleven different types. The problem of his concept is that it is too sophisticated. In contrast, Rhodes and Marsh (1992) developed a pragmatic and flexible solution. They formulated four network dimensions and defined coherent policy communities and loose issue networks as end points of a continuum. Rhodes and Marsh's typology is the result of extensive UK fieldwork and allows the comparison of policy areas (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 186).

For the following reasons, the present study will rely on Rhodes and Marsh's model: first, it is a simple, sufficiently concise and flexible model, which plays a useful diagnostic role. For the purpose of the present study it can be easily adjusted to analyse Russian foreign policy-making. Second, the model has been used for a wide range of case studies

[42] The issue network concept has been created originally by Heclo (1978).

in the fields of agriculture, civil nuclear power, youth employment, smoking, heart disease and health services, sea defences information technology and exchange rate policy (Marsh and Rhodes 1992). Hence, it seems to be a reliable and established concept for practical use. Subsequently, Rhodes and Marsh's concept shall be outlined in more detail.

Rhodes and Marsh distinguish four different network dimensions: membership, integration, resources and power (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 186-188). These dimensions and their subcategories (see Table 3) allow a comprehensive characterisation of any policy network. It is important to note that the authors conceive a policy network as a generic term encompassing all types of networks. Based on this set-up, Rhodes and Marsh identify and describe two policy networks as opposite end points of a continuum. Whereas a *policy community* is viewed as a small and stable network with a limited number of participants and with some groups consciously excluded, *issue networks* are large, instable and marked by a large number of actors representing a wide range of interests and fluctuating contacts (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 187).

Dimension	Policy community	Issue networks
1. Membership		
a) Number of participants	Very limited number, some groups consciously excluded	Large
b) Type of interest	Economic and/or professional interests dominate	Encompasses range of affected interests
2. Integration		
a) Frequency of interaction	Frequent, high-quality, interaction of all groups on all matters related to policy issue	Contacts fluctuates in frequency and intensity
b) Continuity	Membership, values and outcomes persistent over time	Access fluctuates significantly
c) Consensus	All participants share basic values and accept the legitimacy of the outcome	A measure of agreement exists but conflict is never present
3. Resources		
a) Distribution of resources (within network)	All participants have resources, basic relationship is an exchange relationship	Some participants may have resources, but they are limited and basic relationship is consultative

Dimension	Policy community	Issue networks
b) Distribution of resources (within participating organisations)	Hierarchical, leaders can deliver members	Varied and variable distribution and capacity to regulate members
4. Power		
	There is a balance of power between members. Although one group may dominate, it must be a positive sum game	Unequal powers, reflects unequal resources and unequal access. It is a zero-sum game

Table 3: Dimensions and types of policy networks according to Rhodes and Marsh

Rhodes and Marsh stress the diagnostic role of their typology (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 187). In practice, most policy networks might be located somewhere between these two poles. Additionally and inevitably, no policy area will conform exactly to either list of characteristics. Therefore, Rhodes and Marsh's typology will subsequently be adjusted for the purpose of the present study.

Rhodes and Marsh's continuum from policy communities to issue networks is striking, because it unconsciously and subtly reproduces differences between foreign and domestic policy-making structures and processes specified in Chapter 1. It stands out that characteristics of policy communities theoretically reflect foreign policy-making, whereas features of issue networks may be found within the domestic arena. Clearly, both comparisons are stereotypical, purely diagnostic and extreme. Nevertheless, they may be helpful to analyse and categorise policy networks in the field of foreign policy-making.

In Table 4, aspects of the foreign and domestic policy-making comparison[43] are merged with Rhodes and Marsh's model. Policy communities adjusted to foreign policy networks are opposed to modified issue or domestic policy networks. With regard to membership, a small number of executive authority interests dominate in policy communities, whereas issue networks encompass a wide range of interests. Concerning integration, the subdimension 'continuity' has been removed, as memberships, values and outcomes cannot be observed over time (see 2.1). In contrast, the subdimensions 'centralisation' and 'executive authority's position' add two important aspects to Rhodes

[43] Compare with Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3.

and Marsh's model. Whereas policy communities are highly centralised around executive authorities, issue networks are considered as remote.

The resource dimension can only be analysed with regard to the network, while the intra-organisational distribution of resources has to be ignored. However, a distinction is made between the quantity and the distribution of resources. These aspects have to be analysed separately. The same holds true for the power dimension.

Dimension	**Policy community (foreign policy network)**	**Issue networks (domestic policy network)**
1. Membership		
a) Number of participants	Very limited number, some actors consciously excluded	Large
b) Number of interests	Small range of interests	Encompasses wide range of affected interests
b) Type of interest	Executive authority interests dominate	Economic and legislative and other bodies are involved
2. Integration		
a) Frequency of interaction (information and resources)	Frequent, high-quality, interaction of all actors on all matters related to policy issue	Rather low, contacts fluctuates in frequency and intensity
b) Centralisation	High	Low
c) Executive authority's position	Central position of executive authority	Non-central position of executive authority
3. Resources		
a) Quantity of information (scientific, legal, political or other knowledge) and resources (money, labour power, facilities and more) within network	Generally high	Generally limited
b) Distribution of information (scientific, legal, political or other knowledge) and resources (money, labour power, facilities and more) within network	Information and resources among participants are more or less evenly distributed	Information and resources are unequally distributed
4. Power		
a) Quantity of power within network	Generally high	Generally limited
b) Distribution of power within network	There is a balance of power between members, even if some actors may dominate the network.	Unequal powers, reflects unequal access

Table 4: Adjusted dimensions of policy networks

This subchapter described and modified Rhodes and Marsh's typology of policy networks. The adjusted model outlined in Table 4 is very essential, because it allows at a later stage to formulate hypotheses (see 3.3) and to operationalise them (Chapter 4). Yet, before that, it has to be explained how the analytical concept developed here can be applied to Russian foreign policy-making. This will be done within the next chapter.

3. Applying the Concept: The Russian Foreign Policy Domain

In Chapter 2, the analytical concept of this study was laid out. Based on Knoke and Pappi's policy domain model, organisational actors, policy interests, power relations and collective actions have been introduced and partially modified. Also, Rhodes and Marsh's typology of policy network was introduced and adjusted in order to provide a clear concept for the analysis of foreign policy-making.

In this chapter, it shall be explained how the developed concept may be applied to Russian foreign policy-making. The first part presents the Russian foreign policy domain and its subfields. Subsequently, the case studies will be introduced before the hypotheses are formulated in the last part.

3.1 The Russian foreign policy domain and its subfields

In the Russian Federation, relatively few people are interested in foreign policy. And even fewer people are involved in foreign policy-making. As a relatively closed system, the Russian arena of foreign affairs may be considered as a policy domain according to Knoke and Pappi's definition.[44] Even if the domain boundaries are not synonymous with formal state ministries (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 10), Russian foreign affairs are clearly separated from any other public policy field and decision-making obviously attracts relatively fixed circles of actors, be it within the Kremlin, in the White House, in the federal assembly, in economic or societal spheres.

Following Knoke and Pappi's model, this study considers Russian foreign policy domain actors to be organisations, not individuals. Certainly, this crucial and highly sensitive assumption needs a more thorough discussion. In fact, as numerous interviews in

[44] See section 2.2.

Moscow have shown, the role of institutions and individuals in decision-making is disputable. On the one hand, many experts believe that policy formulation – and foreign policy formulation in particular - is predominantly a matter of personal relations. They argue that political fights, interactions and coalition building between individual elite members are deeply rooted in Russian culture.[45] Consequently, the influence of an organisation mostly depends on the individual on top of it.[46] The Foreign Ministry, for instance, had more institutional weight under Evgenij Primakov (1996-1998) than under Igor Ivanov (2000-2004) or Sergej Lavrov (2004-present).[47] Another indicator for personalised decision-making is the transfer of policy responsibilities irrespective of the functional position. For example, the former chief of staff Dmitri Medvedev – the President's main advisor with regard to Ukrainian matters – kept this role when he was assigned to the post as vice-Premier, which usually implies more domestic oriented tasks.[48] In sum, the individual perspective pronounces the influence of character, personage and mood of distinct human beings.

On the other hand, many observers conceive policy-making in Moscow as an interplay between various organisations. Decision-making processes mainly involve institutions, which constrain, streamline and direct the behaviour of the involved individual actors. Also, individuals usually cover their personal role behind official fronts and act on behalf of an official organisation.[49] This strand of argumentation would rather justify the focus on organisational actors. In reality, the truth lies probably somewhere in between the two poles. Organisations and individuals both matter and vary from case to case. Whereas some issues are strongly influenced by a few personal relationships, other issues have a more institutional touch.[50] Sometimes, actors hide themselves behind institutional walls and sometimes official bodies are not organised properly, which

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45 See, for instance, Steen (2003), who has analysed Russian decision-making cultures.
46 Representatively: Expert interview, PIR-Center, Moscow: 22.04.2005.
47 Expert interview, The Moscow Times, Moscow: 29.04.2005.
48 Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 29.03.2005.
49 Representatively, Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 04.07.2005.
50 Expert interview, independent analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005.

enhances the role of individuals.[51] Therefore, it may be assumed that institutional and individual action is more or less balanced.

In addition to these interpretations, practical deliberations have to be taken into account before deciding about this essential theoretical aspect. Individual action in particular is highly difficult to trace within the framework of empirical research. Especially in Russia, personal relationships are secretive and hardly perceivable for the public. Also, personal interactions would be too complex to reconstruct for research purposes. The irrational, emotional and volatile nature of personal liaisons would render an implementation of the above-mentioned analytical framework nearly impossible. For all these reasons, this study adopts an institutional perspective and considers organisations only as foreign policy actors.

After having clarified this important question, the attention shall now be drawn to the Russian foreign policy domain as such. As Knoke and Pappi stated, it is not easy to specify the policy domain and its subfields (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 14). However, with regard to the Russian foreign policy domain, two cleavages are clearly visible: the first one divides the domain on the basis of a *geopolitical factor*, whereas the second trench separates the Russian foreign policy domain in terms of a *sectoral factor*.

With regard to the geopolitical divide, Russian near and far abroad problems may be distinguished. The term 'near abroad' stands for the former Soviet Republics, who gained independence after the brake-up of the USSR. Except for the Baltics, they are united within the CIS since January 22, 1993. In contrast, the notion 'far abroad' describes other world nations or international organisations. The divide is insofar geopolitical as it in fact describes not the geographical, but the political distance to Russia. For instance, whereas Turkmenistan, which has no common boundaries with the Russian Federation, is considered a near abroad state, Finland – a neighbouring country – belongs to the far abroad (Alexandrova 2001: 457).

[51] Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 04.07.2005.

Concerning the sectoral divide, world politics from an accentuated Russian perspective is divided into security and economic matters. Subsequently, it shall be explained in more detail to what extent the Russian foreign policy domain can be considered as containing four different subfields.

The geopolitical divide: near- and far-abroad

The Russian Federation perceives, assesses and handles near- and far abroad issues qualitatively in a different way. As an example, the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict in January 2006 illustrates the rather *emotional, direct, informal, instant, personal and sometimes even irrational character of relationships between Moscow and CIS-member states*. As the Soviet Union imploded, domestic ties between Moscow and its federal periphery transformed literally over night into foreign relations among sovereign and soon emancipated states. However, Russia's bi- and multilateral interactions with CIS-members like Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia – to name Moscow's most important partners – seem to have kept a certain domestic character. This may be explained by political, economic and social interdependencies, geographical and cultural closeness as well as common historic experiences.

In contrast, Moscow's relations to far abroad countries are based on a stable and long-lasting Soviet foreign policy tradition. They could be labelled as rather *business-like, diplomatic, formal, planned, institutionalized and rational.* This divide between near and far abroad is reflected in Russia's current foreign policy concept (Rossiiskaja-Federatsija 2000) approved by President V. Putin on June 28, 2000. Part IV prominently covers CIS matters and attaches top regional priority to its former republics. It rationally defines objectives and means in order to integrate the CIS-space on a multilateral basis or in order to develop mutually beneficial bilateral relations. As Alex Pravda (2001: 215) stated, "in the near abroad Moscow has clearer foreign policy interests and hegemonic ambitions which it typically pursues proactively even where hampered by major resource constraints. Further afar Russia's aims are more ambivalent, its capabilities more limited and its policies more reactive."

The sectoral divide: security and economy

For various reasons, a security-economy cleavage spans the Russian foreign policy domain. Under Boris Yeltsin, the political elite were by and large dominated by oligarchs and a wider business community (Mommsen 2004, Shevtsova 2005). However, since the presidency has been handed over to Vladimir Putin, a gradual rise of *siloviki* has changed the balance of power behind the Kremlin walls. As an illustration, in 2002, 26,6% of Putin's crew had a military background compared to 6,7% in 1993 (Kryshtanovskaja 2005: 269). Increasingly, sectors of strategic importance[52] have been used as a tool of Russian foreign policy and security-related deliberations have returned on the top of the Kremlin's agenda.

However, despite the securitization of Moscow's foreign policy (Lo 2003), a liberal economic bloc has kept an influence on policy-making processes (Feifer 2002). Contrary to Kryshtanovskaja and White (2005), Sharon and David Rivera (2006) even argued that between 1993 and 2002, business representation within the political elite arose more rapidly than the security establishment. Whichever interpretation applies, a security-economy front is clearly discernible within Putin's court. Even if boundaries between economic and political spheres in Moscow are often blurred, two different communities continue to worry about two often diametrically opposed objectives: the warranty of reliable security and the creation of a steady economic development.[53]

Characterisation of the four policy domain subfields

Obviously, the four above-described subfields and their interested communities are not similar to each other. But, to what extents do near and far abroad, security and economic-related circles vary? In order to answer this question, the network dimensions of Rhodes and Marsh's (1992) network typology (see 2.3) shall be used in a broader sense. Although the two authors establish the dimensions in order to describe policy networks, their criteria

[52] The Kremlin has introduced a list of *strategic enterprises and strategic joint stock companies* by order of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1009 of August 4, 2004.

[53] See part I of Russia's current foreign policy concept: Rossiiskaja-Federatsija (2000).

provide a good analytical tool to characterise interested communities as quasi-networks. Subsequently, each subfield will in turn be qualified by referring to Table 4 in subchapter 2.3. Thereby, it has to be stressed that the stereotypical characterisation of these subfield communities corresponds to the analytical concept. The generic and pure coloration of a subfield does by no means exclude exceptions and deflections.

It has to be assumed that the *far abroad subfield* is relatively small in size. Proportionately, only few actors in Moscow worry about far abroad issues, since these problems simply do not matter that much in a country stretching over two continents and not less than eleven time zones. Indeed, Russia's relations with China, the US or the Middle East – to name a few – are highly important. Nevertheless, only a small number of specialized actors have the interest and competence to follow or even influence these matters.[54] The far abroad players are very well accustomed to Western or Asian culture, they fluently speak English or other world languages and have a rather liberal and open minded attitude. Consequently, the far abroad subfield seems to consist of a small, consistent and chosen community, which crystallizes around executive authorities. Information and resources seem to be more or less equally distributed among organisations interested in fanciful far abroad issues and events.

In stark contrast, the *near abroad subfield* is vast, heterogeneous, complex and loose. Communities specialized, for instance, in relations to Central Asian or Caucasian states are deeply rooted in Russian culture. They stereotypically continue to consider other CIS states as peripheral and somewhat committed to obedience. These circles usually do not speak foreign languages and their resources are often scarce and unequally distributed. As near abroad issues and events often involve an emotional component, interactions between subfield members fluctuate in frequency and intensity.

With regard to the sectoral divide, the picture looks similar, even if the constellation is completely different. The *security subfield* seems to be comparatively small in size, as the understanding of external security requires a specific background as well as skills and special knowledge. Usually, actors interested in foreign security issues and events have

[54] Informal statement by expert, Carnegie Moscow Center, 1.2.06.

kept a great power mindset. Their worldview is dominated by the wish to restore Russia's global power that it was able to exert during the Soviet past.[55] The typical national security establishment member would not ignore any possibility to enhance Moscow's position abroad, irrespective of political mid or long-term cost and benefit considerations. Accordingly, these tight circles of actors frequently interact and gather around executive authorities.

In contrast, the *economic subfield* seems to be huge, manifold and uncoordinated. The state, business corporations and crime groups are closely entangled (Orttung 2006: 41) having a significant impact on Moscow's foreign relations (Wenger, Perovic, et al. 2006). Some actors may be driven by a liberal interest to integrate Russia as quick and smooth as possible into global economic institutions. Others may just seek rear cover of the state for their predatory business activities abroad. Contacts among economic subfield members are rare and unsteady. Typically, interests, information and resources are dispersed and unevenly distributed.

To what extent is it appropriate to consider these four subfields as independent variable? The answer to this question has a theoretical and a practical component. Theoretically, the domain of international affairs is simply too large and complex to be handled by one community only. Multi-faceted world politics requires a wide range of actors with special knowledge (Risse 2002: 263-264). This leads inevitably to nested sub-communities within the domain (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 13-17).

Practically, the distinction in near and far abroad, security and economy subfields makes sense, because it is reflected within the Russian society. From a public perspective, issues and events within the post-Soviet space matter much more than politics farther abroad. While newspapers are full of stories about Ukraine, Kazakhstan or Belarus, comparatively few articles cover Russian-related developments in Western Europe or Japan. Also, a clear parting line between security and economy runs through the Russian

[55] See, for instance, the statements made by Oleg Morozov (Chair United Russia), who advocates a historic Russian revenge after Russia has disintegrated in 1991. ("Ruling elites in search of an ideology", Kommersant 01.08.2006).

public. Whereas military might, power and brute force have always been well known categories for Russian citizens, economic liberalization, foreign investment, financial markets or trade facilitation are unfamiliar and external terms. Despite widespread growing economic competence, the cleavage remains up to date.

Evidently, as the cleavages perpendicularly span the Russian foreign policy domain, the four subfields overlap. Moreover, it is essential to stress that subfields do not have clear-cut boundaries. They are fuzzy, porous and even conflating on some specific locations. Figure 2 illustrates the overlapping subfields and depicts the comparatively smaller and tighter far abroad and security communities.



Figure 2: Russian foreign policy domain subfields

So far, it has been discussed how the policy domain and subfield concept corresponds to Russian reality. In the next subchapter, the focus will be shifted to the issues and events. Thereby, the case studies will be introduced and explained.

3.2 Issues and Events: selection of case studies

As mentioned earlier, the two subfields boundaries perpendicularly divide the Russian foreign policy domain. Therefore, the four subfields - far abroad, near abroad, security and economy – overlap to a high degree. This study concentrates on four issues and treats them as policy network case studies. As stated in Chapter 2, an *issue* is defined as a 'broadly characterised set of substantive matters that attract the attention of some domain actors' (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 14). Subsequently, the criteria for the selection of the issues shall be specified.

The selection of the cases is based on three criteria: First, each issue shall lie within the *sphere of influence of a geographical as well as a sectoral subfield*. Hence, each case study shall be located at the intersection of two different subfields. This criterion will allow policy network cross-comparisons between near and far abroad issues as well as between security and economic issues. Second, all four cases shall represent decisions taken during President Vladimir *Putin's first term* between 2000 and 2004. This temporal delimitation renders policy networks comparable. Third, all case studies are *multilateral foreign policy decisions*. Either bilateral issues or a mix between bi- and multilateral cases would significantly reduce comparability. The next section will present the selected issues one-by-one.

The establishment of the NATO-Russia council (NRC, 2001-2002)

As Figure 3 shows, this issue is located at the intersection of the far abroad and security subfield. The establishment of the NATO-Russia council started on September 11th 2001, as Vladimir Putin immediately manifested solidarity with the U.S. These events were a major impetus for NATO-members to integrate Russia on a larger scale within northern-atlantic security structures. The NRC was established on May 28th, 2002 in Rome and replaced the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), which has provided the framework for cooperation between Russia and NATO since 1997.



Figure 3: NATO-Russia Council (NRC) subfields

The transformation of the Collective Security Treaty into an international organisation (CSTO, 2001-2003)

This issue is located within the spheres of the near abroad and security subfield as displayed in Figure 4. It has its roots in 1992, when the Collective Security treaty (CST) was signed between Russia and 8 CIS-member states. However, the decision to transform this treaty into an international organisation was taken only on May 14th, 2002, as U.S. troops gained grounds in Central Asia and in the Caucasus in order to fight terrorism and to support operations in Afghanistan and Irak. Subsequently, the constitutional documents were negotiated between Russia, Kyrgisia, Tadjikistan, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Belarus and entered into force on September 18th, 2003.



Figure 4: Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) subfields

The development of the Common European Economic Space (CEES, 2000-2003)

Last but not least, this issue involves the far abroad and economic subfields as illustrated in Figure 5. It encompasses the decision to establish a common economic space between Russia and the EU. Brussels' gradual eastern enlargement enhanced the necessity for a closer cooperation with the Russian Federation. It was therefore decided on May 17th, 2001 to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), that has existed since 1994, with a new framework of collaboration. After a long drawn-out negotiation process, the two sides agreed on November 6th, 2003 on four areas of closer cooperation: Trade and economy (blueprint of CEES), internal security, external security (EUROPOL) as well as joint scientific research and education.



Figure 5: Common European Economic Space (CEES) subfields

The formation of the Single Economic Space between Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus (SES, 2000-2004)

This foreign policy-making process involves the near abroad and economy subfield as depicted in Figure 6. It stands in line with other Russian efforts to economically integrate the post-Soviet space. The Presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus decided on the creation of the Single Economic Space, on February 23rd, 2003. As a complementary project to the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the SES's goal was, in particular, to involve Ukraine. Although talks between the four biggest economies within the soviet-space have not yet concluded, the basic documents entered into force on May 20th, 2004.



Figure 6: Single Economic Space (SES) subfields

Indeed, the four selected case studies are not very spectacular. They didn't have a major impact on Russia's foreign affairs or on public opinion. Also, the four issues did not fundamentally change any relationship between Russia and its near or far abroad. Nevertheless - or precisely therefore - they represent attractive cases. They are chosen deliberately, because they reflect ordinary decision-making in Moscow. Foreign policy-making structures and processes are presumably better framed and compared if they are not stirred up by outstanding and all-dominant events. Knoke and Pappi (1996: 20) confirm this argumentation as they discuss events:

> Most researchers resort to purposively selecting only highly visible and controversial events, where core actor participation is exceptionally great. However, overemphasizing exciting rather than routine events risks distorting how policy participation occurs.

In contrast to Knoke's and Pappi's work, this study considers issues as the central object of investigation. Every issue ultimately leads to a policy proposal (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996: 14) and contains a series of events as specific happenings within a case's chronology. According to the definition mentioned in subchapter 2.2, an *event* is a 'critical, temporally located decision point in a collective decision-making sequence that must occur in order for a policy option to be finally selected' (Laumann and Knoke 1987: 251). The events of the four issues, (NRC, CEES, CSTO, SES), are traced by four detailed time-event matrices. For each case study, the decision-making process is reconstructed. With the help of qualitative face-to-face interviews, press documents, electronic media, chronologies and literature, every single event (meeting, statement, conference, phone call etc.) within the case study's time frame is integrated into a matrix. This laborious research activity leads to a detailed chronology of the four foreign policy-decisions, which is important to assist in the understanding of major developments, actors and general process-related and structural patterns.

3.3 Hypotheses

After having outlined the analytical concept and its application, the hypotheses shall be derived within this section. To this end, the main research question of this study is recapitulated here: *What types of decision-making networks define Russia's foreign policies under Putin and to what extent, how and why do they vary depending on the policy problem?* Based on the analytical concept applied to Russian circumstances, the hypotheses will subsequently be formulated.

Main hypothesis

Russia's foreign policy domain consists of four basic overlapping subfields: near abroad, far abroad, security and economy. The involvement of these subfields determines the shape of policy networks dealing with specific issues.

This main hypothesis is deliberately formulated in a generic way. It links the independent with the dependent variable as developed in Chapter 2. However, the correlation between policy networks and involved subfields has to be further specified. Based on the previous theoretical deliberations, three sub hypotheses can be formulated. Thereby, the numbers at the end of each line correspond to the numbers used in Table 4.

Sub hypothesis A

If a Russian foreign policy issue is addressed by the far abroad and security subfields, policy networks tend to take the shape of *policy communities* characterised by…

- a limited number of participants (1a);
- a small range of interests (1b);
- a domination of executive authority's interests (1c);
- frequent and high-quality interactions of all actors (2a);
- high centralisation (2b);
- central position of the executive authority (2c);
- a generally high quantity of information and resources (3a);
- a more or less even distribution of information and resources (3b);
- a generally high quantity of power (4a);
- a balance of power between network members (4b).

Sub hypothesis B

If a Russian foreign policy issue is addressed by the near abroad and economic subfields, policy networks tend to take the shape of *issue networks* characterised by…

- large number of participants (1a);
- wide range of affected interests included (1b);
- the involvement of economic, legislative and other bodies (1c);
- low interactions fluctuating in frequency and intensity (2a);
- low centralisation (2b);
- a non-central position of the executive authority (2c);
- a generally limited quantity of information and resources (3a);
- unequally distributed information and resources (3b);
- a generally limited quantity of power (4a).
- unequal powers between members (4b);

Sub hypothesis C

> If a Russian foreign policy issue is addressed by any other subfield combination, policy networks tend to develop into *hybrid forms*, which may incorporate features from both extreme policy network types.

Figure 7 is a key table of this study, because it visualises sub hypothesis A, B and C. It illustrates the theoretical assumptions and the expected shape of policy networks in Russian foreign policy making. Theoretically, security-related far abroad issues are supposed to be addressed by policy communities. As the two involved subfields are relatively small and homogenous, policy networks dealing with specific issues tend to be stringent. The characterisation of policy communities in sub hypothesis A fully corresponds to the analytical concept developed in subchapter 2.3. By contrast, economy-related near abroad issues are supposed to be tackled by issue networks. Two vast and complex communities coalesce to rather large and loose policy networks. Again, the circumscription of issue networks in sub hypothesis B reflects theoretical deliberations made earlier. Sub hypothesis C states that any other policy domain subfield combinations usually leads to hybrid forms of policy networks. Accordingly, Figure 7 shows that security-related near abroad issues and economy-related far abroad matters tend to be addressed by mixed types.

Although all three sub hypotheses contain a clear statement, they are formulated with great caution. The described correlations have to be conceived as general tendencies, not as compelling laws. This understanding entirely stands in line with Rhodes's and Marsh's perception that no policy area will conform exactly to the extreme types (policy communities and issue networks). In their view, it is "important to focus on trends in a given policy area, to explore the extent to which it is becoming more or less integrated or an interest is becoming more or less dominant" (Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 187).



Figure 7: Hypothetical form of Russian foreign policy networks

How can all these statements be verified? The operationalisation of the hypotheses requires an ample discussion of delicate methodological procedures. Therefore, these questions will be addressed in a separate section. Chapter 4 presents the methodological approach of this study. In section 4.3, various appropriate parameters will be assessed, which allow the determination of policy networks and the testing of the hypotheses. Thereby, the focus will remain on sub thesis A and B, as the main hypothesis represents a rather qualitative and generic statement.

4. Methodological Approach

The past three chapters focused on the theoretical aspects of foreign policy-making, developed a specific analytical framework and explained its application to the Russian reality. Based on these elements, palpable hypotheses have been deviated and formulated in subchapter 3.3. In this section, attention will be drawn to methodological aspects and specific procedures will be presented, which allow testing of the hypotheses.

The first subchapter addresses the issue of policy network delimitation. It explains the methods used to specify network boundaries. In subchapter 4.2, the focus is turned on network interactions. Ties among network actors are determined according to specific procedures. After that, network dimension parameters are established and described in subchapter 4.3. With the help of methods used in social network analysis, the hypotheses can be operationalised. Subchapter 4.4 outlines the way networks are visualised. It covers methodological aspects with regard to network design and layout. Finally, subchapter 4.5 discusses the qualitative analysis of decision-making processes. It identifies the major elements, which have to be registered along the time line.

4.1 Delimitation of networks

The reconstruction of social networks is a complex task that requires well-defined procedures. Therefore, it will be split-up in four different working stages. These will sequentially be presented and explained within the next subchapters. Initially, the focus shall be directed on the definition and identification of all potential policy domain actors (working step 1) and on the specification of the policy network boundaries (working step 2).

Working step 1: definition and identification of potential policy domain actors

The first step to reconstruct policy networks consists in defining and identifying potential policy domain actors. Wassermann and Faust (1994: 30-35) use the word 'population' as a generic term describing the entire sphere of interest. With regard to the definition of the population, it is important to stress that this study considers Russian domain actors only. Hence, all kinds of foreign, global and international units will be excluded from investigation. Western state leaders, the CST General Secretariat, the EU Commission, NATO or regional organisations like the Shanghai five or EurAsEC – only to name a few - cannot be taken into account. Certainly, these players may all have a considerable influence on Moscow's foreign policies. However, this study deliberately focuses on domestic sources of Russian decision-making.

Which methodological principles and tools are applied to identify potential domain actors? Initially, it is necessary to collect all organisational actors potentially interested or involved in Russian foreign policy-making. The actor's name, function and incumbency need to be properly registered in order to have a complete basis for the following working steps. The listing requires intense research efforts and access to information sources about the Russian state, economic and societal spheres. It is complicated by the fact that governmental structures in Moscow were largely reorganised in February 2004. Hence, the contemporary Russian foreign policy domain looks remarkably different than it did during Putin's first term; the decisive period selected for the case-studies.

Data was retrieved from different open sources. The basic list, valid for August 2001, was extracted from a detailed database (Grankin 2001). This abstract was adjusted and amended with the help of a reference book and telephone directory, valid for 2003 (Maximov 2003). Finally, it resulted in a structurally ordered spreadsheet with five different actor's categories:

- Presidential actors
- Governmental actors
- Parliamentary actors
- Economic actors
- Other actors

All in all, 128 potential actors have been identified (see Appendix I). Thereby, units have been included top-down until the level of departments within ministries, commissions within the parliamentary chambers or single companies within the economic sphere. At this stage, the presentation of these actor's categories as a cursory overview shall suffice. The different actors will be described in detail within the framework of Chapter 6. At that stage, Russian foreign policy domain actors at the time of Putin's first term will be discussed in terms of their function and potential influence on decision-making processes.

Working step 2: network boundary specification

As a second step, the network boundaries have to be specified. Obviously, the domain population defined and identified in the first working stage is too large. Contacts among its members are usually too occasional and unspecific. Interactions only become intense around issues or events. In this case, a limited number of influential actors form a policy network. Apparently, not all policy domain members have an interest and sufficiently available resources to actively take part in all the policy development processes. They may be focussed on one or two issues only. Consequently, for every issue or event, the specialized audience has to be elicited. Who are the influential actors? How can policy network boundaries be specified?[56]

Within the framework of the present study, the terms influence and power are not used as synonyms, although common characteristics have been debated during the past fifty years.[57] For the purpose of this study, influence shall be defined as the broader term. It describes the possibility of an actor to manipulate other actors or events. In contrast, power shall be understood as the potential access of an actor to other network members. Whereas the term power will be discussed more in detail at a later stage (see 4.3), the focus shall here be turned to the differentiation between influential and non-influential actors. Commonly, three different methods are used to identify core decision-makers or to specify network boundaries respectively.

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[56] Comprehensive overviews with regard to the boundary specification problem have been written for example by Laumann, Marsden, et al. (1992) as well as by Jansen (2003).

[57] Serdült (2006) provides a survey of this debate.

The *positional approach* refers to formally defined positions or group memberships (Scott 2000: 55, VonBeyme 2001: 66). It assumes that actors are influential by virtue of their official location within organigrams or institutional hierarchies. This method is relatively easy to perform, but it misses informal actors and those who are influential, thanks to their capacities and resources. The *decision-making approach*[58] follows a different logic. It tries to reconstruct decision-making processes and identify their main actors. Based on interviews, documents, media and other sources, this method seems to be promising, but highly difficult to implement (Hudson and Vore 1995: 211, Seidelmann 2001: 21-22, VonBeyme 2001: 65-66). Last but not least, the *reputational approach* (Laumann and Knoke 1987: 152-189, Scott 2000: 56, VonBeyme 2001: 65) provides an alternative when comprehensive listings and dependable information sources with regard to decisions are scarce. Selected informants are asked about the most influential actors of a particular decision. Even if this method is laborious to apply, it seems to include the whole range of participants. However, the image may be distorted by media-affected individual perceptions of the informants.

The present study relies on the reputational approach, because extensive data about Russian decision-making processes are hardly available.[59] With the help of expert opinions, the policy networks can be delimited and determined. Thereby, the selection of informants as well as the establishment of boundary criteria are matters of crucial importance (Scott 2000: 56). Subsequently, these questions and the concrete proceeding will be explained in more detail.

In 2005 and 2006, the author of the present study spent nine months in Moscow and performed five quantitative face-to-face interviews per case study (see questionnaire in Appendix II). For the following reason, this number can be considered as sufficient. Three expert assessments would constitute the absolute minimum, as it allows equilibrating two extreme opinions. With a fourth and a fifth rating, the average value attains sufficient

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[58] See for, instance, Allison (1971), Snyder, Bruck, et al. (1954).

[59] In fact, reputational methods are popular in Russia. Newspapers and magazines regularly publish polls of the most influential politicians and compare those over time. See, for instance, 'Nezavisimaja Gazeta' or 'Politicheskii Klass'.

stability and significance. Serdült (2006: 1) confirms that 'reliable results can be obtained with at least five experts'.

The main selection criterion, with regard to the informants, was a high affiliation with the issue in question. Furthermore, the informants had to be experts in the appropriate field. Hence, the author of this study interviewed a broad range of government officials, diplomats, military officers, experts within international organisations, members of parliament, political advisors, academics and journalists. It is important to stress that these experts were not selected according to the 'snowballing' technique (Scott 2000: 56). Rather, actors were mostly identified and contacted based on their profile, involvement and knowledge with respect to a particular case.

During the interviews, the informants were confronted with the entire list of potential foreign policy actors (see Appendix I) in order to allocate ratings with regard to one particular decision-making case[60]: 1 (no influence), 2 (minimal influence), 3 (considerable influence) and 4 (high influence). After that, the average (arithmetic mean) was calculated for each actor and issue. Subsequently, the actors were put in a hierarchical order for every single case. These four case lists reflect the rated influence reputation of all domain actors.

Obviously, not all actors appearing on these lists had an influence on decision-making in reality, since roughly half of the actors were rated with 1. Therefore, it is necessary to clearly specify the network boundaries. For the purpose of this present study, this limit shall be fixed at the value of 2.75. Actors are only considered to be part of a policy network if their average influence rating lies at or above this value. This boundary makes sense, because it includes in the policy network all key actors having a nearly considerable influence on the issue. Simultaneously, it excludes the bulk of actors, whose influence may be marginalized.

[60] The rating corresponds to a questionnaire developed in 2004 by M. Jegen, Department of Political Science at the University of Geneva. See appendix II.

4.2 Specification of network interactions

Once the network boundaries are specified, it might be assumed that the identified core actors somehow played an essential role with regard to the issue in question. However, their high average influence rating alone does not allow detailed statements about their role in decision-making. Therefore, it is necessary to determine and assess interactions between the most influential actors. Only these two working steps allow reconstructing and analysing the policy networks.

Working step 3: determination of network interactions

In subchapter 2.2, the term 'interaction' – or tie, relation, degree, lines link[61] - has been already introduced. According to Knoke and Pappi (1996: 17-19), power relations consist of two factors: information (scientific, legal, political or other knowledge) and resources (money, labour power, facilities and more). For the purpose of this study, information and resources are taken together. *Interactions are considered as exchanges of all kinds of resources with regard to a specific issue.*

The network determination for the four case studies was performed analogue to the boundary specification presented in the previous subchapter. Based on the reputational approach, the author performed a second round of quantitative face-to-face interviews in Moscow[62]. He asked another five informants per case study about the interactions among the identified key actors. Thereby, the author consulted not the same experts who already rated the actor's influence in round one. Mostly, new informants valued the interactions according to the following scale: 0 (no or low interaction during the appropriate decision-making process), 1 (medium interaction during the appropriate decision-making process) and 2 (intense interaction during the appropriate decision-making process). It is

[61] In social network analysis, various terms have been used to describe the interlinkage between network units.

[62] Based on Serdült's assessment, five informants should be enough to achieve stable results and to determine the network Serdült (2006).

noteworthy, that the new informants had no objections to the list of influential actors presented to them. Often, they explicitly agreed to the boundary specification performed earlier.

Subsequently, the individual expert ratings were registered in four different case-matrices that confront identified key actors with each other. Then, the values were cumulated (mathematic sum) for each case and for each interaction. This data processing resulted in an *accumulated matrix* with values ranging from one to ten. The maximum average interaction rating signifies an intense bilateral exchange of resources with regard to the issue in question. In contrast, a relationship between two actors labelled five times zero is apparently non-existent.

Working step 4: assessment of network interactions

Theoretically, the accumulated interaction rating would allow setting up the four policy networks. However, these values are not always appropriate for calculation and visualisation, as they are differentiated and sometimes confusing. Hence, for specific calculation or visualisation purposes it is necessary to find methods for a more reasonable assessment of network interactions. In this study, two additional data sets will be created:

- Dichotomized data for calculation purposes
- Categorised data for visualisation purposes

The power dimension of the policy networks needs to be calculated with dichotomized instead of accumulated interaction ratings. This is due to unusable software outputs with regard to closeness centrality computations. The transformation of the data sets can conveniently be performed by UCINET 6. All accumulated interaction ratings greater than 3 receive a value of 1, whereas relations weighted 3 or lower are zeroed. This boundary makes sense because an interaction of less than 4 can be neglected, whereas a link without doubt exists if the frequency and intensity of an interaction reaches a value of 4 or higher. Definitely, the resulting dichotomized matrix shows rather coarse data, as they do not account for any shading in network relations. Yet, they are simple and easy to use.

For the visualisation of networks, neither the accumulated nor the dichotomized matrices provide a suitable basis. Whereas the former makes the picture too complex and unclear, the latter leads to an oversimplified network structure. For this reason, the accumulated ratings have to be categorised. Values between 10 and 6.666 are allocated the number 2, ratings between 6.666 and 3.333 receive a 1 and interactions weighted 3.333 or less are zeroed. This categorisation produces an appropriate image of interactions within the policy network.

After four working steps, all required raw data is available to reconstruct the policy networks. The next subchapter will focus on network dimensions and their parameters in order to operationalise the hypotheses.

4.3 Determination of network dimension parameters

Whereas the previous subchapters focused on the network reconstruction, this section determines the essential network dimension parameters. Particularly, the operationalisation of the hypotheses will be performed and discussed in-depth.

Earlier in this study (see subchapter 3.3), the hypotheses have been developed on the bases of Rhodes and Marsh's (1992) network dimensions. These four dimensions – membership, integration, resources and power - shall be picked-up again here in order to provide a framework for a systematic finding of methodological solutions. Table 5 is already well known to the reader and shall be inserted at the outset of this section as an overview. It has been adjusted once more by individually listing all elements and the corresponding applied parameters.

For each parameter, a threshold has been defined in order to distinguish two sides on the policy network spectrum: the left hand side represents policy community coloured networks, whereas the right hand side covers issue networks and related forms. Subsequently, all elements, parameters and their thresholds will be explained sequentially.

Dimension	**Policy community**	**Applied parameter (threshold)**	**Issue network**
1. Membership			
a) Number of participants	Very limited number, some actors consciously excluded	**Number of involved network actors** **(threshold: 10)**	Large
b) Number of interests	Small range of interests	**Number of involved actor's categories** **(threshold: 3)**	Encompasses wide range of affected interests
c) Types of interest	Executive authority interests dominate	**Percentage of involved Presidential actors** **(threshold: 33.333%)**	Economic and legislative and other bodies are involved

Dimension	Policy community	Applied parameter (threshold)	Issue network
2. Integration			
a) Frequency of interaction (information and resources)	Frequent, high-quality, interaction of all actors on all matters related to policy issue	**Network density** **(threshold: 5.00)**	Rather low, contacts fluctuates in frequency and intensity
b) Centralisation	High	**Overall network degree centralisation** **(threshold: 50%)**	Low
c) Executive authority's position	Central position of executive authority	**Degree centrality ranking** **(threshold: At least two Presidential actors within top three)**	Non-central position of executive authority
3. Resources			
a) Quantity of information (scientific, legal, political or other knowledge) and resources (money, labour power, facilities and more) within network	Generally high	**Maximum normalised degree centrality** **(threshold: 75%)**	Generally limited
b) Distribution of information (scientific, legal, political or other knowledge) and resources (money, labour power, facilities and more) within network	Information and resources among participants are more or less evenly distributed	**Spread between maximum and minimum normalised degree centrality in percentage of the highest value** **(threshold: 50%)**	Information and resources are unequally distributed
4. Power			
a) Quantity of power within network	Generally high	**Maximum normalised closeness centrality** **(threshold: 75%)**	Generally limited
b) Distribution of power within network	There is a balance of power between members, even if some actors may dominate the network.	**Spread between maximum and minimum normalised closeness centrality in percentage of the highest value** **(threshold: 50%)**	Unequal powers, reflects unequal access

Table 5: Applied parameters for the operationalisation of hypotheses

1. Network membership

- Parameter 1a: Number of participants

  The number of participants included in a policy network is the most essential element, because it determines the size of a decision-making structure. It is directly measured by the number of actors, who received an average influence rating of greater than 2.75.

  The threshold to differentiate between policy communities and issue networks is fixed at 10. This number has been chosen for the following reason: Given 128 identified potential foreign policy actors, it is reasonable to assume that a policy community never involves more than 10 decision-makers. Any higher number would hinder efficient and tight network coordination - a major attribute of policy communities. Therefore, small networks including less than 10 members are considered to be on the policy community side, whereas more than 10 actors are characteristic for issue networks.

- Parameter 1b: Number of interests

  The range of affected interests is the second important feature of the network membership dimension. It is measured by the number of actors' categories (see Annex I) represented within the network. Of course, the assumption that an actor's category represents only one homogenous, single set of interests is a simplification. However, the reality in Moscow often confirms that actors within one specific category have a wide range of interests in common, which does not always match with other categories. Economic actors, for instance, may have significant business interests in Georgia, while governmental actors by and large support drastic retaliation measures against Tbilisi. Presidential actors establish the NATO-Russia council, whereas the parliamentary chambers would have virtually voted against any form of cooperation with the alliance.

  Therefore, it is assumed that the number of interests increases as more actor's categories are included within the decision-making structure. A network is considered to resemble a policy community if less than three interests are

represented in the network. More than three interests are rather characteristic for the issue network side. This threshold makes sense because a homogenous policy community could not afford to integrate more than two dissenting opinions.

- Parameter 1c: Types of interest

  The third network membership parameter focuses on the types of interest. For the differentiation between policy communities and issue networks, the domination of the executive authority is decisive. For the purpose of this study, presidential actors will be regarded as executive authorities. Therefore, the percentage of involved presidential actors will be calculated.

  In order to distinguish the two policy network types, a threshold of 33.333% makes sense. If more than one third of all members belong to the Presidential category, a network is supposed to be dominated by executive authorities' interests. It may then be considered as a policy community. In all other cases, the network rather resembles an issue network – especially if other types of interests are represented additionally within the structure.

2. Network integration

- Parameter 2a: Frequency of interaction

  The frequency of interaction in a policy network is measured by the network density. The density of a network is the total number of valued ties divided by the total number of possible valued ties (Borgatti, Everett, et al. 2002: 217). Hence, it represents the average interaction value of the network. Thereby, the calculations will be based on the accumulated matrices.

  As the experts assessed the interactions with ratings from 1 to 10, a value of 5.00 shall be chosen as threshold. This definition corresponds to the dichotomization of the matrix values described earlier. This means that densities greater than 5.00 may be allocated to policy communities, as frequent, high-quality interactions take place between actors on all matters related to the issue. In contrast, looser issue network-like structures are characterised by density values lower than 5.

- Parameter 2b: Centralisation

  Network centralisation is calculated by the overall network degree centralisation[63]. It is based on the valued, accumulated data sets and allows conclusions about the central or peripheral structure of a network. The parameter reaches a maximum of 100% when one actor is linked with all other actors, whereas the other players choose to interact only with this one. This is exactly the situation in a star graph (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 180). 0% indicates that all actors interact with each other with exactly the same frequency and intensity.
  Consequently, the threshold is fixed at 50%, reflecting a reasonable and average value. A network centralised more than 50% belongs to the policy community side of the spectrum, whereas lower percentages may be assigned to issue network types.

- Parameter 2c: Executive authority's position

  This parameter is important, because it measures an essential feature of policy networks: the executive authority's position within the network. Similar to parameter 1c, Presidential actors are considered as executive authorities. It is assumed that they occupy a much more central position in policy communities than in issue networks. How can this parameter be measured? For each network member, a degree centrality value is calculated based on accumulated data, which reflects the actor's activity in terms of his cultivated ties (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 178). For comparative purposes, degree centrality will be normalised - which means expressed as percentage. Network members with higher values are more active and therefore central in terms of their interactions with other decision-makers.

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[63] For a given binary network with actors $v_1 \ldots v_n$ and maximum degree centrality c_{max}, the network degree centralisation measure is calculated by the $\Sigma(c_{max} - c(v_i))$ divided by the maximum value possible, where $c(v_i)$ is the degree centrality of actor v_i Borgatti, Everett, et al. (2002: 167).

Hence, if at least two presidential actors belong to the top three positions, the network may be considered as a policy community. In all other cases, the network belongs to the issue network side, where the executive authority is supposed to be located rather peripherally. This threshold makes sense, because it pays regard to the main parameter requirement without ruling out a central position of a non-executive authority.

3. Network resources

- Parameter 3a: Quantity of information and resources

  As discussed earlier, resources in a network may consist of information (scientific, legal, political or other knowledge) or other factors (money, labour power, facilities and more). These goods are supposed to be continuously exchanged within a network structure. The quantity of available resources within the network represents another indicator to differentiate policy networks. It shall be measured by determining the maximum normalised degree centrality value within the network. As pretests with different data sets have shown, the value of the most active member is a good indicator for the level of information and resources reached in a network. If the most interlinked actor is highly active, the common quantity of information and resources in a network turns out to be on a high echelon.

  75% shall be defined as the threshold. The quantity of information and resources within the network is generally high if the maximum value exceeds 75%. In this case, the network is considered as a policy community. Lower percentages are perceived as a sign of limited information and resources, which is typical for issue networks.

- Parameter 3b: Distribution of information and resources

  The second resource-related parameter focuses on the distribution of the network goods. It is measured by the spread between the maximum and minimum

normalised degree centrality ranking[64] expressed as a percentage of the maximum value. This index quantifies the spectrum of available goods in the network. The reason why it has to be related to the highest quantity is a statistical one. In order to compare data, parameter calculations are based on normalised values, which reduces the spread of lower quantities and vice versa.

The threshold of this parameter is fixed at 50% as well. If information and resources are distributed over a spectrum of less than 50%, the network may be viewed as a policy community. In this case, variations are smaller, which indicates a more or less even distribution. As the spectrum exceeds 50%, differences between actors with regard to their available resources are larger. This is supposed to be a typical sign for issue networks.

4. Network power

- Parameter 4a: Quantity of power

  As already mentioned earlier, 'power' may not be equated with 'resources' or 'influence'. For the purpose of this present study, power is defined in terms of an actor's access to other network members. An actor is central if he can quickly and as directly as possible interact with other network members (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 183). Hence, the quantity of power prevailing in a policy network depends on how close the actors are to each other. This shall be measured by determining the maximum normalised closeness centrality[65]. Similar to parameter 3a, pretests have proven that the value of the most powerful actor in the network reflects the available power quantity. For computational purposes, the above-explained dichotomized data sets will be used, since the access to other actors is supposed to be either existent (1) or non-existent (0).

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[64] The normalised degree centrality has already been calculated for parameter 2c.

[65] According to Borgatti, Everett, et al. (2002: 169), the normalised closeness centrality of an actor is the reciprocal of farness (the sum of the lengths of the geodesics to every other actor) divided by the minimum possible farness expressed as a percentage.

75% marks the threshold between the two policy network types. As the maximum closeness value surmounts 75%, the level of power in the network generally becomes higher and thus allows for easy access among network members. This is a major characteristic for policy communities. In contrast, an issue network usually shows power levels below 75%, since actors in larger networks are often only linked indirectly with each other.

- Parameter 4b: Distribution of power

  Analogue parameter 3b, the distribution of power is calculated in order to determine the policy networks. Hence, the spread between the maximum and minimum normalised closeness centrality is expressed as a percentage of the highest value.

  Obviously, the threshold is again fixed at 50%. Thus, if power values of the network members vary over a spectrum smaller than 50%, the power within the network is considered to be, more or less, evenly distributed. This would indicate a policy community like network structure. However, if the spread is greater than 50%, the network members have unequal access to each other. Some actors may be very powerful whereas others are quite isolated within the network. This situation is typical for issue networks.

Obviously, a whole range of additional measures could be calculated with UCINET 6. However, this study shall be restricted to the most crucial and effective values, which allow specifying policy networks. With the help of the above-presented parameters, it will be possible to distinguish policy communities and its adjacent forms from issue networks and their relatives.

Also, the applied measures will make it possible to compare the four policy networks with each other. It will be particularly interesting to draw a comparison between issues involving the near abroad subfields with issues addressed by the complementary community. Likewise, a comparison between security and economically coloured policy-networks may lead to beneficial conclusions.

4.4 Visualisation of resulting decision-making procedures and structures

Finally, policy networks shall be visualised. This subchapter explains the methodological aspects of that task. Theoretically, the decision-making structures could be visualised and presented in various ways. They could be reproduced based on different data sets (accumulated, dichotomized, categorised), layout methods or visualisation software. However, this study commits itself to a single graphic per case study for two reasons. First, comprehensive pretesting of data sets, layout tools and softwares has shown that there are only minor variations between different solutions. The core research findings and the overall significance of a specific policy network remain visible irrespective of the presentation method and procedure. Second, the different visualisation of one and the same network would be confusing. The analysis section of this study is complex enough given four different cases.

The policy network visualisation is based on the UCINET 6 program and therefore on the integrated NetDraw software (Borgatti, Everett, et al. 2002). Data sets are created and adjusted in UCINET in the form of matrices before they can be transferred and opened on the NetDraw platform. Subsequently, the exact procedure of the visualisation will be determined and explained.

Depiction of actors

The actor's – or node's – depiction and layout vary in terms of shape, size and position depending on different attributes. The definitions made here will apply throughout the whole study. The *shape* of network members shall reflect the actor's category.

▽ Down triangles stand for Presidential actors;

△ Up triangles represent governmental actors;

◇ Diamonds indicate parliamentary actors;

☐ Squares signify economic actors;

○ Circles denote other actors.

The node's *size* refers to the network member's power. Hence, the diameter of a symbol reflects the ability of an actor to access other participants in the decision-making process. It is based on the normalised closeness centrality, which has been introduced in subchapter 4.3. The average influence rating won't be employed for visualisation purposes, because the expert assessments only serve as a tool to delimitate the network boundaries.

The actor's *position* within the policy network is determined according to the normalised degree centrality as explained in section 4.3. This definition makes sense because it considers network members as being central if they are active and closely linked in terms of their interactions. In contrast, lower degree centrality values places actors at the periphery of a policy network.

Depiction of interactions

As mentioned within the framework of working step 4 in section 4.2, accumulated or dichotomized data sets are not suitable to illustrate networks. Whereas, the former results are too differentiated and confuse patterns, the latter does not sufficiently reflect the complex nature of decision-making. Therefore, the four case study data sets are categorised. Ties between actors are visualised according to the following interaction intensity:

- 0 = no or low interaction during the appropriate decision-making process
- 1 = medium interaction during the appropriate decision-making process
- 2 = intense interaction during the appropriate decision-making process

In this study, the line size of an interaction will correspond to these categories. Intense relationships (2) are boldly illustrated, whereas medium links (1) are depicted as thin lines.

No or low interactions (0) are not inserted at all, which leads to clearer network structures. As this definition is easy to interpret, the attachment of labels is not necessary.

One final remark has to be added concerning the general layout of policy networks. The UCINET software NetDraw arranges the decision-making structures random-like, provided that no special graph features are selected. This implies that every illustration has to be set up manually. The actor's location, for instance, in the north or in the south of a picture therefore has absolutely no significance. The spatial placement of an actor rather fulfils graphical needs. However, it has to be kept in mind that the actor's distance from the network's midpoint highly matters due to the above-mentioned degree centrality values.

4.5 Qualitative analysis of decision-making processes

In the context of Russian foreign policy-making, the analysis of pure quantitative data would not be very meaningful. The highly dynamic and complex surrounding of decision-making processes in Moscow implies that instruments of SNA are supplemented by qualitative research. Therefore, the reconstructed policy-networks shall be viewed as embedded findings. They are interpreted with the help of a wide range of open source information.

Most of the qualitative data has been gathered by means of face-to-face interviews. In addition to the 40 quantitative questionings, the author held more than 60 qualitative conversations in Moscow (see Appendix II). They covered both case-specific aspects and general facets of Russian foreign policy-making. Supplementary, media products, scientific documents and literature help to understand the case studies and decision-making in Moscow. The accumulation of all these sources yielded numerous remote small pieces of a huge puzzle.

As explained in subchapter 2.2, this study considers the four case studies as issues, not as events[66]. Whereas issues are conceived as specific policy problems, events may be understood as single happenings along the timeline. From a process-related perspective, they are aligned in a meaningful sequence. Of course it is technically impossible to reconstruct every detail of a decision-making process. However, an issue can be understood for the most part if the cornerstones within the appropriate time period are conceived.

The four main Chapters 7 to 10 will each start with a section outlining the issue and its main events. These subchapters will provide a qualitative and process-related overview of the decision-making cases and include the following fragments:

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[66] Compare with Knoke, Pappi, et al. (1996: 13-17).

- Appearance of the issue
- Evolution of the issue
- Decision on the issue

The qualitative analysis of the decision-making processes has two objectives. On the one hand, it contributes to a better understanding of the policy networks. Abstract actor relations per se are not really meaningful if they are not placed in a larger descriptive context. On the other hand, the illustration of the four processes helps to find characteristic features of Russian foreign policy-making. Intentionally, no hypotheses have been formulated for this qualitative task. The recognition of specific or general patterns of actor's behaviour shall result from open, less-routed research. In combination with the reconstruction of policy network structures, the analysis of decision-making processes hopefully leads to precious insights and conclusions with regard to the genesis of Russia's foreign and security policy.

A final remark has to be added. Whereas policy networks only consider Russian actors, the four qualitative subchapters include international and non-Russian regional players. The characterisation of decision-making events simply cannot be performed without mentioning foreign activities. For this reason, general conclusions of this study may possibly include statements with reference to external causes.

Summary

Part I provides the theoretical and methodological framework for the present study. It initially defines the foreign policy-making process as a 'set of procedures and structures that states use to arrive at foreign policy decisions and to implement them' (Goldstein 1996: 176). Also, features of the foreign policy-making process are discussed and contrasted with characteristics of domestic policy-making.

Subsequently, the analytical concept and its application is outlined based on Knoke's and Pappi's (1996) policy domain model and Rhode's and Marsh's (1992) typology of policy networks. It is assumed that the Russian foreign policy arena represents a policy domain that contains four different overlapping subfields. A geographical and a sectoral cleavage perpendicularly span the domain and separate actors interested in near abroad, far abroad, security or economic matters. With reference to the specific features of high and low politics, it is then argued that the far abroad and security subfields are relatively small and homogenous. In contrast, the near abroad and economic communities seem to be comparatively vast, complex and diffuse.

Against this background, this study investigates four specific issues, each involving a combination of a geographically and sectorally coloured subfield: the foundation of the NATO-Russia Council (far abroad – security), the transformation to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (near abroad – security), the establishment of the Common European Economic Space (far abroad – economy) and the development of the Single Economic Space (near abroad – economy).

By relying on methods of social network analysis, the thesis of this present study advocates that policy networks tend to take the shape of small-sized and tight policy communities if a Russian foreign policy issue is addressed by the far abroad and security subfields. In comparison, large and heterogeneous issue networks tackle near abroad and economic policy problems.

Part II. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

The previous four chapters of Part I have presented the theoretical and methodological framework of the present study. Thereby, four particular issues have been selected and introduced which are considered to be instructive for Russian foreign policy-making: the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Common European Economic Space (CEES) and the Single Economic Space (SES). This part aims at providing the contextual background for the analysis of these four issues. Thereby, it addresses the following question: *what kinds of political settings influence the form of decision-making networks?*

In particular, two political settings influence the Russian decision-making networks: the foreign policy contents and the foreign policy domain. With regard to the first setting, it is important to understand the general layout of Russian foreign policy, the most prominent global challenges between 2000 and 2004 as well as Moscow's reactions. Therefore, Chapter 5 presents Russia's policy contents with regard to world affairs and embeds the four case studies in a wider political landscape. It highlights Russia's foreign policy concept 2000 and illustrates Moscow's activities facing jeopardised influence in the near abroad and institutional changes in the far abroad.

In addition to that, it is crucial to comprehend the Russian foreign policy domain and its actor's constellation. Chapter 6 illuminates Moscow's political arena more in depth. It outlines all presidential, governmental, parliamentary, economic and other actors, which have a potential impact on foreign policy-making. It highlights their roles and assesses their prospects to become policy network members.

5. Russia's Foreign Policies Facing Global Challenges

In this chapter, the focus will be turned on global developments and Russia's corresponding foreign policies during Vladimir Putin's first presidential term. Between March 26th, 2000 and March 14th, 2004, the Russian Federation has been challenged by a variety of problems, which arose geographically most notably on the southern flank and in the west. The following subchapters will discuss Moscow's foreign policies with reference to Russia's foreign policy concept in order to locate the four case studies within a global context.

5.1 Russia's foreign policy concept 2000

On June 28, 2000, only three moths after his election, President Vladimir Putin approved a new foreign policy concept (Rossiiskaja-Federatsija 2000). It was designed to provide a guideline for Russian foreign policies in a modern, fundamentally and dynamically changing world. The document describes the country's diplomacy as 'multidirectional, balanced, independent and based on national interests' (People'sDaily 2000). According to Foreign Minister Ivan Ivanov, the paper represents an integrated long-range foreign policy doctrine (Iwanov 2002: 8). For him, the biggest innovation of the concept is its realism. Foreign policy priorities are more closely linked than before to the long-term tasks of internal development. They consider Russia's real possibilities and resources (VanBuskirk 2000).

The concept's content

Russia's foreign policy concept lays out the following general objectives (Rossiiskaja-Federatsija 2000: part I):

> Ensurence of reliable security of the county;
> Influence on general world processes;
> Creation of favourable external conditions for steady development of Russia;
> Formation of a good-neighbour belt along the perimeter of Russia's borders;
> Quest for concord and coinciding interests with foreign countries;
> Preservation of the rights and interests of Russian citizens abroad;
> Promotion of a positive perception of the Russian Federation in the world.

Part II of the concept discusses transformations in international relations. It is stressed that Russia seeks to achieve a multi-polar system contrary to the growing trend towards a pronounced U.S. hegemony.[67] In part III, priorities of the Russian Federation in resolving global problems are outlined: new world order, international security, economic relations, human rights and information.

With regard to regional priorities (Rossiiskaja-Federatsija 2000: part IV), the concept mentions the CIS space first. The emphasis shall be made on the development of good-neighbourly relations and strategic partnerships with all CIS member states. Thereby, Russia follows a 'two-track integration model', which distinguishes a nucleus of states willing for a higher level of integration from so called 'dragging states' (Iwanov 2002: 85).

Relations with Western states and institutions are part of Russia's traditional foreign policy. Whereas Russia retains a negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO, it seeks due respect for its interests concerning institutional evolutions of the European Union. For Moscow, bilateral relations with individual EU member countries and other states are of key importance. Certainly, relations to the U.S., China, India and Japan shall be constantly developed.

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[67] See additionally Ivanov (2002) remarks about unilateralism made at Stanford University in San Francisco.

The concept's evaluation

The foreign policy concept 2000 may retrospectively be assessed from different perspectives: favourably estimated, it may well be argued that the document heralded a new period in Russia's behaviour abroad. Putin's new pragmatism in fact stabilized Moscow's position on the international stage after chaotic years under Boris Yeltsin. The year 2000 is to some extent comparable with 1856[68] as Aleksander Gorchakov declared in the aftermaths of the Crimean war that Russia does not pout, but gathers its forces.[69] During the reform era under Alexander II, Russia mainly focused on stabilization and on the domestic socio-economic development.

Certainly, the Russian Federation of the 1990's didn't loose a war, it didn't isolate itself or remain silent. However, the shock of the Soviet brake up and the constant political conflicts during Yeltsin's presidency lead to a commonly conceived desire of smoother, more effective and duly formulated policies paying tribute to domestic modernization (Trenin 2005). To this end, the new foreign policy concept made a considerable contribution.

It may also be argued that the foreign policy concept provides a useful tool to facilitate rational and foreseeable policy-outcomes. Even if the paper does not account to a 'vision thing' (Trenin 2005), it nevertheless supports more strategic arrangements. Definitely, the foreign policy concept serves as a base for policy-debates.

From a more critical point of view, one could also argue that the foreign policy concept 2000 has basically remained nothing more than a piece of paper. Even if Russia has vigorously debated its new identity and foreign policy over years (Ivanov 2001, Iwanov 2002), a real consensus about core national interests has not been reached up to date (Carnegie 2004). Quite understandably, the quest for 'a certain idea of Russia'[70] is an

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[68] Compare with Ivanov (2001: 8), Ivanov (2002) and Hösch (1996).

[69] "Говорят, что Россия сердится. Нет, Россия не сердится, Россия сосредоточивается". See Senin (2001).

[70] This term refers to Coles (2000), who stressed the importance of a 'a certain idea of Britain', when it comes to foreign policy formulation.

at least ongoing – if not impossible - task for a multi-ethnic, multi-religious gigantic country with a turbulent history.[71]

Also, the well-meant concept often enough gets overthrown as foreign policies in Moscow are usually forged in the last minute. In these very moments of reactive crisis management, it seems as if anybody remembers general policy principles and guidelines. It may as well be criticised that the foreign policy concept does not contain clearly formulated red lines (Carnegie 2005). In other words, the document leaves it open to what extent Russia can accept certain activities of other countries or not.[72] Additionally, it could be advocated that there simply exists a gap between high-pitched claims of the concept and the available means to satisfy them (Schröder 2004).

Finally, it might be argued that world politics in general and Russia's position within the international community in particular has significantly changed within a short period of time. September 11th 2001 and the subsequent global war on terrorism, growing significance of energy resources, rapid economic growth and institutional changes have brought forward the expiration date of the foreign policy concept. It has never been up-dated till this day.

In spite of all shortcomings, the foreign policy concept may be considered as valid for the relevant period of the present study (2000 – 2004). Within this time frame, it has been applied to a remarkable extent. The next two subchapters will focus more closely on concrete challenges within Russia's near and far abroad and pinpoint the four case studies in this context.

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[71] A vast amount of literature addresses Russia's national idea and interests. Representatively, see Surkov (2006), Ivanov (2001), Ivanov (2002), Shevtsova (2005), Mommsen (2004).

[72] See for instance criticism concerning ABM treaty, NATO and the Kurlis by Safranchuk (2004).

5.2 Jeopardised Russian influence in the near abroad

Within what kind of global context did the two near abroad case studies – Single Economic Space (SES) and Collective and Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) – emerge? Basically, these issues have appeared on the political agenda during Putin's first term, as Russia's influence in the near-abroad has been double challenged: economically, it became clear that the integration of the post-Soviet space needed new impetus in order to safeguard Moscow's predominance. Geopolitically, foreign powers increasingly gained a foothold in Central Asia and in the Caucasus after September 11th 2001.

Ineffective economic integration

Among CIS member states, Russia's economy plays a pivotal role. In 2004, the Russian Federation's exports to CIS countries accounted to almost 30 bn US dollars. In comparison, the following three nations in the ranking – Ukraine (8,6 bn), Belarus (7.3 bn) and Kazakhstan (4,1 bn) - fall far short of this figure.[73] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow started various initiatives in order to consolidate and strengthen its key position as an economic regional power.[74] This endeavour became gradually more urgent around the turn of the millennium, as foreign institutions like EU, WTO, OSCE or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation[75] (SCO) started to embrace CIS member states. Additionally, some newly independent states formed separate regional organisations like the Economic Cooperation Organisation[76] (1992), GUUAM[77] (1997) in order to push back Russian influence.

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[73] Source: CIS trade figures 2004, CIS Statistical committee on http://www.cisstat.com/rus/, 21.02.2007.
[74] See Alexandrova (2001).
[75] The SCO (http://www.sectsco.org/) was created in June 2001 on the base of its prototype – the "Shanghai-five" mechanism.
[76] This organisation has initially been founded in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey.
[77] Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova formed this institution to oppose alleged neo-imperialist activities of the Russian Federation.

Moscow initially intended to rely on the young institution CIS as a framework for broad integration. However, the economic dimension of this grouping[78] has not engendered significant results.[79] Multilateral projects mostly failed because the participating parties lacked of either shared interests, political will, resources or all together.

In 1992, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSEC)[80] has been founded in order to 'foster interaction and harmony among the Member States, as well as to ensure peace, stability and prosperity encouraging friendly and good-neighbourly relations in the Black Sea region'.[81] However, this grouping has not achieved concrete results except the establishment of a trade and development bank in 1999 (Burakovsky 2004: 9).

Another initiative was taken in 1996, as Russia and Belarus started to create a Union State (RBU) intending mainly harmonized custom duties and a common currency. Yet, it seems as if both sides lack of enthusiasm to push this project beyond existing bilateral arrangements.[82]

In 1995, the Eurasian Economic Community[83] was established in order to form common external customs boundaries and to coordinate integration approaches into the world economy and the international trade system. But much to Russia's regret, the second largest economy within the post-Soviet space – Ukraine – has never joined this organisation. For political reasons, Kiev continues to observe this Russian-dominated project from a distance (Zlenko 2003).

Against this background, a separate integration project was initiated in February 2003. The Presidents of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan decided to found the Single Economic Space (ЕЭП). Beside a customs union, the ЕЭП is supposed to lead to

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78 See http://cis.minsk.by/main.aspx?uid=234, 25.09.2006.

79 See "Reformirovanie organisatsii SNG: Zadachi I taktika Moskvy v ekonomike I sfere bezopasnosti", Center Cur, 19.05.2002, ISI database, 18.05.2005.

80 This regional arrangement involves Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Turkey.

81 http://www.bsec-organisation.org, 25.09.2006.

82 Frumkin (2004) outlines actors and their activities with regard to the formation of the Russian-Belarussian Union.

83 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

free movement of goods, services, capital and persons (Ruzhin 2005). For Russia, the establishment of ЕЭП ranks high on the agenda because it integrates Ukraine and the other three major national economies in the region. Though, also this undertaking may end as a lame duck. As the numerous approaches before, SES - if it ever will be implemented at all - runs the risk of being highly ineffective in terms of its goals and future ambitions. Nevertheless, the initial decision-making process on the Russian side to establish ЕЭП represents a good example of near-abroad economic foreign policy-making. It will be traced in detail within Chapter 10 of the present study.

Foreign geopolitical influence

Russia's traditional sphere of influence in the near-abroad was not only challenged on an economic level. Inextricably, Moscow's position has also been endangered in terms of geopolitical authority. Russia's foreign policy towards the near abroad during the 1990's was particularly fluctuating. Moscow's initial *laissez faire* attitude in 1992 was followed by a period of *Realpolitik* from 1993 until the end of the millennium (Pravda 2001: 215-216). Within this era, Russia tried to consolidate its regional hegemony by transforming CIS into a full-fledged military and political grouping under Russian leadership (Burakovsky 2004: 6). However, these plans failed as the former Soviet Republics resisted to renewed Russian dominance as far as they could afford.[84]

Similarly, the Collective Security Treaty founded in 1992 by nine Eurasian states,[85] did not lead to significantly closer cooperation among its signatories. On the contrary, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Georgia resigned in 1999 and the agreement did not live up to the status of a security structure (Saat 2005: 3).

Russia's geostrategic leverage within the post-Soviet space further shrank as third powers started to gain a foothold in 1994. At that time, all Central Asian and Caucasian states - including Russia - acceded to the NATO's Partnership for Peace program (PfP).

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[84] Most CIS member states simply cannot afford real confrontation with powerful Russia ("Alliances within the CIS", Rossiiskie Vesti, 03.11.2003, ISI database, 18.05.2005).

[85] Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgizstan, Tadjikistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Kazhakhstan.

Obviously, this framework provided a good opportunity for former Soviet Republics to strengthen their independence and their position vis-à-vis Moscow. To this day, PfP-consultations with regard to security sector reform, civil-military relations, transition to NATO standards, defence management, strengthening of democratic institutions play a positive role (Chitadze 2005: 2).

Yet, the security-related context in Russia's near abroad significantly changed only September 11th, 2001. The subsequent military interventions of coalition forces in Afghanistan (October 7th, 2001) and in Iraq (March 3rd, 2003) required Washington and its allies to install air force bases within the Eurasian region. Therefore, the U.S. received Uzbek permission on October 5th, 2001 to use the air base Khanabad for operations (GlobalSecurity 2001). Similarly, U.S., Canadian, French, Danish, Netherlands and Norwegian troops were allowed to move into Kyrgyzstan. In December 2001, American engineers arrived at Bishkek's Manas international airport to open the airfield for operations.[86]

In addition to the Central Asian air bases, U.S. military instructors landed in Tbilisi, Georgia on May 19th, 2002. Their duty was to train Georgian troops, enabling them to fight Chechen guerrillas believed to be operating in the countries Pankisi Gorge.

At the top of these developments, NATO started to prepare its fifth enlargement round. Already in spring 2002, it became apparent that the alliance would invite seven eastern European countries to take up accession talks. This development loomed extraordinarily large on Russia's Western horizon, even if NATO officials consequently reassured Moscow.

Understandably, all these developments looked menacing from a Russian perspective. Nevertheless and to the surprise of political observers,[87] President Putin adopted a mild attitude and reacted in a relaxed and even minded manner. It was not a coincidence that Putin was the first state leader solidly uniting with President Bush after

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[86] See Global Security, "Manas International Airport: Ganci Air Base, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan", 18.09.2006 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/manas-imagery.htm, 16.01.2007).

[87] Representatively, see Rumer and Sokolsky (2002).

the terrorist attacks. Obviously, 911 was a formidable opportunity for Putin to justify his new pragmatic course (Parkhalina 2005) aiming to improve ties with the West.

Within Russia's political arena, Putin's new approach was barely understood. Especially the national defence and security establishment in Moscow was stunned and upset. They advocated a tougher stance and decisive reactions in order to safeguard Russia's weight in world politics and to keep Moscow's backyard clean of third party intrusion.[88] Therefore, massive political pressure on Putin emerged along the domestic internal front (Kobrinskaya 2002, Rumer and Sokolsky 2002). Raising the status of the Collective Security Treaty to an international organisation (CSTO) may be viewed as one of Putin's major responses to soothe conservative elite members.

Upon the transformation of the Collective Security Treaty into a full-fledged military-political organisation, new goals were defined. According to its charter, the CSTO was designed to strengthen 'peace, international and regional security and stability, protection - on a collective basis - of the independence and the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member-states'.[89] The CSTO was meant to become an eastern counterpart of NATO[90] involving the states of Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Tadzhikistan.

Officially, the CSTO was aimed at fighting common challenges like drugs, terrorism and terrorist groupings, illegal migration, trafficking of immigrants as well as organised criminal groupings in some specific industries.[91] However, it goes without saying that through the CSTO, Moscow in fact gained new capabilities in keeping its military dominance in the ex-Soviet republics.[92] The Russian decision-making process concerning the establishment of the CSTO will be reconstructed in depth within the framework of Part III of the present study.

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88 Torbakov (2004) distinguishes three main schools of thought with regard to CIS policies: Neo-imperialists, benevolent integrationists and the pragmatists.

89 Chapter II, article 3 of the ОДКБ charter signed in Kishinev on October 07th, 2003.

90 'CIS Collective Security Treaty Update' in: Izvestia 19.03.2003, ISI database 18.05.2005.

91 Nikolaj Bordjuzha, ОДКБ General Secretary, in: Krasnaya Zvezda 'To do away with drugs mafia', 25.07.2003, ISI database 18.05.05.

92 CCPR – Russia Foreign Politics 'Foreign Politics of the Week', 23.03.2003, ISI database 18.05.2005.

5.3 Institutional changes in the far abroad

This subchapter will focus on the emergence of the two far abroad case studies: the establishment of the NATO-Russia council (NRC) and the Common European Economic Space (CEES). What kind of global political developments triggered these issues? In short, NRC and CEES appeared on the political agenda due to significant institutional changes within the Western hemisphere. Particularly, the two most important groupings – the EU and NATO – evolved at a remarkable pace at the outset of the new millennium.

The EU's eastern enlargement

In contrast to the near abroad issues and to the NRC, the collapse of the World Trade Centre in New York did not play an important role for the CEES case. Obviously, the EU has planned its 5th round of enlargement well before these tragic events. Already in June 1993, the European Council mentioned the potential accession of central and eastern European countries to the EU for the first time.

Nine years later, on October 9th 2002, the Commission recommended to start entry talks with 10 states: Cyprus**,** Czech Republic**,** Estonia**,** Hungary**,** Latvia**,** Lithuania**,** Malta**,** Poland**,** Slovakia and Slovenia. The historic decision to enlarge the EU has been taken at the Copenhagen summit on December 13th, 2002. It was followed by the official accession of the 10 new members on May 1st, 2003.

Even if the Russian Federation did not fundamentally oppose the EU eastern enlargement project, it worried about economic disadvantages in general and about its enclave Kaliningrad in particular (Baranovsky 2002). Solutions had to be found within the framework of the bilateral Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), signed on December 1st 1997.

It is difficult to determine the ultimate trigger for the CEES-project initiation. The idea first and surprisingly came up on the occasion of the 7th EU-Russian summit on May

17th, 2001 in Moscow.[93] Therefore, it maybe assumed that it has been at least informally discussed earlier among members of the Commission, as the eastern enlargement was already on the internal agenda or at least becoming apparent on the horizon. In light of this situation, the EU felt obliged to accommodate Moscow by enhancing the bilateral cooperation agenda.

The CEES intends to create an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia. It shall reduce 'barriers to trade and investment and promote reforms and competitiveness, based on the principles of non-discrimination, transparency and good governance'.[94] In May 2003, the two sides agreed to complement the CEES by three other spaces: the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space on External Security and the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture. Russia's decision-making process with regard to the formation of CEES will be analysed in Chapter 9 of the present study.

NATO enlargement and ABM treaty

Since 1997, the relationship between Russia and NATO has been developed by the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). This institutional framework has been created in order to facilitate bilateral cooperation after decencies of cold war. Yet, latest after the World Trade Center attacks, it became clear that the PJC was outdated. It had to be replaced by a new agreement allowing farther reaching Russian involvement.

At least three impetuses may have lead to the Rome declaration founding the NRC on May 28th 2002. First, the terrorist attacks on 911 significantly changed the relationship between the NATO headquarter in Brussels and Moscow. Putin's immediate expression of solidarity towards Washington on September 12th 2001 and his subsequent pragmatic course engendered sympathy in the Western world (Rumer and Sokolsky 2002). In the end

[93] Expert interview, Swedish Embassy in Moscow, 02.05.2005.
[94] The EU's relation with Russia – The common economic space: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/index.htm#comm, 25.09.2006.

of 2001, both sides felt a historic opportunity to leave behind cold war thinking and to move on to a qualitatively different bilateral relation.

Second, similarly to the EU, NATO was also about to plan its 5th round of enlargement.[95] On November 22nd 2002, seven new countries were invited to begin accession talks. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia signed protocols on March 26th 2003 and formally joined the alliance one year later. It is not entirely clear at what time the potential enlargement appeared on Brussels agenda. However, it is obvious that this issue was unofficially discussed at an early stage. Hence, it has to be assumed that NATO anticipated the enlargement by appeasing Russia with a closer integration within Europe's most powerful defence and security structure. The following statement of U.S. Foreign Minister Colin Powell confirms this link: 'The Rome declaration and other joint initiatives between USA and the Russian Federation had succeeded in making the issue [NATO's eastern enlargement] less of a problem for the Russians and less of an irritant in our relations'.[96] Indeed, Putin's rhetoric against the 'big bang' NATO enlargement[97] softened after 911 (Gallis 2003: 5) and especially after the creation of the NRC in May 2002.

Third, the establishment of the NRC is closely linked with America's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. After September 11th 2001, the U.S. accelerated its plans to deploy the National Missile Defence (NMD). Therefore, they resigned from the ABM treaty on December 13th 2001, which amazingly didn't provoke a sharp reaction of President Putin.[98]

Two reasons account for the soft Russian response. On the one hand, George W. Bush allegedly discussed the issue 'over several meetings this year [2001]'.[99] It seems as

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95 See "The Road to NATO membership", http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/more_info/membership.htm, 19.09.2006.

96 'NATO enlargement to continue despite Russian objections: Powell', Agence France-Presse, 28.05.2002, ISI database, 18.04.2005.

97 "Eastern Europe politics: A 'big bang' NATO enlargement?", Economist Intelligence Unit, 05.06.2002, ISI database, 18.04.2005.

98 "America withdraws from ABM treaty", BBC news, 13.12.2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1707812.stm, 18.09.2006.

99 Ibid.

if the two sides agreed in advance on a new international agreement to replace the ABM. On the other hand, the U.S. accommodated the Russians by announcing and ultimately enabling the NRC. Both issues have been linked at a later stage, on April 12th 2002.

This interpretation is backed by statements made by John Holum (2000), President Clinton's senior adviser on arms control. He considered Russia as the key to managing NMD diplomacy. Washington – even if it was not dependent on Moscow's support – nonetheless strived to address Russia's concerns.

The NRC was created 'as the main forum for advancing NATO-Russia relations, in which the 26 Allies and Russia work together as equal partners to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action'.[100]

In sum, this chapter has shown that the Russian Federation went through difficult times during Putin's first presidential terms. Between 2000 and 2004, it faced a broad range of external challenges both within the near and far abroad. Whereas Moscow's economic and strategic shares on the southern flank were about to shrink, it was confronted with institutional changes of Western organisations.

[100] "NATO-Russia relations", NATO topics, 15.09.2006, http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-russia/index.html, 28.09.2006.

6. Actors and Roles within the Russian Foreign Policy Domain

Whereas the last chapter embedded the four selected case studies in a wider political context, this chapter will describe actors and their roles within the Russian foreign policy domain. The following subchapters will cover the role and significance of different potential foreign policy decision-makers. In sequence, presidential, governmental, parliamentary, economic and other actors will be discussed. However, prior to this discussion, three preliminary remarks about the Russian foreign policy domain shall be made here.

First, it has to be reiterated that the present study focuses on *organisational actors*. In accordance with previous social network analysis (Knoke, Pappi, et al. 1996, Laumann, Heinz, et al. 1991, Laumann and Knoke 1987), the present study views the role of natural persons in public decision-making as less significant. This does not mean that individuals may be ignored. However, as stated in Chapter 2.2, public and private organised interests are believed to have a more effective and systematic impact on foreign policy-making.

Second, it has to be pointed out that the *Russian foreign policy domain is highly dynamic*. In particular, actors, their roles, positions and influences rapidly change. On the one hand, this may be explained by the continuous elite struggle for access to the decision-making process (Rjabov 2005: 48-51). Some actors get knocked-out, new ones appear. Elite and cadre affiliation in Russia is decidedly ephemeral and precarious (Kryshtanovskaja 2005: 99-216, Lapina 1996).

On the other hand, the dynamic domain's landscape stems from administrational reforms. The most extensive reorganisation was decreed by Putin on March 9th 2004.[101] After Prime Minister Kasjanov was replaced by Fradkov in February already, the number of ministries was cut from 23 to 16.[102] Within the framework of a major restructuring, the

[101] No. 314 'About system and structure of federal administrational organs' (‚О системе и структуре федеральных органов исполнительной власти').
[102] Politicheskii zhurnal No. 9, p. 21, 15.03.2004.

ministerial department heads were reduced from 250 to a hundred and a vertical top-to-bottom organisation structure implemented.[103] The actor's presentation in this chapter reflects the governmental structure before the reform's implementation.

Third, when analysing Russian public policy-making, *crime and corruption* are factors that have to be kept in mind. The present study does not treat criminal groups as independent actors. Rather, criminal activities in general and corruption in particular are considered as embedded phenomena in decision-making. Their magnitude is hardly assessable. According to the INDEM foundation, paid bribes in Russia have risen from 36 bn USD in 2001 to 319 bn USD in 2005 (Popov 2005). Yet, these figures may also be exaggerated (Lavelle 2005). Whatever the estimates are, crime groups have a major impact on foreign policy making (Orttung 2006).

[103] RIANovosti 01.04.2004 'Summing-up: Government to make Russia's top managers'.

6.1 Presidential actors

President

According to Article 80 of the Russian constitution, the head of the State represents the Russian Federation in international relations. He governs the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, holds negotiations and signs international treaties, agreements as well as ratification instruments of the Russian Federation.[104] Further more, the President is the supreme commander-in-chief of the armed forces,[105] the head of the Security Council and of his own administration.[106]

In fact, the constitutional powers of the president with regard to international relations are far-reaching. 91% of experts view the president as the main subject in foreign policy-making (Korobeinikov 2005: 75). This fact may be assessed ambiguously: obviously, the concentration of almost all policy-making responsibilities in the hands of the president has its advantages. It is supposed to contribute to a more effective, efficient and coherent policy formulation. However, a constitutional super-president in foreign affairs lacks of both democratic control, long-term stability and expertise (Korobeinikov 2005). This is the shady side of one and the same medal.

Beyond doubt, the main constitutional provisions show that Putin de jure holds main authority in foreign policy-making. This may be historically explained, as Russian foreign affairs have always been regarded as 'tsarskoe delo' – important matters to be exclusively addressed by the Czar (Trenin and Lo 2005: 9). How does it look like de facto?

As mentioned in the introduction of the present study, the role of president Putin in decision-making has been interpreted again and again with different outcomes. The whole range of opinions became apparent on the occasion of the expert interviews gathered in Moscow: on one end of the spectrum, the head of the state is considered as a puppet

[104] Art. 86 Constitution of the Russian Federation.
[105] Art. 87 Constitution of the Russian Federation.
[106] Art. 83 Constitution of the Russian Federation.

controlled by the Federal Security Service.[107] On the other end, Putin is described as an almighty leader, who has been trained throughout his career to take his own decisions.[108] The president mostly disregards advices from his immediate surroundings and finally decides himself.[109]

However, recapitulating all existing opinions, the common denominator may be formulated as follows: Putin is neither a puppet nor a dictator. He may be conceived as a referee, as a balancer or mediator between different competing groups.[110] Thereby, he continuously needs to compromise and deal with trade-offs. It has to be stressed that Putin's role cannot be painted in either black or white. Rather, his position and influence in foreign policy-making varies. Sometimes, he takes decisions within his 'kitchen cabinet', where he depends on one or few advices.[111] Sometimes, he simply decides on the spot and alone.[112]

Presidential administration

According to article 83 of the constitution, the President forms his own administration. Its function is to support the President to fulfil all his duties. Therefore, the presidential *apparat* plays a significant role, particularly with regard to foreign policy planning and implementation (Korobeinikov 2005: 75).

The approximately 170 employees of the presidential administration[113] are firmly directed and closely connected with the President. Its organisational structure been reformed in March 2004.[114] From 2000 until then, it encompassed the following units (Grankin 2001, Maximov 2003):

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[107] Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow, 01.04.2005.
[108] Expert interview, Fond "Politika", Moscow, 01.07.2005.
[109] Expert interview, PIR-Center, Moscow: 14.04.2005.
[110] Expert interview, PIR-Center, Moscow: 22.04.2005.
[111] Expert interview, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow: 04.07.2005.
[112] Expert interview, Swedish Embassy to Russia, Moscow: 02.05.2005.
[113] As per November 2001, confidential source of information.
[114] Mukhin (2006) and Tsepljaev (2004) both describe the presidential administration's contemporary structure and the most important officials.

- Direction (Chief of staff and his deputies)
- Aides of the President
- Advisors of the President
- Plenipotentiary Representatives of the President
- Presidential Services
- Presidential Executive Divisions

Putin's closest organisational unit is the administration's direction. Between 2000 and 2004, the chief of staff changed once. In October 2003, Putin replaced Aleksander Voloshin - a former member of the Yeltsin Family - by Dmitrii Medvedev. Apparently, Putin and the administration's head often discuss foreign policy issues and sometimes, they even decide without further consultations.[115]

The chief of staff's deputies also play a crucial role in foreign policy-making. Predominantly, Deputy Sergei Prikhodko - nowadays presidential aid - has been responsible since June 2000 for international relations. He prepares analytical information for the president, organises and coordinates all activities with regard to foreign policy formulation and implementation.[116] Moreover, the two deputies Igor Sechin and Vladislav Surkov have a massive influence on decision-making processes, since they are close to the President.[117] Even if they are mostly engaged in domestic *polit-tekhnologia*, their imprints on Russia's foreign policy become visible once in a while.[118]

Aids, advisors and plenipotentiary representatives of the president may as well be regarded as highly important to the foreign policy-making processes. Their influence is twofold: on the one hand, they are fulfilling a coordinating function between different

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[115] According to an expert (24.05.2005), Medvedev was Putin's one and only advisor with regard to the Ukrainian presidential elections in November/December 2004.

[116] http://www.grankin.ru/dosye/ru_bio2.htm, 11.10.2006.

[117] Kamyshev (2004) rated Sechin as the most influential player within the Presidential Administration. Surkov appeared as number three on the ranking behind the chief of staff Medvedev.

[118] Expert interview, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow: 04.07.2005. See also for instance Surkov's remarks with regard to national ideology (RIANovosti, 30.08.2006).

ministries.[119] Due to their personal closeness to the president and their polyvalent personal profile, they can independently interact with governmental actors. On the other hand, the President's crew also plays a technical role (Carnegie 2004). It channels a lot of information and requests designed for the president. Lobbying activities of economic actors for instance mainly involve the president's aids, advisors or representatives.[120]

Presidential services and presidential executive divisions involve personal assistance, press service, protocol office, cadre development division and a variety of other bureaus. Their impact on Russian foreign policies is restricted.

Security Council

According to article 83 of the constitution, the president forms and heads the Security Council. This institution represents the main actor with regard to Russian national security. Under the terms of the corresponding law,[121] the Security Council is responsible for the preparation of presidential decisions in the field of domestic and foreign security. More precisely, the Security Council and its interdepartmental commissions acquire information, perform strategic analysis or outlooks and control the implementation of decisions (Carnegie 2004). Therefore, the Security Council officially plays an important role with regard to foreign policy-making.

For the purpose of the present study, the Security Council is divided in two organisational subunits:

- Direction (Secretary, his administration and the Scientific Council)
- Members of the Security Council

[119] Expert interview, INION, Moscow: 24.05.2005.
[120] Expert interview, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Moscow: 05.05.2005.
[121] Zakon Rossiskoi Federatsi ot 5 Marta 1992 No 2446-I "O Bezopasnosti", st.11-19.

The direction encompasses the Secretary, his administration and the Scientific Council. From March 2001 until March 2004, it has been leaded by Secretary Vladimir Rushajlo, a rather weak *apparachik*,[122] who nowadays chairs the executive committee of the CIS. The permanent members include the key actors of the national security community: the head of the presidential administration, the Prime Minister, the Ministers of foreign affairs, defence and interior, the speakers of the two parliamentary chambers as well as the directors of the two intelligence services.

In practice, the influence of the Security Council on Russia's foreign policy-making processes was restricted between 2000 and 2004. This may be explained primarily by the fact that the above-mentioned juridical provisions are formulated in a general and abstract manner (Korobeinikov 2005: 76). Hence, its position and role within the system of foreign policy institutions has remained unclear. Additionally, the Security Council's position has been considerably weakened under Putin. Its expert knowledge has less frequently been used for decision-making.[123] The President and the *siloviki* are simply not interested in an external coordinating body. And last but not least, the role of the Security Council has been weakened by frequent personal changes and continuous reorganisations (Carnegie 2004).

Against this background, presidential actors may generally be considered as most influential on foreign policy-making processes. It has to be expected that they play prominent roles within particular policy-networks. This will be empirically verified and discussed in parts Part III and Part IV of the present study. The next subchapter will focus on governmental actors and their leverage on Russian foreign affairs.

[122] Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 04.07.2005.
[123] Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 10.05.2005.

6.2 Governmental actors

According to article 114 of the constitution, the Federal government of the Russian Federation shall carry out measures to secure the defence of the country, the state security, and the implementation of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. This provision basically defines the governmental role in foreign policy-making. Whereas presidential actors take decisions, the government ensures their implementation.

However, this picture is much too simplistic. The Russian Federal government's structure is vast and complex. Prior to the administrational reform in 2004, it encompassed a large amount of organisational units, different accountabilities and partly overlapping responsibilities. It is necessary to analyse governmental actors more closely in order to determine their potential influence on foreign policy-making.



Figure 8: Ministierial structure of the Russian Federation

Between 2000 and 2004, the Prime Minister headed 18 Ministries, the Governmental Administration and numerous Agencies, Services, Committees, Commissions and other federal bodies. Five Federal Ministries and five Federal Services were directly subordinated to the President, as these 'power agencies'[124] all were (and still are) essential with regard to Federal interests. For the present study, they certainly could have also been classified as presidential actors. Yet, they are discussed within the framework of this subchapter, since power agencies commonly appear on governmental organisation charts.



Figure 9: Federal Agencies, Services, Committees, Commissions and other bodies

Apparently, within the framework of the present study, it is not possible to investigate every single actor in terms of his potential roles in foreign policy-making. Therefore, some organisational units have been taken together and treated as one category. However, some actors such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have to be analysed more carefully. In this

[124] This term has sometimes been used to describe presidentially controlled organs. See for instance Saradzhyan and Yablokova (2004).

case, actors are examined on the level of administrational departments. Subsequently, the most important actor categories will be discussed one by one.

Prime Ministry

For the purpose of the present study, the Prime Ministry (PM) consists of the following two elements (Grankin 2001, Maximov 2003):

- Direction (Prime Minister, his deputies and plenipotentiary representatives)
- Governmental Administration (Departments of International Cooperation, Defense Complex, Finance, Economy & Property, Energetics & Natural Resources)

From May 2000 until January 2004, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasjanov headed the government. Although he and his deputies regularly attended official presidential and governmental meetings, the influence of the Prime Ministry on foreign policies was weak.[125] This seems to be true also for the post-Kasjanov era under Mikhail Fradkov. The PM plays a coordinating role between Ministries, Services, Agencies, Commissions, Committees and other administrational units. Its involvement in policy content formulation is low.

In contrast, particular Ministries, Services or other governmental bodies and their sub departments may under certain conditions directly participate in foreign policy-making. This will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

[125] Expert interview, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Moscow: 05.05.2005.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the central governmental actor with regard to foreign policy. Its organisational structure in effect during Putin's first presidential term has been slightly adjusted for the present study (Grankin 2001, Maximov 2003):

- Direction (Minister and his deputies)
- 1st European Department (Mediterranean and Western European countries)
- 2nd European Department (Northern European countries)
- 3rd European Department (South-Eastern European countries)
- 4th European Department (Central European countries)
- Northern America Department
- Latin America Department
- Middle East & Northern Africa Department
- Africa Department
- 1st Asian Department
- 2nd Asian Department
- 3rd Asian Department
- 1st CIS Department (General Cooperation)
- 2nd CIS Department (Belarus, Moldavia, Ukraine)
- 3rd CIS Department (Central Asian countries)
- 4th CIS Department (Caucasian countries)
- Relations to Federal Regions Department
- All-European Cooperation Department
- International Organisation Department
- Security & Disarmament Department
- Humanitarian Cooperation & Human Rights Department
- Culture & UNESCO Department
- Economic Cooperation Department
- Legal Department

- Personnel Department
- Consular Service
- Leadership issues Department
- Financial Department
- Legal Department
- Abroad Financial capital and property Department
- Ambassadors

The Russian law does not exactly determine the role of the ministry in foreign policy-making (Korobeinikov 2005: 76). The corresponding act only delegates the coordination of international relations to the Foreign Ministry according to the President's directives.[126] Although, this coordinating function of the MFA is not explained in greater detail. Therefore, the exact tasks and functions vary and ultimately depend on the behaviour of the presidential actors.

In practice, the MFA is not able to fulfil this coordinating task (Carnegie 2004). There are several reasons, which may explain this fact. As a peripheral actor, the Ministry is not in a position to effectively coordinate all the activities on different administrational sectors and levels. Furthermore, it simply lacks the capacities and resources to do so.[127] Against the lucrative private sector, the financially limited Ministry has difficulties competing for sufficient and skilled labour. However, the main reason for the MFA's weakness lies in the fact that it has been taken under the special service's wings. It seems as if the *siloviki* nowadays control structures and processes within the MFA (Carnegie 2004). In light of these circumstances, the role of the MFA is reduced to two responsibilities: preparation and implementation of decisions.[128]

With regard to the *preparation of decisions*, the influence of the MFA is significant. The expertise of concerned departments basically flows bottom up into the process of

[126] Zakon ot 04.01.1999, N4-F3 "O Koordinatsii Mezhdunarodnykh I Vneshnepoliticheskikh Svjazei Subjektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii", St. 11.
[127] Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Moscow: 01.04.2005.
[128] Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Moscow: 04.05.2005.

foreign policy-making. However, it is questionable whether these documents reach presidential circles in due time and whether they are noticed at all. As stated in Chapter 1, foreign policy formulation often resembles crisis management, when the need for action within short time frames is high. Usually, the MFA prepares the ground for decision-making by gathering technical information and facilitating contacts[129].

The main role of the MFA is to *implement decisions*. Under Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (09.1998 – 03.2004), the agency was relatively successful in softening, explaining, streamlining and packing decisions taken by presidential actors.[130] However, the pure implementation of foreign policy decisions is a thankless role. The ministry often acts as a fig leaf, forced to cover odd presidential judgements.[131]

Ministry of Defence

The de facto role of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is comparable to the one of the MFA. In principle, it is reduced to prepare and implement decisions taken by presidential actors.[132] Even if Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov (03.2001 – dato) is a close ally of President Putin (Makarkin 2003: 59-73), his organisation seems to have a restricted impact on foreign policy-making.

For this analysis, the Ministry has been split-up in four subunits. Given the instrumental role in foreign policy-making, a more detailed division of the actor would have been inappropriate.

- Direction (Minister and his deputies)
- General Staff
- Departments

[129] Expert interview, Independent Advisor, Moscow: 29.04.2005.
[130] Expert interview, Swiss Embassy, Moscow: 31.01.2006.
[131] This role has become visible during the Ukrainian presidential elections 2004/2005, the talks with Hamas or the gas conflict with Ukraine in January 2006 – to name a few cases.
[132] Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Moscow: 04.05.2005.

The MoD's main function is commanding the Russian army. This task includes the formulation of the national security concept, the military doctrine and long-term military planning strategies.[133] The results of these activities only affect foreign policy-making indirectly. Nevertheless, the present study pays attention to the MoD and its subunits, because two of the four case studies cover security issues.

Ministry of Economic Development and Trade

The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT) is the last ministry discussed individually. Its general influence on foreign policy-making is low. However, as two of the four issues treated in the present study involve external economic relations, the Economic Ministry has to be analysed more in-depth. Between 2000 and 2004, the MEDT encompassed 58 departments and directorates (Maximov 2003). Due to this gigantic organisational structure, the present study will only focus on four subunits:

- Direction (Minister and his deputies)
- Department for External Economic Affairs
- Department for Multilateral Cooperation with CIS Countries
- Department for Trade Policy and Multilateral Trade Negotiations

Unlike the rest of the MEDT, these four units all deal with foreign economic affairs. Their influence on particular foreign policy issues may be considerable, since they are the only state actors possessing the technical knowledge. This special role of the MEDT may also be due to the narrow relationship between the direction (Minister German Gref, 05.2000 – dato) and the Kremlin (Makarkin 2003: 59-73).

Other Federal Ministries

So far, three ministries have been discussed in detail. Whereas the MFA represents the official actor in Russian foreign affairs, the MoD and the MEDT are primarily affected

[133] See Viktor Litovkin's comment on RIANovosti, 23.07.2004, about a "New Chain of Command".

with regard to the four case studies. Certainly, it would be interesting to discuss at least all five Ministries, which are directly subordinated to the President. However, it can be assumed that the influence of the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Justice as well as Civil Defence, Emergencies and Disaster Relief on foreign policy decision-making is minimal. Their interests and capacities are basically oriented towards other political sectors.

Therefore, the remaining 20 ministries are collectively listed on the questionnaire without considering their subunits:

- Ministry of Internal Affairs
- Ministry of Justice
- Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Disaster Relief
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Labour and Social Development
- Ministry of Health Care
- Ministry of Culture
- Ministry of Press, Telecom and Communication
- Ministry of Agriculture
- Ministry of State Property
- Ministry of Finance
- Ministry of Tax and Duties
- Ministry of Transport
- Ministry of Communication
- Ministry of Railways
- Ministry of Natural Resources
- Ministry of Nuclear Energy
- Ministry of Energy
- Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology
- Ministry of Anti-Trust and Business Support

Federal Services

Within the Russian government, there exist numerous Federal Services. Until 2004, five services were directly subordinate to the President, eight services were accountable to the PM. This organisational structure (see Figure 9) reflects the significance of these Federal Services with regard to presidential priorities. For this reason, the present study included the following categories in the questionnaire:

- Federal Security Service (FSB)
- Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
- State Courier Service
- Federal Border Service
- Federal Guard Service
- Other Federal Services

Expert opinions about the influence of these most important Services on foreign policy-making vary considerably. Some observers believe that the intelligence services in general - and FSB in particular - fundamentally determine the Russian strategic course of action.[134] They stress that former KGB-agent Putin bases his foreign policy judgments predominantly on secret services. Security-related services just manage to capture presidential actors more successfully than other actors.[135] Apparently, this led to a general mistrust between *razvedchiki*[136] and other officials within the Kremlin walls.

The colossal size of security services in Russia confirms their high significance. From 2000 until 2004, FSB alone employed approximately 92'000 functionaries, whereas the Federal Guard Service's staff counted around 30'000 (Mukhin 2005). Comparatively,

[134] Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Moscow: 01.04.2005.
[135] Expert interview, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Moscow: 05.05.2005.
[136] Persons belonging to or affiliated with secret services.

2049 officials worked for the Ministry for Economic Development and Trade in November 2005.[137]

In contrast to this point of view, some experts consider the picture of almighty security services as overrated. They argue that these services generally lack the technical expertise to effectively influence foreign policy issues.[138] According to their opinion, the Services are more concerned with practical matters within the sphere of domestic security.

Federal Agencies, Committees and Commissions

For the present study, Federal Agencies, Committees and Commissions are merged to three categories:

- Agencies (Aviation & Space, Patents & Trade Marks, etc.)
- Committees (Fishing Industry, Statistics, etc.)
- Commissions (Energetics, Stock Markets, etc.)

Given their specialization and their predominant domestic orientation, these organisational units are supposed to have a negligible influence on foreign policy-making processes. As they are directed by the Prime Ministry, they are just too far away from the foreign policy epicentre in Moscow.

Other Federal Bodies

Similar to Agencies, Committees and Commissions, other Federal Bodies do have - if at all - a fractional impact on foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, the following actors have been listed on the questionnaire:

- Bank for Foreign Trade
- Vneshekonombank
- Savings Bank

[137] www.economy.gov.ru, 21.10.2006.
[138] Expert interview, Independent Advisor, Moscow: 29.04.2005.

- Central Bank
- Federal Assets Fond
- Audit Chamber
- Central Elections

Some of these organisations may have hardly any stakes in foreign policy, but it cannot be excluded beforehand that, for instance, the Central Bank or the *Vneshekonombank* (Foreign Economic Bank) have an interest in certain foreign economic issues. Due to their technical know-how, key decision-makers may sometimes hear their voice.

6.3 Parliamentary actors

The Russian Federal Assembly consists of two legislative bodies: the State Duma (lower chamber) and the Federation Council (upper chamber). Their constitutionally granted codetermination rights in foreign policy-making are limited.[139] According to article 106, laws on the following issues have to be adopted by both houses:

- financial, currency, credit, customs regulation, and money issues;
- ratification and denunciation of international treaties and agreements;
- the status and protection of the state border;
- peace and war.

In practice, the influence of parliamentary actors on Russia's foreign policies seems to be even weaker. The Federal Assembly seems to have almost no impact on practical decision-making.[140] Its review of international treaties or agreements does not represent a major barrier for key policy-maker, but legitimises negotiation outcomes.[141] Under Putin, a series of administrational measures have led to a monopolization of the political landscape within the legislative arena. The party of power 'United Russia' completely controls both chambers (Ivanchenko 2004).

Nevertheless, the roles of parliamentary actors have to be analysed and assessed in a differentiated manner. Under certain conditions, some organisations may have admission to decision-making processes. Subsequently, the State Duma and the Federation Council are examined more closely.

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[139] Compare with U.S. library of Congress, country listing 'Russia – The Parliament', http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ru0166), 19.10.2006.
[140] Expert interview, Federation Council, Moscow: 14.02.2006.
[141] Expert interview, MGIMO, Moscow: 14.04.2005.

State Duma

The State Duma is a complex and large organisation. Between 2000 and 2004, it included a council, an administration, 28 committees, 15 commissions, different fractions and 450 representatives (Grankin 2001, Maximov 2003, Segedinenko 2004). For the purpose of the present study, it is not necessary to consider all subunits, as numerous of them obviously have little relation to foreign affairs. Therefore, the following small group of actors were selected based on their importance and the issues they cover:

- Duma Council (Chair and his deputies)
- Administration
- Committee for Security
- Committee for Nationality
- Committee for CIS Cooperation
- Committee for International Affairs
- Committee for Defence
- Committee for Natural Resources
- Committee for Economic Policy
- Committee for Energy, Transport & Communication
- Commission for Geopolitics

In certain circumstances, these actors may have a limited influence on foreign policy-making. The Duma Council sometimes has direct access to presidential actors and a whispering voice in decision-making when an international treaty or agreement has to be ratified.[142] Similarly, a particular Committee ore Commission may become involved in foreign policy-making processes, when expertise or a clear popular statement is required. However, these influences are diminutive and rare. Under President Putin, the State Duma

[142] Expert interview, Independent Advisor, Moscow: 29.04.2005.

has lost its role as a counter-balance to the Kremlin. Its institutional impact on foreign policies is practically non-existent.[143]

Federation Council

The role of the Federation Council in foreign policy-making corresponds to the one of the State Duma. Actors of the Federation Council barely have an institutional influence on foreign policy-making processes. Nevertheless, the following subunits are selected and listed separately in the questionnaire:

- Chair
- Administration
- Committee for Security & Defence
- Committee for Economic Policy
- Committee for CIS Cooperation
- Committee for International Affairs

[143] Expert interview, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Moscow: 05.05.2005.

6.4 Economic actors

What kind of role do economic actors play in foreign policy making? This question has absorbed many experts since the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the 1990's, dubious privatisation processes engendered a Russian business community, which gradually hijacked the Russian political sphere. Especially after Yeltsin's re-election in 1996, oligarchs were able to selectively bend foreign policy decisions to their favour.[144] Big industrial and financial players became more influential players as they had direct access to information and knowledge of the decision-making process (Kobrinskaya 2000). However, the real impact of business actors on Russia's international relations remained limited. Since each group fought for its own particular interests, they mostly neutralized each other (Schröder 2001).

Under the new President Vladimir Putin, a freshening wind reached the Russian political circles. Without massive tensions or struggles, Putin managed to transform the regime from Yeltsin's oligarchic authoritarianism to bureaucratic authoritarianism (Shevtsova 2005: 322-351). At the latest, the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the break-up of his Western-style managed and successful corporation YUKOS made it clear once and for all: the President will no longer allow the business sector to interfere in politics. These territories belonged strictly to Putin and his crew.

In light of these developments after the year 2000, economic actors were no longer able and eager to manipulate Russia's authority (Kononenko 2005). Business-state relations were redefined by concluding a relatively simple deal: Under Putin, economic actors are left alone by civil authorities if they basically keep silent, mind their business and pay their taxes.[145]

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[144] Representatively for a broad range of literature, see Mommsen (2004:56-92).

[145] Numerous experts have analysed the transformation of business-state relations under Putin. Representatively, see Jack (2004: 174-215), Maass (2004), Zelenin (2005).

Yet, this re-established primacy of politics over business does not mean that economic actors are no longer influential in public policy-making. Since political decisions often have a direct impact on the economy, Russian transnational corporations continue to be highly interested in good relationships with state decision-makers and vice versa. Particularly with regard to foreign policies, Russian business is dependent on close ties to the Kremlin.

Basically, business actors play an important role in foreign policy-making if their interests coincide with state interests. According to Robert Orttung (2006: 61), the understanding of this interplay 'helps explain the role companies and crime groups play in promoting conflict or cooperation on Russia's borders'.

Common interests may be identified in two fields (Orttung 2006: 61-64). First, the state and corporations both desire to expand markets for Russian business abroad. To this end, the energy sector, in particular, and the military-industrial complex have contributed towards formulating Russian foreign policies. State-business cooperation are successful such as the acquisition of oil fields in the Caspian Region, the establishment of gas transit routes to EU countries or arms exports to Middle Eastern states – to name a few examples.

A second common interest lies in developing closer ties with foreign countries. Here, energy companies are instrumental for the Russian state to expand its influence within the post-Soviet space. However, other economic actors may also have an influence on foreign policy decision-making. Considering the variety and intensity of Russian business interests within the CIS space, lobbying of Russian firms in the Kremlin is particularly effective.[146]

Lobbying processes on the Federal level are highly complex and opaque (Orttung 2006: 55-57). Even if only Putin initiates the involvement of an economic actor in foreign policy-making, he hardly meets business representatives personally. Business interests are usually channelled, examined and passed-on by the presidential administration. This is a new feature in Russian foreign policy-making, as during the 1990's, lobbyists

[146] Expert interview, Higher School of Economics, Moscow: 06.05.2005.

concentrated their activities on the parliament.[147] The MFA barely transmits business interests (Carnegie 2004).

For the purpose of the present study, economic actors are categorised based on four sectors: energy, finance, industry and service. Obviously, it is impossible to list all existing corporations. Therefore, the questionnaire only considers the five most important energy firms individually. There are good reasons for this proceeding. In 2004, Russia's energy sector provided 44% of all export revenues.[148] Putin is determined to maximise the role of Russia's energy resources in foreign policy (Olcott 2004). Compared to the other sectors, the energy dimension plays a dominant role in Russia's international relations (Carnegie 2004). Therefore, it is justified to list these five enterprises separately and cover the other sectors as broad categories.

- Energy sector (Gazprom, Lukoil, RAO UES, Transneft, Yukos, other companies)
- Financial sector
- Industrial sector
- Service sector

From 2000 until 2004, five companies have dominated the energy sector. Gazprom is the largest company: 50.002% of its shares are controlled by the Russian Federation. Currently, Gazprom employs 330'000 people and contributes with its taxes more than 25% of the Russian Federal budget (Kupchinsky 2006). As Gazprom is closely intertwined with the state, there is no doubt about its role in Russian foreign policy-making.

Lukoil is the second largest private oil Company worldwide by proven hydrocarbon reserves. It is mainly (62.93%) controlled by ING Bank Eurasia ZAO, but has close ties to state authorities. Unified Energy System (RAO UES) is the largest electricity producer and distributor as well as heat provider of the Russian Federation. It is a state controlled

[147] Expert interview, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Moscow: 05.05.2005.
[148] Worldbank, 'Russian Federation at a glance', August 13th, 2006, http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/rus_aag.pdf, 22.10.2006.

giant that also exports power primarily to CIS countries. Therefore, it may be assumed that RAO UES has an impact on Russia's near abroad policies.

Transneft coordinates and manages oil transportation through long-distance pipelines to refineries in Russia and abroad. It is completely controlled by the Russian Federation and represents a major factor in Russia's foreign policy formulation. Until 2003, Yukos was Russia's number two in oil production, but at the same time the enfant terrible in the eyes of the Kremlin. The privately owned and Western-style managed corporate group started to break apart as state authorities prosecuted the company due to tax fraud.

The influence of the financial sector on foreign policy-making is unclear. Although Russia's banking system for the most part belongs to the state, it is supposedly only indirectly instrumentalised for international affairs. The same holds true for the Russian service sector. The industrial sphere occasionally has a voice in decision-making processes. The military-industrial complex is a major factor that is taken into account by foreign policy-makers[149]. Between 2000 and 2003, arms exports accounted to more than 17 bn. USD[150]. This is approximately one fourth of total exported manufactures.[151]

It has to be added that the significance of business actors in foreign policy-making has generally augmented under Putin. As insubordinate tycoons have been repelled from the political sphere, obedient state-controlled economic players have had smoother access to decision-making. This trend has been supported by the strengthening state control over strategically important sectors that go far beyond oil and gas (Gavshina 2005).

[149] Expert interview, MGIMO, Moscow: 05.05.2005.
[150] Source: 'Voenno-promyshlennyi Kompleks', Kommersant VLAST, 24.05.2004.
[151] Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 14.02.2006.

6.5 Other actors

So far, the most capital players of the Russian foreign policy domain have been presented and assessed. However, it would be wrong to consider only presidential, governmental, parliamentary and economic actors as potential foreign policy-makers. In fact, there exist more organisations, whose influence on international issues cannot a priori be excluded. Therefore, this subchapter focuses on four additional actor categories: regional actors, judiciary actors, political parties and miscellaneous actors.

Regional actors

The autonomy of regional actors with regard to Russian foreign policy issues has significantly changed. Under Yeltsin, some regions had a major impact on the Federal level. They were not only able to participate in decision-making processes, they also enjoyed enhanced freedom to establish and cultivate their own relations to foreign countries and institutions.[152]

Under Putin, asymmetric and accentuated regionalism came to an end. He introduced a streamlined structure of seven plenipotentiary representatives, each controlling a federal district. After 2000, the autonomy of regional actors was drastically reduced (Trenin and Lo 2005: 13). As a result, regional concerns and interests hardly – or only indirectly - flow into the foreign policy-making process.

Nevertheless, the questionnaire does not renounce to place regional actors at the disposal. 89 Federal subjects are divided in five consolidated groups:

- Republics
- Oblasti

[152] See for instance Alexandrov (2001), who analysed the city of Moscow's position among regions with regard to Russian foreign and security policy.

- Autonomous Okrugy & Oblasti
- Krai
- Cities of federal importance (Moscow, St. Petersburg)

It has to be mentioned that the seven districts and their presidential envoys are not considered here. Since they are organisationally integrated in the presidential administration, they are treated as presidential actors.

Judiciary actors

According to article 118 of the Russian constitution, courts alone administer justice in the Russian Federation. Judges are independent and submit only to the constitution and to the federal law. Consequently, judiciary actors are supposed to have nothing to do with Russian international affairs.

In practice however, an influence of judiciary actors in public policy-making cannot be totally excluded. Two arguments may be brought forward to back this point. First, as Russia still lacks an independent and effective judiciary system (Krasnov 2004), state authorities and courts are to a certain extent interlinked. It is not exaggerated to state that Putin's regime - despite its constitutional provisions - by and large controls judiciary actors (Voswinkel 2005).

Second, national jurisdiction has a potential impact of on bilateral international relations. The 'Adamov-affair' has impressively illustrated this. In December 2005, the Swiss Federal tribunal finally decided to extradite the former nuclear energy minister Evgenii Adamov to Russian instead of U.S. judiciary authorities. Prior to this, Moscow exerted massive pressure on Swiss authorities[153].

Hence, the present study considers the following Federal players as potential actors in Russian foreign policy (Grankin 2001):

[153] See 'Adamow wird an Russland ausgeliefert', Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 30.12.2005.

- Supreme Court
- Supreme Arbitration Court
- General Prosecutor
- Constitutional Court

Political parties

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has developed a dysfunctional and extremely unstable party system. According to Riggs and Schraeder (2004), this is one of the major impediments to real democratization. Against this background, the present study only considers political organisations that have received more than 5% of votes at the Duma elections in December 2003. Accordingly, the following parties are integrated in the questionnaire:

- United Russia
- Communist Party
- Liberal-democratic Party
- Motherland

The Russian political party landscape can roughly be divided in two parts: the party of power and opposition parties. United Russia represents the party of power. At the Duma elections 2003, it received 38% of the votes and hence possesses the majority within the Russian lower chamber.[154] Since Putin's regime controls the party, its function boils down to legitimizing the government's decisions through its parliamentary faction (Stanovaya 2005). As the party is 'polit-technologically' constructed for the domestic political arena,[155] international issues rarely appear on its agenda. Therefore, United Russia hardly plays any role with regard to foreign policy-making.

[154] Data according to the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, www.cikrf.ru, 23.10.2006.
[155] Expert statement, Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow: 07.02.2006.

The rest of the political parties represent opposition parties. Similarly to United Russia, the Communist, Liberal-democratic and Motherland party primarily care about domestic politics. Their opinions on international issues mostly constitute propagandistic voices, that are scarcely relevant to realistic foreign policy-making (Trenin and Lo 2005: 13).

Miscellaneous actors

What kind of other actors have to be regarded as potential foreign policy decision-makers? Apparently, it is not possible to list all kinds of remaining organisations individually. Therefore, miscellaneous actors shall be summarized. The following categories are included within the questionnaire:

- Religious actors (Orthodox, Muslim)
- Academic actors
- Media
- Societal actors

Religious actors have considerably gained popularity in post-Soviet Russia. The biggest institution constitutes the Orthodox Church, which bands together approximately 72% of the Russian population.[156] Even if the Russian Federation is a secular state according to its constitution, the Orthodox Church has nonetheless become the established national church over the last few years (Soldatov 2004).

The Russian Orthodox Church under its patriarch Alexi II seems to have an influence on the Kremlin with regard to specific domestic issues.[157] However, its role in foreign policy-making is limited. Sometimes, the Orthodox Church may have a voice when issues about the relationship between Moscow and the Vatican[158] are under

[156] This estimate also includes believers, who do not actively practice. Source: Country studies, Library of US Congress, http://countrystudies.us/russia/37.htm, 24.10.2006.
[157] Expert interview, MGIMO, Moscow: 14.04.2005.
[158] Expert interview, Independent Advisor, Moscow: 29.04.2005.

consideration. It also has an imprint on Russian-Ukrainian relations, as Kiev constitutes the original centre of the Orthodox Church.[159]

The Islamic community accounts to approximately 20% of the Russian society.[160] It is institutionally far less important within the Russian foreign policy domain than the Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, the Muslim factor may weigh heavily on the thinking of Russian leaders (Trenin and Lo 2005: 14). It has to be taken into account when issues such as Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan or Iran have to be decided.

Academic actors compose another category with potential influence on international affairs. Some Russian think tanks and certain trusted circles of political advisers can have access to decision-making processes. Their opinions are considered mostly by the presidential actors, even if Putin himself rarely gets involved.[161]

Under Putin, the media and societal actors like NGO's or other civil groups are marginalized in foreign policy-making (Trenin and Lo 2005). In fact, these actors construct the Russian public opinion, but their institutional influence on policy formulation is quasi non-existent. This situation will hardly change in future, even if Putin initiated the foundation of a new public chamber consisting of 126 selected personalities who are neither politicians nor businessmen (Bransten 2005). The new chamber will be created according to top-down principles and incorporate people chosen by the president (Petrov 2005).

[159] Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 29.03.2005.
[160] This estimate also includes believers, who do not actively practice. Source: Country studies, Library of US Congress, http://countrystudies.us/russia/40.htm, 24.10.2006.
[161] Expert interview, PIR Center, Moscow: 22.04.2005.

Summary

Part II of the present study covered the contextual background of Russian foreign policy-making. Thereby, it focussed initially on Russia's behaviour with regard to various global challenges. Moscow's foreign policy concept developed in 2000 has constituted a highly ambivalent product. On the one hand, it formulated Putin's new and pragmatic course of action. As a general guideline for multi-vectored and rationalized policies, Russia strived for security and modernization. On the other hand, the foreign policy concept retrospectively turned out to be of limited use. Frequently, Russian foreign policies diverged and included unpredictable contents.

The first chapter additionally analysed the political origins of the four case studies. The two near abroad issues - the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Single Economic Space (SES) - appeared on the agenda due to the jeopardized Russian influence within the post-Soviet space. Institutional changes in Western Europe triggered the two far-abroad issues: the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the Common European Economic Space (CEES).

The second chapter presented the different actors and their roles within the Russian foreign policy domain. In turn, presidential, governmental, parliamentary, economic and other actors were analysed and discussed. Basically, presidential players dominate the foreign policy sphere. Putin and his administration control the access to decision-making processes, whereas governmental actors fulfil an advisory or implementing function. Particularly, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to have limited influence on international matters. Its role is usually boiled down to packing and selling decisions taken by presidential actors.

Parliamentary actors hardly have an impact on foreign policy-making. In contrast, business organisations keep a low profile under Putin's authority, but possess a strong voice in policy-making, as soon as their interests are congruent with state interests.

Part III. POLICY NETWORK ANALYSIS

The present study has so far introduced the theoretical and methodological framework (Part I) as well as the contextual background of Russian foreign policy-making (Part II). In this section, the following question will be addressed: *what kinds of network appearances and qualities emerge in terms of specific Russian foreign policy issues?*

Each of the following four chapters covers a particular multilateral Russian foreign policy issue that has been addressed between 2000 and 2004. Chapter 7 investigates the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) – a far abroad and security-related issue. In Chapter 8, the decision to transform the Collective Security Treaty into a full-fledged international organisation (CSTO) will be analysed. This network involves near abroad and national security circles. Chapter 9 will examine the far abroad and economic-related decision to create the Common European Economic Space (CEES) with the EU. Last but not least, the creation of the Single Economic Space (SES) between Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan will be studied in Chapter 10. This will encompass the near abroad and economic policy domain subfields.

At the outset of the present study's core section, it is necessary to recall three important points. First, it has to be reiterated here that this part banks fully on the methodological approach presented in Chapter 4 of the present study. Therefore, the data collection and processing won't be explained again. Subsequent statements are restricted to the presentation and discussion of empirical findings.

Second, the composition of the four following chapters is completely identical. The first subchapters focus on the decision-making process and provide a general chronology of events. The second subchapters present the raw data sets and compute the appropriate policy network parameters. Thereby, the findings are not immediately interpreted. The assessment and discussion of empirical results shall be performed only within the framework of the final subchapters.

Third, it is important to reiterate that the analysis focuses on Russian policy networks only. Accordingly, the decision-making structures do not include any foreign

actors. However, the issues and its events at the outset of every chapter will be commented on and explained in a larger context. In so doing, international or regional players obviously cannot be disregarded.

7. NATO-Russia Council (NRC)

On the 28th of May 2002, the NATO member states and Russia signed the Rome declaration to establish the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). It marked the end point of a decision-making process that started after September 11th 2001. What did this process look like? What kind of decision-making structure emerged in Moscow? This chapter will give answers to these questions by initially providing an overview of the issue and its events (subchapter 7.1). Subsequently, the policy network dimensions and their parameters will be discussed (subchapter 7.2) and at the end of this section, the decision-making structure will be visualised and interpreted in subchapter 7.3.

7.1 The issue and its events

After the attacks on September 11th 2001, Vladimir Putin reacted in a very prompt and effective manner. He was not only the first state leader calling George W. Bush in order to express his sympathy and solidarity. He also offered unprecedented political, military and intelligence support.[162] Additionally, Putin instantly invited 21 Russian politicians for an extensive discussion about future foreign policy options. Thereby, 18 representatives recommended a neutral Russian position; two suggested an alignment with Western partners and one proposed cooperation with the Taliban regime and the Arabic world. But despite the clear outcome of this vote, Putin publicly announced and thereby confirmed his Western-oriented strategic course on September 12th 2001.[163] This statement constituted a massive shift in world politics and immediately raised an urgent question

[162] Speech by U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation Alexander Vershbow, St. Petersburg State University, 22.02.2002.

[163] Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005.

among European and U.S. policy-makers: how can Russia be integrated to a greater extent into Western institutions?

Subsequently, the NRC decision-making process shall be divided in three different segments. The first paragraph describes the appearance of the issue. The second paragraph covers the evolution of the issue, and the final decision is portrayed in the end.

Appearance of the issue

It has to be assumed that the idea to create the NRC was generated initially within the sphere of a brilliant British diplomat.[164] Sir David Manning was the UK's Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council from January until September 2001. In this function, he was closely in touch with NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson and with his Special Advisor for Central and Eastern European Affairs, Christopher Donnaly.[165] Apparently, both NATO officials immediately supported the idea to strengthen the NATO-Russia relationship.

But it seems as if the brainchild then grew further within the British government, because Tony Blair called David Manning to London right after the terrorist attacks. With immediate effect, the Ambassador was appointed personal Foreign Policy Advisor to the British Prime Minister on September 13th 2001. Against this background, it becomes clear why it was Blair, who confronted Putin for the first time with the new initiative upon a phone call at the end of September. The pleased Russian President immediately invited his British counterpart to Moscow and announced on October 2nd that Russia was prepared to make profound changes in its relations with NATO and the European security structure.[166]

The issue then appeared all of a sudden and with great intensity on all fronts. On October 3rd, Putin met with Robertson in Brussels and discussed the initiative "to create a working body that would consider the possibility of expanding, deepening and

[164] Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005.
[165] Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.
[166] Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.27.

qualitatively changing the relations between Russia and NATO".[167] The next day, Putin received Blair in the Kremlin to follow-up the issue. Simultaneously, the NATO Ambassadors in Brussels held a brainstorming over the new cooperation framework. It was the Canadian delegation that took the lead and responded first to the Secretary General's ideas. In sum, the initiation phase of the NRC was marked by hundreds of phone calls and hectic diplomatic activities.[168]

Evolution of the issue

So far, the development of the NRC has included only the top of Russia's state. Putin himself responded to foreign inputs whereas his administration, the government or other actors were by and large left out. The Ministries started to get involved top down only around mid October, when Putin attended a MoD conference on the 17th or when Ambassadors of the NATO Permanent Joint Council (PJC) took stock of the positive efforts on the 29th. At that time, however, the leading Russian ministries were absorbed with ABM-treaty negotiations with Under Secretary of State John Bolton and his team[169] as well as with preparations for the Bush-Putin summit on November 13th-15th.

Meanwhile, NATO independently created a working group in order to develop the new cooperation framework between the alliance and Russia. The group involved 7 experts, who intensively coordinated the activities of Brussels and of the NATO member-states.[170] In a personal phone call, Tony Blair announced a first British-influenced NRC proposal to Vladimir Putin on November 17th. It was presented the next day at the NATO headquarter.[171]

At this stage, discussions started on the Russian side. Defense Minister Sergej Ivanov and the Secretary General of the Security Council Vladimir Rushailo basically

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[167] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Press Department, 03.10.2001.
[168] Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.
[169] Particularly, the heads of the MoD and the MFA were engaged more than 5 times with the American side during the first half of November 2001.
[170] Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.
[171] Conflict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.52.

welcomed Blair's proposal.[172] Yet, the head of the Communist Party Gennadj Zjuganov personally tried to convince Putin to abandon these plans. A NATO-Russian parliamentary assembly (Joint Monitoring Group) was convened in Moscow on November 22nd in order to discuss the initiative.[173]

Simultaneously, an intense debate started among NATO-members. It was caused by additional proposals filed by Canada, the U.S. and Italy.[174] In essence, some delegations disagreed on the level of joint decision-making, whereas the Russians asked for more political influence in Brussels. The U.S. pentagon, in particular, demanded to keep some 'fire-walls' in place.[175] Nevertheless, the PJC Foreign Ministers decided on December 7th 2001 to establish the new format 'full-fledged 20' latest at their next meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002. This ambitious goal implied a tight schedule.

Nevertheless, from January to March 2002, the peak of diplomatic activity was not yet reached. Whereas NATO administration was already completely involved, the Russian were still acting mostly on a ministerial level. In particular, Sergej and Igor Ivanov often met Western policy-makers during this period to discuss the concept of 'retrievability'.[176] Whereas Moscow favored a council made up of 20 individual nations with separate decision-making mechanisms, NATO wanted to keep the option to retrieve issues back at 19. Due to this dissent, the negotiations stalled and broke down on March 4th 2002.

Until that date, the Russians did not substantially contribute to the issue. Moscow either accepted or rejected Western proposals.[177] There may be several reasons for this Russian apathy. Perhaps the political and administrational spheres in Moscow had a general suspicion for Western ideas and for NATO initiatives in particular. But it is also possible that the Russian bureaucracy lacked the will and capacities to coordinate and

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[172] Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.55.
[173] A Summary of the Meeting of the NATO-PA-Russian Federal Parliament Joint Monitoring Group. http://www.nato-pa.int (08.09.2005).
[174] NATO Press Conference 23.11.01, www.nato.int (16.08.2005).
[175] Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.
[176] 'NATO, Russia move to joint council', 27.02.2002, www.content.mail.ru (16.08.2005).
[177] Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005.

draft their own proposals. And finally, one could also imagine that NATO did not dedicate enough efforts to integrate the Russian side during the phase of concept development.

Decision on the issue

However, this situation remarkably changed for the rest of the NRC decision-making process. As the May deadline was approaching, NATO and Russian experts had daily discussions and fights at the headquarter in Brussels, whereby they learnt to deal with each other.[178] At the same time, Russian high-level representatives started bilateral negotiations in European capitals and in Washington. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov extensively travelled from Italy (04.03.02) over Great Britain (19.03.02) to Germany (21.03.02) in order to agree with national delegations.

Only at this stage, the Russian government was also involved, but at a lower, technical level. Several bilateral meetings between Deputy Foreign Minister Evgenni Gusarov and Deputy NATO Secretary General Günther Altenburg confirm this fact.[179] Three internal working groups (MoD, MFA & Security Council) were created in order to find possible solutions. Representatives of these working groups met day by day.[180]

A breakthrough only became possible at the end of March 2002, as Russia dealt directly with its main opponent - Washington. In a personal phone call on the 27th March, Putin and Bush talked about the issue in connection with strategic stability.[181] The two sides primarily discussed a potential new agreement on strategic nuclear weapons. Over 10 years, the present level had to be cut from 6000 to 5000 and from 2200 to 1700 warheads. However, the Presidents also addressed the NATO-Russia relationship and it seems as if they interlinked these two subjects. In return for a Russian concession on the

[178] Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.
[179] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 22.03.02.
[180] Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005.
[181] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 28.03.02.

bilateral nuclear dossier, the U.S. gave the green light for the multilateral NRC.[182] Seemingly, this Presidential intervention paved the way for a solution officially found during a meeting in Madrid on April 11th between the Foreign Ministers Igor Ivanov and Colin Powell. As this deal was never made public, it seemed as if Russia compromised its national interests. Accordingly, Sergej Ivanov dismissed these accusations in the aftermath of the meeting.[183]

This interpretation is plausible, since the next day was marked by hectic telephone diplomacy at the highest level. After conversations between Putin, Bush, Blair and Berlusconi, the White House spokesman Ari Fleischer announced on April 12th that a NATO-Russia summit in Italy will be convened in May 2002. After weeks of difficult negotiations and numerous polemic statements, Igor Ivanov said on April 15th in Brussels: "Documents are basically prepared. Experts will now take care of the remaining details. Reykjavik is a realistic goal".[184]

The 19 NATO Foreign Ministers met in Reykjavik on May 14th 2002 and approved a document, that provided a basis for Heads of State and governments to decide on the creation of the NATO-Russia Council.[185] And only ten days later, Bush and Putin signed the new treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. The happy end was marked by the opening of a NATO-Russia Military Liaison Mission in Moscow on May 27th and finally by signing the Rome Declaration on May 28th in Pratica di Mare. Whereas the state leaders hailed the historic and ground braking new body, Russian domestic forces criticised the content and the pace of the new agreement. In their view, the 'carrot for

[182] The Russian side initially insisted on an official treaty. Yet, the agreement finally encompassed not more than three pages including a long preamble. It did not involve any definitions, timetables, verification procedures or other limitations (The Moscow Times, 16.05.2002). The NATO and nuclear deals were interlinked also from a pure Russian perspective ('Rossija – NATO. Polnochlennoe vkhozhdenie? Putin i Bush sazhtopajut "dyrki"', Argumenty i Fakty No. 20, 15.05.2002).
[183] 'Russia's Ivanov Defends US Arms Deal', A. Charlton, Associated Press, 15.05.2002.
[184] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 16.04.02.
[185] 'NATO and Russia 'bury Cold War'', BBC news, 14.05.2002.

Putin' reflected the 'Alliance's hopes to neutralize Russia's negative reaction to the big-bang enlargement of NATO planned for the summit in Prague'.[186]

[186] D. Rogozin 'Russia and NATO at 20: Should the new arrangement be rushed?', 19th International Workshop on Global Security, Berlin, 03.-06.05.2002.

7.2 Policy network parameters

The last subchapter outlined the whole process of decision-making in a qualitative manner. It particularly revealed the role of Moscow's policy-makers and their administrational units. Contrastingly, this section presents the empirical findings with regard to the NRC decision-making structure. It fully concentrates on the Russian side and neglects all international actors.

Policy network parameters are specified pursuant to the methodological approach (see Chapter 4). Accordingly, they are sequentially determined within the four policy network dimensions: membership, integration, resources and power. It is important to mention that the values won't be interpreted immediately in the context of the policy network type debate. The question whether a policy network represents a policy community or an issue network can only be answered by assessing all parameters at once. For that reason, the empirical findings are aggregated at the end of this subpart. They are then compared to the parameter's thresholds and commented in terms of the policy network typology.

1. Network membership

The expert's assessments of all potential Russian foreign policy actors with regard to the NRC decision have lead to the following result. Only eight actors achieved an average rating lying at or above the value 2.75. This means that only eight Russian organisational actors are considered as really influential concerning the above-described decision to found the NRC (parameter 1a).

Position	Actors			Average influence ratings
1	Presidential actor	President		4
2	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Direction	3.25
3	Governmental actor	Ministry of Defence (MoD)	Departments	3.08333
4	Governmental actor	Ministry of Defence (MoD)	General Staff	3.08333
5	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Aides of the President	3
6	Governmental actor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Direction	3
7	Governmental actor	Federal Services	Federal Security Service (FSB)	2.85
8	Governmental actor	Federal Services	Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)	2.85

Table 6: NRC network members (parameter 1a-c)

Second to none, the President was assessed as highly influential with a rating of 4. This is no surprise given the personal preferences and efforts of Vladimir Putin, which have been highlighted in the previous section. In fact, the President personally controlled the NRC decision-making process.[187] The second most influential actor was the Direction of the Presidential Administration. The chief of staff and his deputies received an average rating of 3.25. This confirms their position as a hinge in decision-making. The Aides of the President (3) are located at a lower position. But nevertheless, they allegedly accompanied Putin side-by-side throughout the whole decision-making process.[188]

Two governmental actors follow the core presidential actors: The Departments (Department of International Treaties) and the General Staff of the Ministry of Defence.

[187] Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005.
[188] Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 09.02.2006.

Their considerable influence (3.0833) is no surprise given their expertise.[189] The two actors were linked through a common working group led by General Bushinski[190] and jointly addressed the numerous and extensive military-technical cooperation sectors covered by the NRC agreement[191].

As the qualitative analysis showed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3) was a core decision-maker on the Russian side. The Direction was supported by an internal working group chaired by Ambassador Aleksejev. Allegedly, the MFA and MoD working groups coordinated their activities independently and in an effective manner.[192]

On the seventh and eighth position, the Federal Security Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service were rated 2.85. Although the two services were never mentioned publicly, they played an essential role in checking all involved institutions.[193]

Evidently, only two interests were included as Russia decided about the NRC: (parameter 1b). Executive authority's interests are highly involved, as 37.5% of the policy network members belong to the Presidential category (parameter 1c). The remaining actors are part of the governmental apparatus. Beside the presidential and governmental sphere, no other categories were involved. Neither parliamentary, nor economic or other actors were rated influential enough to be integrated in the NRC policy network. The first non-presidential, non-governmental actors are listed at positions 19 and 20: the Duma Committee for Defence (1.7) and academic actors (1.7). Allegedly, the defence industry was not involved at all with regard to the NRC issue.[194]

Which actors had some influence without being member of the policy network? Table 7 displays the next ten positions of the average influence ranking.

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189 Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 04.05.2005.
190 Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005.
191 See the Rome Declaration: NATO (2002). Cooperative efforts encompass areas like non-proliferation, arms control, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation and defence reform.
192 Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005.
193 Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.
194 Expert statement, Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow: 07.02.2006.

Position	Actors			Average influence ratings
9	Governmental actor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	All-European Cooperation Department	2.65
10	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Advisors of the President	2.4
11	Presidential actor	Security Council	Direction	2.33333
12	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Presidential Services	2.2
13	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Presidential Executive Divisions	2.2
14	Governmental actor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Security & Disarmament Department	2.2
15	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Plenipotentiary Representatives of the President	2
16	Governmental actor	Prime Ministry	Direction	2
17	Governmental actor	Other Federal Ministries	Ministry of Internal Affairs	1.8
18	Governmental actor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Northern America Department	1.75

Table 7: NRC additional actors

The additional actor's list does not comprise any surprises. However, it is amazing that even technical divisions of the Presidential Administration are considered as more influential than for instance the Prime Ministry. Kasjanov and his crew follow on rank 16 with an influence rating of 2. It also stands out that the Security Council didn't belong to the policy network, which after all decided over a relatively important security issue. Despite a special working group dealing with the NRC issue, the General Secretary Rushajlo and his officials remained fairly weak as an institution.[195]

Certainly, all these additional actors played a role with regard to the NRC case. However, according to the methodological procedures, only the eight most influential

[195] Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005.

players can be regarded as policy network members. This group will subsequently be analysed in more detail.

2. Network integration

How did the experts assess the interactions between these eight actors? The following table shows the accumulated ratings with regard to NRC-related links. The data set reveals that no interaction received the highest value (10) or the lowest (0).

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
                               P P D G A M F S
                               - - - - - - - -
  1                  President
  2 Presidential Administration  9
  3             MoD Departments  8 5
  4           MoD General Staff  8 6 8
  5      Aides of the President  9 8 6 5
  6                        MFA  9 9 7 5 9
  7                        FSB  5 4 3 3 5 3
  8                        SVR  8 5 3 3 7 6 5
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 17:13:10
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 8: NRC matrix accumulated

The fact that no relation received the maximum or minimum rating does not only reflect the Gaussian distribution of expert ratings. It primarily tells that all actors within the policy network were somehow linked with each other concerning NRC. A total absence of a relationship between two organisations hardly exists. This, however, reveals the fact that a relationship of maximum intensity cannot be found either. This means that the issue was not predominantly decided by two or three very closely linked actors. The decision was ultimately taken by interplay of these eight key organisations.

Even if these empirical findings are highly interesting as such, they shall be discussed and interpreted in-depth only within the context of the visualised network (see

7.3). This section focuses on data sets and the parameter computation. The next table illustrates the dichotomized data set.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
                                P P D G A M F S
                                - - - - - - - -
  1                   President
  2 Presidential Administration  1
  3             MoD Departments  1 1
  4           MoD General Staff  1 1 1
  5      Aides of the President  1 1 1 1
  6                         MFA  1 1 1 1 1
  7                         FSB  1 1 0 0 1 0
  8                         SVR  1 1 0 0 1 1 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 17:20:56
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
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Table 9: NRC matrix dichotomized

This binary matrix distinguishes only between the categories “interaction” (1) or “no interaction” (0). It is particularly suitable for closeness centrality calculations. These will be performed later in this subchapter. Finally, the categorised matrix is displayed below. It differentiates three sorts of interactions: “intense” (2), “medium” (1) and “low or none” (0). This data set will be used later to illustrate the NRC matrix (see 7.3).

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
                                P P D G A M F S
                                - - - - - - - -
  1                   President
  2 Presidential Administration  2
  3             MoD Departments  2 1
  4           MoD General Staff  2 1 2
  5      Aides of the President  2 2 1 1
  6                         MFA  2 2 2 1 2
  7                         FSB  1 1 0 0 1 0
  8                         SVR  2 1 0 0 2 1 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 17:25:24
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
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Table 10: NRC matrix categorised–

Based on these data, parameter 2a can be calculated. The table below shows the NRC policy network density, which represents the frequency of interaction, or in other words, the average interaction value among all policy network members. With zero being the lowest and 10 the highest number, 6.1071 indicates a considerably high level of activity within the network.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          1
     ------
  1  6.1071
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 17:32:31
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 11: NRC density (parameter 2a)

The next value to be calculated is the network degree centralisation (parameter 2b). Indeed, 25.238% does not indicate a highly centralised network, as the maximum value - which stands for a star formation - would be 100%. But nevertheless, it tells that the network is to a certain extent centralised around one specific actor. This parameter will become more interesting in a comparative context.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Network Centralisation = 25.238%
Heterogeneity = 12.96%.  Normalised = 0.52
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 17:39:14
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 12: NRC network degree centralisation (parameter 2b)

The third parameter (2c) of this section reveals the actor's position within the network according to their degree centrality. A high number of intense links places an actor in the core of a network and therefore high on the ranking. Table 13 shows this ranking of the eight actors based on their Freeman degree centrality. It is striking that the hierarchy looks significantly different than the one set up according to the influence expert ratings. On the one hand, particularly the Presidential aides and the MFA are more central in terms of their interactions with other network members. On the other hand, the direction of the Presidential Administration as well as the MoD actors seem to be interlinked to a lesser degree. Nevertheless, Presidential actors are clearly on top of the list, occupying ranks one, two and four. The executive authority may therefore be regarded as centrally positioned within the NRC decision-making structure.

```
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                          1            2            3
                                     Degree    NrmDegree        Share
                                ------------ ------------ ------------
  1                   President       56.000      80.0000        0.164
  5      Aides of the President       49.000      70.0000        0.143
  6                         MFA       48.000      68.5714        0.140
  2 Presidential Administration       46.000      65.7143        0.135
  3             MoD Departments       40.000      57.1429        0.117
  4           MoD General Staff       38.000      54.2857        0.111
  8                         SVR       37.000      52.8571        0.108
  7                         FSB       28.000      40.0000        0.082
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 18:03:17
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 13: Executive authority's position within NRC network (parameter 2c)

3. Network resources

This dimension covers two important aspects of the network: the quantity and the distribution of resources. The quantity of available information and resources within the network is reflected by the maximum normalised degree centrality. This value can be extracted both from the degree centrality ranking (Table 13) and from the descriptive statistics part shown in Table 14.

```
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        1            2            3
                   Degree    NrmDegree        Share
              ------------ ------------ ------------
  1     Mean        42.750      61.0714        0.000
  2  Std Dev         8.166      11.6661        0.000
  3      Sum       342.000     488.5714        0.000
  4 Variance        66.688    1360.9695        0.000
  5      SSQ     15154.000  309265.3000        0.000
  6    MCSSQ       533.500   10887.7563        0.000
  7 Euc Norm       123.102     175.8594        0.000
  8  Minimum        28.000      40.0000        0.000
  9  Maximum        56.000      80.0000        0.000
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  12 Jan 07 18:03:17
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 14: Quantity & distribution of resources within NRC network (parameter 3a+b)

The maximum normalised degree centrality within the NRC network accounts to 80.00% and is achieved only by the President (parameter 3a). This may be regarded as a high value which stands for the elevated quantity of information available within the network.

But how are resources distributed within the NRC network? Whereas Putin reaches a degree centrality of 80%, the FSB has obviously a lesser amount of resources available (40%). This spread between the maximum and minimum normalised degree centrality values expressed in terms of the maximum value accounts to 50% (parameter 3b). This indicates that the spectrum of resource allocation is relatively medium-sized. The explanatory power of this value will certainly increase in a comparative perspective (see Part IV).

4. Network power

The last policy network dimension covers the power facet of the NRC network. On the one hand, the quantity of available power is decisive. It is reflected by the maximum normalised closeness centrality showed in Table 15. Putin attains 100%, which implies direct access to all other network members (parameter 4a). Obviously, the President was powerful with regard to the establishment of the NRC.

		1	2
		Farness	nCloseness
1	President	7.000	100.000
2	Presidential Administration	7.000	100.000
5	Aides of the President	7.000	100.000
6	MFA	8.000	87.500
3	MoD Departments	9.000	77.778
4	MoD General Staff	9.000	77.778
8	SVR	9.000	77.778
7	FSB	10.000	70.000

```
Statistics

                        1            2
                  Farness   nCloseness
              ------------ ------------
  1     Mean         8.250       86.354
  2  Std Dev         1.090       11.446
  3      Sum        66.000      690.833
  4 Variance         1.188      131.008
  5      SSQ       554.000    60704.398
  6    MCSSQ         9.500     1048.061
  7 Euc Norm        23.537      246.383
  8  Minimum         7.000       70.000
  9  Maximum        10.000      100.000
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  15 Jan 07 11:00:10
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 15: Quantity & distribution of power within NRC network (parameter 4a+b)

On the other hand, the dispersion of power within the NRC network has to be detected. At the lower end of the spectrum, FSB's interconnectedness is computed at 70%. Hence, the spread relative to the highest value makes up 30% (parameter 4b). This number shows the comparatively small range of power distribution within the NRC network.

Network type assessment

The previous four paragraphs presented the empirical data and calculations of the NRC network. At this stage, all values shall be aggregated and reproduced in Table 16.

Dimension	Parameter	Value	Threshold
1. Membership			
a) Number of participants	Number of involved network actors	8	10
b) Number of interests	Number of involved actor's categories	2	3
c) Types of interest	Percentage of involved Presidential actors	37.50%	33.33%

Dimension	Parameter	Value	Threshold
2. Integration			
a) Frequency of interaction (information and resources)	Network density	6.1071	5
b) Centralisation	Overall network degree centralisation	25.24%	50.00%
c) Executive authority's position	Degree centrality ranking	Ranks 1, 2 and 4	At least two Presidential actors within top three
3. Resources			
a) Quantity of information and resources within network	Maximum normalised degree centrality	80.00%	75.00%
b) Distribution of information and resources within network	Spread between max and min normalised degree centrality in percentage of the highest value	50.00%	50.00%
4. Power			
a) Quantity of power within network	Maximum normalised closeness centrality	100.00%	75.00%
b) Distribution of power within network	Spread between maximum and minimum normalised closeness centrality in percentage of the highest value	30.00%	50.00%

Table 16: Aggregated NRC parameters

With regard to the membership dimension, all NRC parameters are clearly located on the policy community side of the thresholds. The network is small and restricted as it consists of only eight members representing not more than two interest categories. Since 37.5% of all members belong to the Presidential sphere, the executive authority has a remarkable share in decision-making.

Two of the three integration dimension parameters are characteristic of a policy community. The network is fairly dense (6.1071) and largely controlled by centrally located Presidential actors. However, the centralisation of the NRC network only amounts

to 25.24%, which lies clearly below the defined threshold of 50%. This parameter would be typical for issue networks.

With regard to resources and power, three of four parameters confirm the policy community nature of the NRC network. With 80% and 100%, the quantity of resources and power within the structure lies above the threshold. Also, the distribution spectrum of power amounts to 30%, which lies clearly below the dividing line. This indicates a balance of power between members of the NRC network. The only ambiguous parameter is 3b. The distribution of information, knowledge, money and other factors reaches a value of 50%, which equals the threshold value.

In sum, eight of the ten calculated parameters are situated on the policy community side. Obviously, the NRC decision was marked by a comparatively small-sized, tight, resource rich, powerful and balanced network primarily controlled by the executive authority. This finding basically corresponds with sub hypothesis A formulated in subchapter 3.3, as the NRC issue was addressed by far abroad and security subfields. However, the testing of the hypothesis shall not be anticipated here. This matter will be addressed only in Chapter 11, which reviews all four policy networks in a comparative perspective.

7.3 Resulting decision-making procedures and structures

The previous two subchapters have recorded the decision-making process and determined the NRC policy network dimensions. In doing so, it has become clear that the NRC web amounts to a policy community according to the theoretical definition presented in 2.2. Based on this solid basis, the resulting decision-making network shall now be visualised and examined.

The following graphic has been created with the help of the UCINET NetDraw software. Since it is based on the categorised matrix, frequent and intense interactions are illustrated by bold lines, whereas moderate links are shown with fine lines. Few or no relations are not displayed at all. It also has to be reiterated that the actor's size reflect his power while his position is determined by the centrality rating.



Figure 10: NATO-Russia Council (NRC) resulting policy network

The resulting NRC policy community is indeed small in size and dense with regard to its degrees. Rightly, President Putin is located in the very centre with bold ties to almost all actors. The only exception is the Federal Security Service (FSB), which was linked only moderately to the state leader. Doubtlessly, the President was the main actor, who personally controlled the decision-making process. He seized the chance to unfreeze Russian relations with the West and NATO after a longer period of isolation caused by the Kosovo and Chechen war.[196]

Obviously, the Presidential Administration and the Aides were Putin's closest partners within the network. They are both powerful and had links to all other network members. Yet, the Aides of the President were even more central due to their higher degree. Particularly and in contrast to the Administration's Direction, the assistants had a strong link to the Foreign Intelligence Service.

The third central player in the network is the MFA Direction. It was interlinked with all others except with the FSB. In a sense, the role of the MFA within the policy network does not correspond to the hyperactivity of Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. In fact, this actor was pushed forward to the public front. Behind the scenery, the MFA had little influence and received instructions.[197]

The two MoD actors were positioned more peripheral within the network. Definitely, the Departments and the General Staff contributed the technical expertise in the field of military cooperation with NATO. Nevertheless, they only had minimal influence on the decision itself. Remarkably, both MoD actors had no or only insignificant contacts with the two intelligence services. This is surprising since the collaboration among *siloviki* actors would be commonly assumed.

Last but not least, the FSB and SVR are located at the outer rim of the network. Without possessing any significant power, they only participated in small-scale interactions with other actors. Nevertheless, FSB allegedly checked and consulted the

[196] Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005.
[197] Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.

major Russian players,[198] while SVR most probably delivered additional information for decision-making.

[198] Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.

8. Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)

The decision to transform the Collective Security Treaty (CST) into a full-fledged international organisation represents the second case study. Policy-making regarding this issue started right after September 11th, 2001 and finished on September 18th, 2003. At that date, the CSTO-charter entered into force after ratification by all six member states – Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan. What kind of Russian actors, interactions and events marked the establishment of this security-related Eurasian alliance?

The form of this chapter pursues the same route of analysis as the previous NRC section. The first subchapter 8.1 discusses events of the issue along the time line. This process-related perspective allows an understanding of the main occurrences of the case. Subsequently, the policy network dimension parameters are determined and discussed in subchapter 8.2. It ends with the classification of the CSTO decision-making structure based on the policy network typology. Finally, subchapter 8.3 draws attention to network visualisation. The resulting patterns of actors and interactions shall be analysed and explained.

8.1 The issue and its events

The transformation of the CST into a regional organisation according to the UN charter extended two years all in all. Compared to the nine months it required to create the NRC, this is a remarkably long period. However, it has to be kept in mind that the CSTO was subject to ratification, whereas the NRC entered in force immediately after the signing of the Rome declaration. In fact, the heads of the six treaty member states approved the charter and the legal status of the CSTO by October 7th 2002. However, for the analysis of

decision-making structures and processes, it would be wrong to disregard the parliamentary phase. This would possibly tamper the resulting policy networks.

Similarly to the NRC case, the CSTO process can be divided into three different phases. The following paragraphs in turn present the appearance, the evolution and the decision of the issue.

Appearance of the issue

According to the first General Secretary of the CSTO, Ambassador Velerii Nikolaenko, the idea to bestow the security treaty with the status of an organisation traces back to 1999. [199] At that time, the CST should have been adapted to the geopolitical situation and to a new level of effectiveness. However, the signatory states confined themselves to the prolongation of the CST for another five years. Apparently, the project failed due to a general lack of political will.

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington significantly changed the dynamics in international relations and hence particularly in geopolitics within the post-Soviet space. From September 11th 2001 until May 14th 2002, it became clear on various occasions that more coordinated security efforts were indispensable. The Russian Federation, in particular, took the lead to reinforce security related institutions within its Eurasian and Caucasian backyard.

On October 7th 2001, U.S. and British troops started operations in Afghanistan and simultaneously established the two air force bases in Manas (Kirgizia) and Khanabad (Uzbekistan). These activities were officially tolerated by Moscow, but had to be counter-balanced. Therefore, intense communication initially started between Russia and Kirgizia as well as Tadzhikistan. On October 4th, Duma chairman Seleznev visited Bishkek.[200] On October 5th, Putin called Tadzhik President Emomali Rakhmonov and at the same day, an

[199] See Nikolaenko (2004: 89).
[200] Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.28.

interparliamentary commission called for the set-up of a Russian air base in Southern Tadzhikistan in line with the CST. [201]

On short notice, the CST signatory states staged command and staff exercises from October 8th until October 13th.[202] These activities were combined with a meeting of the six CST Security Council Secretaries in Dushanbe. Thereby, Vladimir Rushailo and his colleges discussed various questions with regard to the role of the CST and further potential steps with regard to security-related integration.[203]

During the following period, numerous bustling activities took place. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov supported an initiative taken by senators to establish a single air defence system for all CIS member states.[204] Putin convened an important MoD Conference on October 17th.[205] The Duma Defence Committee chairman Andrej Nikolajev and his entourage verified plans to physically fortify the Russian southern border.[206] Also, the Russian Border Guard Service signed a cooperation protocol with the Kazakh counter-part and the CIS military cooperation headquarters announced Russian military equipment for CST members at discount prices.[207] Additionally, the 201st Motor Rifle Division at the Russian military base in Kant (Kirgizia) was reinforced to enable the operation of a collective rapid reaction force in Central Asia within the CST framework.[208]

Meanwhile in Moscow, on October 23rd 2001 and on January 29th 2002, the plenipotentiary CST representatives leaded by Nikolaenko examined the legal basis of further CST integration in security matters.[209] Gradually, it became clear that all initiatives

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[201] Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.28.
[202] These exercises involved three phases and included personnel in Moscow as well as troops in Kirgizia. (Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.28).
[203] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'O Konsultatsijakh Polnomochnykh Predstavitelei Gosudarstv-Uchastnikov DKB', 24.10.2002.
[204] Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.31.
[205] Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.35.
[206] Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.37.
[207] Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.52.
[208] Statements of force commander Maj-Gen Sergey Chernomyrdin, Confict Studies Research Center, A Russian Chronology, April-June 2002, J30, p.25.
[209] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'O Konsultatsijakh Polnomochnykh Predstavitelei Gosudarstv-Uchastnikov DKB', 24.10.2002 & 'Ob Ocherednykh Konsultatsijakh Polnomochnykh Predstavitelei Gosudarstv-Uchastnikov DKB', 30.01.2002.

had to be institutionally combined in a bundle. However, the CSTO issue was discussed in earnest only in spring 2002. On April 9th, the CST deputy Foreign and Defence Ministers met to further develop options with regard to a single regional collective security organisation.[210] On April 12th, the CST Security Council Secretaries held a meeting in Alma-Ata[211] and Putin personally prepared the issue with Nikolaenko on May 6th.[212]

The issue to transform the military-political CST into a full-fledged political-military organisation[213] finally appeared officially and prominently on the agenda on May 14th, 2002. On this date, the CST council session celebrated the treaty's 10th year jubilee in Moscow. The Presidents of the six states determined the future of the pact behind closed doors without any participation of ministers, advisors or bureaucrats.[214] As they stepped out of the Kremlin's Aleksandrovsky Hall, they instructed their governments to form a working-group at the level of deputy ministers of foreign affairs and defence by July 1st 2002. The objective of this group was to prepare draft agreements to regulate the activities of the Organisation and its elements by November 1st 2002.[215]

It is striking that the 14th of May 2002 cornerstone took place exactly 14 days prior to the NRC final meeting in Rome., This date was deliberately chosen for two reasons. First, nationalist forces within the Russian elite were upset due to the U.S. presence in Central Asia and the rapprochement of NATO and Russia.[216] Therefore, Putin and his more liberal surroundings had to accommodate these dissatisfied circles by anticipating

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[210] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'O Konsultatsijakh zamestitelei Ministrov Inostrannykh del i oborony gosudarstv-uchastnikov dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti', 05.04.2002.

[211] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'K itogam zasedanija Komiteta sekretarei Sovetov Bezopasnosti gosudarstv-uchastnikov Dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti (DKB) v Alma-Ate', 17.04.2002.

[212] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'O vstrche Presidenta RF V.V. Putina s Generalnym sekretarem Soveta kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti', 08.05.2002.

[213] Alekseyeva N.: 'An examiner charter' Izvestia, 19.12.2002 (ISI database, 18.05.2005).

[214] 'Na jubileinoi sessii liderov gosudarstv-chlenov dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti v Moskve', Telekanal RTR – Vesti, 14.05.2002 (ISI database, 18.05.2005).

[215] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'Zajavlenie glav gosudarstv-uchastnikov Dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnost po sluchaju 10-letnja pdpisanija dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti & Blagov, S.: 'Russia pushes for deeper post-Soviet integration', Asia Times, 15.05.2002.

[216] K. Knox, 'Russia: CIS Military-Alliance Upgrade Plan Faces Numerous Obstacles', JRL No.6246, 16.05.2002.

the Rome summit with an initiative to create something analogous to NATO within the eastern hemisphere.[217] On the other hand, the Russian administration seemed to be inspired by Brussels. It took advantage of the momentum by reproducing the NRC drafting process.

Over all, it is not clear who initially came up with the CSTO idea. According to the official version, the general secretariat CST gave the initial impulse.[218] Yet, given Moscow's strong interest to restore its influence on the southern flank, a Russian actor is more likely responsible. Moreover, Nikolaenko and his entourage were generally conceived as insignificant as well as inexperienced in military matters[219] and therefore incapable of fighting for an idea. In fact, two experts are almost certain that the CSTO idea emerged from the Russian MFA.[220] Igor Ivanov and his deputies were probably farsighted and close enough to the Kremlin to think out and pass on the idea.

Evolution of the issue

After the jubilee session, the issue gained momentum. Putin personally emphasized that the creation of the CSTO should not involve additional bureaucratic units.[221] On May 21st 2002, a consultation meeting was convened in Moscow. Thereby, the plenipotentiary CST representatives created an intergovernmental working group and a group of General Staff coordinators.[222] The high level group was chaired by the Russian deputy Foreign Minister

[217] 'CIS collective security treaty update', WPS Russian Political Monitor, 19.03.2003.
[218] Expert interview, General Secretariat CSTO, Moscow: 22.02.2006.
[219] S. Saradzhyan, 'Russia to shoulder burden in CSTO', The St. Petersburg Times, 29.04.2003 (ISI database, 18.05.2005).
[220] Expert interviews, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 21.02.2006 & Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow 30.01.2006.
[221] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'Zajavlenie Presidenta Rossii V.V. Putina po okonchanii sessii Soveta Kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti 14 Maja 2002 goda, Moskva', 16.05.2002.
[222] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'Ob ocherednykh konsultatsijakh polnomochnykh predstavitelei gosudarstv-uchastnikov dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti pri generalnom sekretare SKB I voennykh predstavitelei v shtabe po koordinatsii voennovo sotrudnichestva', 22.05.2002.

Vjacheslav Trubnikov and consisted of the deputy Foreign, Defense and Finance Ministers as well as of Security Council representatives of all six countries.[223]

Subsequently, the CSTO high level group met twice in Moscow to discuss structures and mechanisms of the new Eurasian alliance. On August 2nd 2002, it mandated an expert group to draft the charter and the legal status of the future organisation.[224] One month later, on September 3rd 2002, it convened again to consider the expert's work.[225] Allegedly, these activities have not caused major friction or disagreement among the participating policy-makers. Separately, Putin personally met the CST Secretary General Nikolaenko on a regular basis.[226]

Another cornerstone of the CSTO decision-making process was October 10th 2002. On this date, the six Presidents met again in Kishinev (Moldavia) in order to sign the charter and the legal status of the future organisation. Thereby, they also decided to forward these documents to the national parliaments for ratification.[227] This is the reason why the decision-making process could not yet be considered as complete.

Meanwhile, activities on the military-operational level fully evolved. The Russian airfield in Kant was inspected and tested.[228] while other subjects like capacity building, quick intervention forces, General Staff headquarter and arms trade were further developed. Within the same time period, debates about the judicial, financial and organisational aspects of the regional security framework dragged on. On February 5th and 6th 2003, the experts met again to prepare and revise legal documents for the high level

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223 Expert interview, General Secretariat CSTO, Moscow: 22.02.2006.

224 Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'O pervom zasedanii Rabochei gruppy predstavitelei gosudarstv-uchastnikov dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti (DKB)', 05.08.2002.

225 Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'O vtorom zasedanii rabochei gruppy vysokovo urovenja predstavitelei gosudarstv-uchastnikov dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti (DKB)', 04.09.2002.

226 Expert interview, General Secretariat CSTO, Moscow: 22.02.2006.

227 Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'O podpisanii ustava organizatsii dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti I soglashenija o pravovom statuse ODKB', 08.10.2002.

228 D. Glumskov, I. Safronov, 'Russian Air force will put pressure on NATO in Kyrgyzstan', Kommersant, 02.12.2002 (ISI database, 18.05.2005).

group meeting four days later.[229] Further talks took place at a ministerial level and among CST plenipotentiary representatives and Security Council members.

The establishment of the CSTO involved numerous sub agreements and financial aspects, which had to be coordinated. In principal, contentious points centred around one major question: how much will Moscow pay for the loyal integration of the former Soviet republics? Or inversely, how many internal votes shall the 'deptor' states receive in return for cut-rated arms sales, officer's training and other benefits?[230]

Decision on the issue

On March 20th and 21st 2003, the Security Council Secretaries made the final adjustments of the prepared CSTO documents. At the end of the meeting, Putin personally addressed the Committee. He took advantage of the occasion to comment on the U.S. led war in Iraq, which had started only a couple of hours earlier. It was also the perfect point of time to emphasize the importance of the CSTO as a tool to protect and stabilize the southern region.[231]

The final decision to bring the CSTO into being was taken on April 28th 2003 in Dushanbe (Tadzhikistan).[232] The six Presidents confirmed and signed the definite documents including the charter, the legal status and 15 additional agreements.[233] Additionally, they appointed Nikolaj Bordjuzha – former KGB officer and head of Yeltsin's Administration in 1998 - CSTO Secretary General. Yet, despite ceremonious speeches and optimistic press statements, the official CSTO founding event held a slightly

[229] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'O predstojashikh zasedanijakh gruppy ekspertov I gruppy vysokovo urovnja gosudarstv-uchastnikov dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti', 05.02.2003.

[230] See N. Alekseyeva, 'An examiner charter', Izvestia, 19.12.2002 (ISI database, 18.05.2005).

[231] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'Bystuplenie Prezidenta Rossii V.V. Putina na vstreche s sekretarjami sovetov bezopasnosti gosudarstv-uchastnikov organisatsii dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti', 24.03.2003.

[232] See Nikolaenko (2004: 95).

[233] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'Interviju ofitsialnovo predstavitelja MID Rossii A.V. Jakovenko v svjazi s voprosami SMI o predstojashem zasedanii mezhgosudartvennovo soveta EvrazES i sessii soveta kollektivnoi bezopasnosti', 28.04.2003.

vapid taste. On television, the six leaders were shown with gloomy faces, which gave rise to speculations about the unanimity and the political will of the CSTO-members.[234]

The ratification process went off without a hitch. After the Russian Government approved the papers and transformed them into two separate law projects, [235] the Federal Assembly ratified them in May2003.[236] The other parliaments followed during the summer, however, Armenia needed some more time.[237] Nevertheless, the CSTO came into effect on September 18th 2003.[238]

[234] 'You have to pay for security', Interview with Nikolai Bordyuzha, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniyer, 19.09.2003.
[235] Zasedanii Pravitelstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 3.04.2003 (www.government.gov.ru, 10.11.2005).
[236] 'Andrei Kokoshin on CIS Collective Security', WPS Russian Political Monitor, 21.05.2003.
[237] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, 'O vstrche prezidenta Rossii V.V. Putina s generalnym sekretarem soveta kollektivnoi bezopasnosti gosudarstv-uchastnikov DKB N.N. Bordjuzhei', 02.09.2003.
[238] 'Collective Security Treaty Organisation', General Secretariat, Moscow: 29.04.2005.

8.2 Policy network parameters

So far, the decision-making process has been traced and reconstructed. In this subchapter, the CSTO network parameters shall be determined and explained. Similar to the NRC case, the calculations are sequenced according to the four network dimensions. Initially, the attention shall be drawn to network members and their reputation. Subsequently, the policy network is integrated by focussing on interactions. In the end, the amount and allocation of resources and power within the network will be analysed.

1. Network membership

All in all nine actors have received an average rating greater than 2.75 (parameter 1a). They are therefore considered as network members. Obviously, the President stands again at the top of the ranking (3.75). In fact - and as the last subchapter clearly revealed - Putin remarkably and personally influenced the establishment of the CSTO. He is followed by two governmental units, the Federal Border Service (3.5) and the Federal Security Service (3.05). These positions are not surprising given the amount of sensitive aspects like drugs and arms trade, military technical cooperation or safeguard of state boundaries that had to be addressed. Assumedly, the two Services possess more expertise in these subjects as the two MoD actors. Nevertheless, the Departments (3) and the General Staff (3) were both rated as considerably influential. The competent MoD Departments and particularly the General Staff's main operational directorate perform the bulk of strategic planning on different theatres of actions, including Central Asia and Caucasus.[239] They are supported additionally by governmental agencies like the defunct Control Systems Agency (3).

[239] Expert interview, The Moscow Times, Moscow: 10.05.2005.

Position	Actors			Average influence ratings
1	Presidential actor	President		3.75
2	Governmental actor	Federal Services	Federal Border Service	3.5
3	Governmental actor	Federal Services	Federal Security Service (FSB)	3.05
4	Governmental actor	Ministry of Defence (MoD)	Departments	3
5	Governmental actor	Ministry of Defence (MoD)	General Staff	3
6	Governmental actor	Federal Agencies, Committees and Commissions	Agencies	3
7	Economic actor	Energy Sector	RAO UES	3
8	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Direction	2.8
9	Presidential actor	Security Council	Direction	2.8

Table 17: CSTO network members (parameter 1a-c)

The seventh actor in the ranking is striking. The experts rated RAO UES as influential (3) with regard to the CSTO decision-making process. What is the reason for the involvement of the energy sector? UES constitutes a power holding that owns 96.1% of the high-voltage grids in Russia. Its export activity is mainly directed towards former Soviet Republics. Its efforts are aimed at expanding into new consumer markets and at acquiring attractive energy assets within the near abroad.[240] Against this background, it is likely that the electricity monopolist had a considerable amount of influence on Russian strategic activities within Central Asia and the Caucasus.[241]

At the end of the ranking, the directions of the Presidential Administration and of the Security Council follow with an influence rating of 2.8. These two players may have been expected to be included in the policy network.

[240] Informatsija o Kompanii, www.rao-ees.ru, 16.01.2007.
[241] Expert interviews, Vremja Novostej, Moscow: 13.02.2006 & Carnegie Center, Moscow: 19.05.2005.

Whereas the NRC network took two interests into account, the CSTO structure encompassed three categories (parameter 1b). In addition to Presidential and governmental interests, the economic sphere was included. However, parliamentary and other actors remained strictly excluded from decision-making. The percentage of the executive authority amounts to 33.33%, which may be perceived as a relatively high value (parameter 1c).

When comparing the influential network members in Table 17 with the less influential non-members in Table 18, three points catch the reader's eyes.

Position	**Actors**			**Average influence ratings**
10	Presidential actor	Security Council	Members	2.6
11	Governmental actor	Federal Services	Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)	2.6
12	Governmental actor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Ambassadors (Kaz/Bel/Kirg/Tadj/Armen)	2.5
13	Economic actor	Industrial sector		2.5
14	Governmental actor	Prime Ministry	Direction	2.45
15	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Aides of the President	2.4
16	Other actors	Political parties	United Russia	2.33333
17	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Presidential Services	2.3125
18	Governmental actor	Governmental Administration	Dep of Defence Complex	2.25
19	Governmental actor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Direction	2.2

Table 18: CSTO additional actors

First, it is astonishing that the Prime Ministry was not involved in the policy network. It only appears on rank 14 with an influence rating of 2.45. Why is it that the head of the government has only a weak voice with regard to an important state issue? This question

will be picked-up again later upon the review and comparison of the case studies. Second, it is even more surprising that actors of the Foreign Ministry did not apply more weight to the decision. Apparently, they played a rather peripheral role, despite the fact that the whole transformation process from CST to CSTO was officially headed by Nikolaenko, an experienced ambassador with close ties to the Russian diplomatic sphere. MFA actors occupy positions 12, 19 and – beyond the displayed ranking - 20 as well as 21.

Thirdly, it is noteworthy that two non-Presidential, non-governmental actors had quite some influence, although they were not part of the policy network. Apparently, the industrial sector was mildly important (2.5) with regard to the establishment of the CSTO. There is evidence that particularly the Russian *parkettnyi generaly* - the parquet generals of the war-industrial complex – were very interested in the security alliance.[242] Even they agreed to export arms at considerable discount to CSTO members, their lobbying was effective. Additionally, the industrial sector is highly interested in the Central Asian region (2.5). RusAl for instance invested millions of dollars in Tadjikistan over the last few years[243]. Last but not least, the political party 'United Russia' seemingly had some influence (2.333) on the creation of the CSTO. Yet, the motives of its involvement are not clear.

[242] Expert interview, The Moscow Times, Moscow: 29.04.2005.
[243] Expert interview, CSTO General Secretariat, Moscow: 29.04.2005.

2. Network integration

This section and the following will focus exclusively on the policy network. How are the nine actors linked with each other? What kind of interactions brought the CSTO into being? The following table shows the matrix with accumulated expert ratings.

```
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
                           P F F M M A R P S
                           - - - - - - - - -
  1              President
  2 Federal Border Service  5
  3                   FSB  7 7
  4        MoD Departments  5 4 5
  5      MoD General Staff  5 5 5 6
  6               Agencies  3 1 2 5 3
  7                RAO UES  3 1 2 1 1 2
  8     Presidential Admin  9 5 7 6 5 6 4
  9       Security Council  7 5 5 4 6 2 0 6
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  23 Nov 06 15:25:19
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 19: CSTO matrix accumulated

It stands out that no interaction reached the maximum value of 10. The most frequent and intense liaison (9) was kept between the President and the direction of his administration. On the lower end of the scale, one relationship was unanimously appreciated with the lowest value 0. The Security Council had seemingly no ties with RAO UES.

The dichotomization of this matrix is performed by allocating the value 1 for all interactions greater than 3 and by zeroing the rest. This simplified matrix is illustrated in Table 20.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
                           P F F M M A R P S
                           - - - - - - - - -
  1              President
  2 Federal Border Service  1
  3                   FSB  1 1
  4        MoD Departments  1 1 1
  5      MoD General Staff  1 1 1 1
  6              Agencies   0 0 0 1 0
  7               RAO UES   0 0 0 0 0 0
  8     Presidential Admin   1 1 1 1 1 1 1
  9       Security Council   1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 10:41:43
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 20: CSTO matrix dichotomized

The dichotomized matrix will be used for power calculations later in this subchapter. However, neither the dichotomized, nor the accumulated matrix will be suitable for the visualisation of the CSTO network. Therefore, the accumulated data set is additionally categorised as shown in Table 21.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
                           P F F M M A R P S
                           - - - - - - - - -
  1              President
  2 Federal Border Service  1
  3                   FSB  2 2
  4        MoD Departments  1 1 1
  5      MoD General Staff  1 1 1 1
  6              Agencies   0 0 0 1 0
  7               RAO UES   0 0 0 0 0 0
  8     Presidential Admin   2 1 2 1 1 1 1
  9       Security Council   2 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  23 Nov 06 15:26:06
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 21: CSTO matrix categorised

At this stage, the CSTO data set is complete and ready to use for UCINET calculations. The first computation determines the network density (parameter 2a).

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          1
      ------
  1   4.3056
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  16 Jan 07 11:16:54
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 22: CSTO density (parameter 2a)

The value 4.3056 is meaningful, because it represents the average level of interaction within the network. Given the range of 0 to 10, the CSTO density lies more or less in the middle of the spectrum. Thus, the interaction frequency and intensity can be considered neither as high nor low.

The next parameter 2b describes the centralisation of the CSTO network. It is shown in Table 23. 21.786% may be perceived as a rather low value. Apparently, the relationship patterns are not straightened out to one single point in the network.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Network Centralisation = 21.786%
Heterogeneity = 11.99%.  Normalised = 0.98
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  16 Jan 07 11:23:43
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 23: CSTO network degree centralisation (parameter 2b)

Nevertheless, the CSTO network is somewhat centralised, as parameter 2b does not lie close to zero either. Therefore, it may be assumed that some actors are located more centrally than others. Table 24 displays the centralisation ranking in terms of actor's degrees. It is striking that the positions in the ranking significantly changed compared to the average influence ranking (see Table 17). This means that some actors are central within the network due to their activity while others become quasi-outsiders.

		1	2	3
		Degree	NrmDegree	Share
8	Presidential Admin	48.000	60.0000	0.155
1	President	44.000	55.0000	0.142
3	FSB	40.000	50.0000	0.129
4	MoD Departments	36.000	45.0000	0.116
5	MoD General Staff	36.000	45.0000	0.116
9	Security Council	35.000	43.7500	0.113
2	Federal Border Service	33.000	41.2500	0.106
6	Agencies	24.000	30.0000	0.077
7	RAO UES	14.000	17.5000	0.045

Running time: 00:00:01
Output generated: 16 Jan 07 11:23:43
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies

Table 24: Executive authority's position within CSTO network (parameter 2c)

The Presidential Administration obviously ascended to the top position with an absolute degree centralisation of 48. Conversely, the Federal Border Service lost some positions and became more peripheral (33). Against this background, it is interesting to locate the executive authority in the network (parameter 2c). Presidential actors occupy positions 1, 2 and 6 of the centrality ranking. Hence, two of them are placed within the top or central three. This result will be discussed in more detail in the context of the network type debate at the end of this subchapter.

3. Network resources

How does the CSTO network appear in terms of resources? The maximum normalised degree centrality attained equals 60% (parameter 3a). This signifies that the potential for possessing information, knowledge, financial means and other resources has not been fully exploited given a maximum value of 100%. Therefore, the quantity of resources within the network may be considered as limited.

	1	2	3
	Degree	NrmDegree	Share
1 Mean	34.444	43.0556	0.000
2 Std Dev	9.662	12.0777	0.000
3 Sum	310.000	387.5000	0.000
4 Variance	93.358	1458.7191	0.000
5 SSQ	11518.000	179968.7500	0.000
6 MCSSQ	840.222	13128.4719	0.000
7 Euc Norm	107.322	134.1524	0.000
8 Minimum	14.000	17.5000	0.000
9 Maximum	48.000	60.0000	0.000

```
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  16 Jan 07 11:23:43
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 25: Quantity & distribution of resources within CSTO network (parameter 3a+b)

On the other end of the spectrum, the minimum normalised centrality value of 17.5% was achieved by RAO UES. This implies a relative spread of 70.83% (parameter 3b). An assessment of this result is fairly easy. The distribution of resources within the CSTO network ranges over 70.83% of the spectrum, which reflects remarkable attributive differences between network members.

4. Network power

After having analysed the membership, integration and resource dimension, his paragraph focuses on the level and distribution of power within the CSTO policy network. Table 26 presents the normalised closeness values and ranks the nine actors accordingly. Compared to the centrality ranking, the positioning of the MoD Departments catches the eye. Apparently, this actor has numerous access channels to other key players, which adds weight to his role in decision-making.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      1            2
                                Farness   nCloseness
                           ------------ ------------
  8     Presidential Admin         8.000      100.000
  4        MoD Departments         9.000       88.889
  1              President        10.000       80.000
  3                    FSB        10.000       80.000
  5      MoD General Staff        10.000       80.000
  2 Federal Border Service        10.000       80.000
  9       Security Council        10.000       80.000
  6               Agencies        14.000       57.143
  7                RAO UES        15.000       53.333

Statistics

                       1            2
                  Farness   nCloseness
             ------------ ------------
  1     Mean        10.667       77.707
  2  Std Dev         2.160       13.603
  3      Sum        96.000      699.365
  4 Variance         4.667      185.029
  5      SSQ      1066.000    56010.984
  6    MCSSQ        42.000     1665.261
  7 Euc Norm        32.650      236.666
  8  Minimum         8.000       53.333
  9  Maximum        15.000      100.000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  15 Jan 07 19:12:34
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 26: Quantity & distribution of power within CSTO network (parameter 4a+b)

As the maximum normalised closeness value corresponds to 100%, the amount of power within the network is on a maximum level (parameter 4a). It also appears as if this power is not unevenly distributed: the comparative power allocation spectrum equals 46.67%.

Network type assessment

After the computation of all parameters, they shall be aggregated and interpreted in this section. The review of all values in terms of the network types shows a very complex picture. Some parameters are characteristic for policy communities while some are typical of issue networks.

Dimension	Parameter	Value	Threshold
1. Membership			
a) Number of participants	Number of involved network actors	9	10
b) Number of interests	Number of involved actor's categories	3	3
c) Types of interest	Percentage of involved Presidential actors	33.33%	33.33%
2. Integration			
a) Frequency of interaction (information and resources)	Network density	4.3056	5
b) Centralisation	Overall network degree centralisation	21.79%	50.00%
c) Executive authority's position	Degree centrality ranking	Ranks 1, 2 and 6	At least two Presidential actors within top three
3. Resources			
a) Quantity of information and resources within network	Maximum normalised degree centrality	60.00%	75.00%
b) Distribution of information and resources within network	Spread between max and min normalised degree centrality in percentage of the highest value	70.83%	50.00%
4. Power			
a) Quantity of power within network	Maximum normalised closeness centrality	100.00%	75.00%
b) Distribution of power within network	Spread between maximum and minimum normalised closeness centrality in percentage of the highest value	46.67%	50.00%

Table 27: Aggregated CSTO parameters

Concerning the membership dimension, the number of actors is small and hence policy community-like. However, the two other parameters are located exactly on the thresholds between the two network types. The integration dimension shows a similar situation: Whereas the executive authority's position within the network reflects a policy community, the moderate density and the weak centralisation value are classic attributes of an issue network.

Both resource parameters are clearly located on the issue network side of the spectrum. A generally moderate level of resources is combined with an unequal distribution of goods. With regard to power, the opposite appears true. The maximum level of closeness centrality as well as the more or less balanced power among network actors corresponds to the policy community side.

In conclusion, the CSTO policy network parameters are highly contradictory. Four values correspond to policy community characteristics while the other four reflect issue network qualities. These results principally stand in line with sub hypothesis C formulated in section 3.3 of the present study. The CSTO decision-making structure may be considered as a hybrid form of policy network. Yet, the testing of hypotheses will be performed at a later stage (Chapter 11).

8.3 Resulting decision-making procedures and structures

The last two subchapters have so far highlighted the decision-making process and the policy network dimensions. In this section, these two aspects are merged and interpreted with the help of the visualised policy network illustrated below.



Figure 11: Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) resulting policy network

When examining the CSTO network structure at first glance, two findings from the previous subchapter can be confirmed. The network is relatively small, but not very tight nor centralised in terms of interactions. This perfectly reflects the hybrid nature of the CSTO policy network. The fact that the Presidential Administration is placed in the very centre of the network is comprehensible. Aleksander Voloshin and his entourage did not only coordinate decision-making: they rigorously controlled the network on behalf of the President, whenever the head of the state was not available for the issue. This view stands

in line with statements of the CSTO General Secretariat, according to which the Presidential Administration was its main point of contact on the Russian side.[244] Nonetheless, the President certainly played a dominant role with regard to the establishment of the Eurasian Security alliance.[245]

The third player of the innermost troika is the FSB, who was constantly involved in decision-making.[246] It is centrally located due to the manifold links to other actors in and outside of the policy network. Beside close ties to the Presidential actors, FSB had an intense exchange with the Federal Border Service, which was highly active due to the sensitive Russian southern frontiers to the former Soviet republics and – farther away at the outer circumference – Afghanistan and Iraq.

As stated in the last subchapter, the two MoD actors played an important role in CSTO decision-making. They owe their position to their military-technical knowledge and to their numerous relationships within the policy network. Even if all MoD links were not particularly frequent or intense, the Departments and the General Staff cooperated with a broad range of actors including the CSTO Secretariat.[247]

In contrast to other network members, it is not clear what role the Security Council played with regard to the CSTO issue. Seemingly, it was closely attached to the President and kept company with the bulk of the other key decision-makers. It is possible that the Security Council provided a useful arena to form an opinion about this near abroad security issue.

Two actors with few or no interactions are placed at the outer rim of the policy network. Governmental agencies were linked to the Presidential Administration and to the MoD departments. This player reflects the channel towards the defence industry, which played an essential role with regard to the CSTO issue.[248] The second actor at the periphery was RAO UES. The electricity monopolist entertained moderate interactions

[244] Expert interview, CSTO General Secretariat, Moscow: 22.02.2006.
[245] Expert interview, Fonda Politika, Moscow: 01.07.2005.
[246] Expert interviews, Vremja Novostej, Moscow: 13.02.2006.
[247] Expert interview, CSTO General Secretariat, Moscow: 22.02.2006.
[248] Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow 30.01.2006 & The Moscow Times, Moscow: 10.05.2005.

with the Presidential Administration only. This is not astonishing, because the heads of the two institutions - Aleksander Voloshin and Anatoly Chubais – are well known to be close allies.[249] Further more, RAO UES was interested in influencing the CSTO decision-making process due to its vast infrastructure located particularly in Armenia and Tadzhikistan. In contrast, Gazprom, for example, is more focussed on Ukraine and Turkmenistan, two non-CSTO members.[250]

[249] Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow 30.01.2006.
[250] Expert interview, The Moscow Times, Moscow: 03.02.2006.

9. Common European Economic Space (CEES)

After having examined the NRC and CSTO cases, this chapter analysis the third Russian foreign policy issue: the Common European Economic Space (CEES). This initiative was brought forward in spring 2001 as Western state leaders were calling for an institutionally integrated, democratic and modern Russia. The main purpose of the CEES was – and still is - to improve conditions of free traffic of commodities, services, capital and people between the EU and the Russian Federation. The development of this common framework was a lengthy process, which came to an intermediate end in November 2003. At this stage, the CEES concept was adopted at the 12th EU-Russian summit in Rome.

Which major events marked the decision-making process to establish the CEES? What kinds of actors were involved on the Russian side and how were they interlinked with each other? Which type of policy network resulted in Moscow?

These questions shall be addressed within this chapter. The first section (9.1) describes the genesis of the EU-Russian economic project along the time line. It thereby provides a useful overview for the reader. Subsequently, the Russian policy network is reconstructed and analysed in subchapter 9.2. In particular, the network parameters are determined and assessed in the context of the policy network typology. The last subchapter (9.3) summarizes all findings by visualizing and interpreting the CEES network structure.

9.1 The issue and its events

The Russian decision-making process with regard to the CEES somewhat differs from the previous two case studies. Namely, the issue appeared suddenly, whereas the NRC and CSTO cases became apparent weeks ahead. Also, CEES policy-making did not end with a clear-cut decision, but arrived at an intermediate stage in November 2003, dragged on and encroached upon a new framework of cooperation. Today, the CEES is one of four common spaces between the EU and Russia: the Common Economic Space, the Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space on External Security and the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture.[251]

Consecutively, the decision-making process shall again be divided in three segments. At first, the emergence of the issue is traced and presented. After that, it is explained how actors further developed the CEES concept and finally, the third segment reproduces the intermediate decision.

Appearance of the issue

The principle notion to form a common European economic space including Russia had been in the air since 1999 and therefore difficult to trace. It has been adopted under the German EU Council Presidency,[252] picked-up by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in Berlin[253] and mentioned again later by French President Jacques Chirac at the European Council meeting in Stockholm.[254] However, it was never an official issue and never appeared on any agenda until the 7th EU-Russian summit in Moscow on May 17th, 2001.

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[251] The European Commission's Delegation to Russia, http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int, 30.01.2007.
[252] Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005.
[253] 'Russian foreign minister says Europe needs single economic space', ITAR-TASS/BBC Monitoring, 25.11.2000 (ISI database, 20.05.2005).
[254] 'France's Chirac greets Russia's Putin as strategic partner', AFP/BBC Monitoring, 23.03.2001 (ISI database, 12.04.2005).

The day before the summit, a part of the EU delegation under Swedish council presidency met with the Russian deputy Foreign Minister Evgeni Gusarov. At this preparatory meeting, the CEES was not a topic of discussion. Later in the evening, the EU delegation was shortly briefed by Commission President Romano Prodi who informed that he will propose a new project to Putin. Until this very moment, the idea was obviously discussed only informally within the Commission and was not mentioned in Prodi's briefing papers.[255] Literally over night, Swedish diplomatic staff had to change the agenda items for the following day.[256]

In light of this prehistory, the summit included a surprising element. When Prodi submitted the proposal to Putin, the Russian President immediately got into the act. It seems as if both leaders acted on the spur of the moment without being completely aware of the political implications. Subsequently, a short amendment to the drafted text was adopted at the end of the session, which raised no specific questions at the following press conference. However, later in the evening, a reporter from the Financial Times called the Swedish diplomats. Yet, at this stage, nobody was able to answer any questions regarding the CEES.[257]

Subsequently, it took six month to set up a CEES High Level Group since the group's composition only gradually became apparent. Allegedly, the Russian side retarded this phase, because, for some unaccountable reasons, it was unable to nominate a delegation.[258] The body was lead by EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten and also by Russian deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko. It involved the following Russian actors including their deputies: Pochinok Aleksander (Minister of Labour and Social Dev), Lesin Mikhail (Minister of Press and Means of Mass Communication), Gordeev Aleksej (Minister of Agriculture), Gref German (Minister of Eco Dev and Trade), Kudrin Aleksej (Minister of Finance), Bukaev Gennadi (Minister of

---

[255] Expert interview, The European Commission's Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 27.01.2006.
[256] Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005.
[257] Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005.
[258] Expert interview, The European Commission's Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 27.01.2006.

Tax and Duties), Frank Sergej (Minister of Transport), Morosov Vadim (Minister of Communication), Artjukhov Vitali (Minister of Natural Resources), Jusufov Igor (Minister of Entergetic), Nazdratenko Evgenii (Head of Governmental Committee for Fisheries) and Koptev Juri (Head of Governmental Agency for Aviation and Space Matters).[259]

Evolution of the issue

During the following two years, the CEES concept was discussed and developed within not less than eight different fora across all levels and various sectors. From a distance, the process appeared well structured, institutionalized and concerted with concrete mandates, schedules and cooperation mechanisms. At a closer look, however, policy-making was marked by many conflicts and misunderstandings.[260] Whereas Brussels intended to involve Moscow in a larger dialogue, to help with reforms and smooth the EU enlargement, the Russian Federation expected to deal with an equal partner, who provides benefits on all fronts. Whereas the EU considered the CEES as a purely economic venture, Moscow regarded it as a political project.[261]

Within the decision-making period, five EU-Russian summits took place. At these meetings, the Russian side was usually represented by Putin with his advisors and assistants, Foreign Minister Ivanov with his deputies, Ambassador to the EU Vassili Lykhachov, Dmitri Rogozin as main negotiator for Kaliningrad as well as, on occasions, Prime Minister Kasjanov, Trade Minister Gref with his deputies and Finance Minister Kudrin.[262] Additionally, the Foreign Ministers met within the framework of the EU-Russian Cooperation Council meetings.

[259] Expert interview, Independent Analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005.
[260] Expert interview, The European Commission's Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 27.01.2006.
[261] Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005.
[262] Expert interview, Independent Analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005.

On October 3rd, 2001, the 8th EU-Russian summit defined a mandate for the High Level Group, which restricted its work to maximum two years.[263] Within this limited time frame, the CEES High Level Group met four times. On December 5th, 2001, it set up a working schedule and designated an informal group of experts to forward technical work. On March 26th, 2002, it agreed to a list of key sectors[264] and defined concrete working stages. Finally, on October 17th, 2002, it concentrated on defined priorities. Patten and Khristenko's group reported twice to the EU-Russian summit and presented their final results on November 6th, 2003.

The details of the CEES concept were elaborated by High Level Group support teams and by PCA subcommittees. These experts – on the Russian side mainly scientists from leading institutes of the Russian Academy of Science (Vinokurov 2004: 13) - often met and worked out the sectoral specifications. Basically, the EU-Russian collaboration was successful. Yet, major difficulties namely arose with regard to air traffic charges for EU airlines over flying Siberia, agricultural questions, WTO terms of accession such as energy prices, antidumping regulations and trade disputes.[265] Technical question were additionally addressed on other occasions. The high level economic dialogues, the EU-Russian Industrialists Roundtables and specific bilateral talks all contributed economic expertise and viewpoints.

Internally, the Russian Administration created its own working group. A governmental commission led by Viktor Khristenko coordinated all activities between the involved Ministries, Services and Agencies. It united a total of 23 administrational units[266] and, allegedly, the interministerial activities were well prepared and tuned.[267]

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[263] Appendix 2 of the Joint Statement, EU-Russia Summit, Brussels, 03.10.2001.

[264] Standardisation, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures; customs regulation; public procurement; competition policy; financial services; auditing and accounting services; telecommunications; space launching services; transport; metallurgy, car industry, civil aviation industry and agriculture.

[265] Expert interview, The European Commission's Delegation to Russia, Economics and Trade Section, Moscow: 17.05.2005.

[266] Expert Interview, Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Department for External Economic Affairs, Moscow: 16.02.2006.

[267] Expert interview, The European Commission's Delegation to Russia, Economics and Trade Section, Moscow: 17.05.2005.

As the CEES concept evolved, three major characteristics about decision-making became apparent. First, on a technical level, most expertise papers were created or commissioned by the EU. In contrast, the Russian Administration delivered rather few and modest assessments.[268] Also, the Russian side revealed a general drafting apathy.[269] However, these diagnostic findings may perhaps be explained by a shortage of qualified experts on the Russian side, by the language barrier or by a lack of interest. Understandably, Moscow didn't appreciate the EU's attempts to implement parts of its 'acquis communautaire' on a third state. In fact, Brussels intended to make the Russian laws compatible to EU regulations[270] and often felt an open Russian reluctance to change legislation.[271]

Second, it became clear that opposite interests, frictions, resistances and other conflicts only appeared at the lower level of administration. It is unnecessary to explain that coming to a concrete agreement on technical questions is a more difficult task than the formulation of abstract and open objectives. Sometimes, the different views become insurmountable.[272]

Third, the development of the CEES manifested that Western and Russian organisational-administrational cultures diverge. Whereas the EU technocrats were fully authorized to negotiate and conclude deals on lower levels, Russian bureaucrats are completely dependent on and controlled by the highest authority. This difference often led to troublesome situations and ineffective collaboration.[273]

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[268] Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005 & Chris Patten, personal statement, Zurich: 29.06.2006.
[269] Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Science, 01.04.2005.
[270] See Chris Patten's remarks in: 'The EU and Russia: close, but how close?', The St. Petersburg Times, 31.05.2002.
[271] Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005.
[272] Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005.
[273] Expert interview, The European Commission's Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 27.01.2006.

Decision on the issue

On May 22nd, 2003, Khristenko travelled to Brussels in order to bilaterally prepare with Prodi the forthcoming 11th EU-Russian summit in St. Petersburg. Thereby, the CEES was their main issue.[274] Much to the Commission's regret, the High Level Group was not yet ready to present its final concept at the historic St. Petersburg summit. Therefore, the joint statement adopted within the framework of the St. Petersburg tricentennial celebrations contained only a reference to the next EU-Russian summit in Rome.[275] Yet, it was decided to complement the CEES with three additional cooperation pillars: freedom, security and justice, external security, as well as research, education and culture.

On October 28th, 2003, the High Level Group met for the last time in order to finalise and come to an agreement on the CEES. After a hectic finish, the concept paper and the final report were attached as appendicies to the Joint Statement of the Rome summit, that took place on November 6th, 2003. For both sides, the CEES concept represented at that time an important project, although it seemed as if its content was secondary. Whereas the Commission managed to integrate Moscow in the face of the upcoming EU enlargement, Russia ascended one step closer to WTO accession.

[274] 'Russian deputy premier, EC president discuss economic, energy cooperation', RIAnovosti/BBC Monitoring, 22.05.2003 (ISI database, 12.04.2005).
[275] Joint Statement adopted at the EU-Russian Summit, St. Petersburg, 31.05.2003.

9.2 Policy network parameters

Whereas the last section covered events and their consequences over time, this subchapter focuses on decision-making structures in Moscow. It potentially confirms the main actors, who were mentioned previously. Based on the methodological approach (Chapter 4) and analogous to the previous chapters, the network parameters are determined and assessed. Whereas paragraphs 1 to 4 cover the specific network dimensions and their characteristics, the last section aggregates and discusses all parameters in terms of the two extreme network types.

1. Network membership

Based on expert opinions, ten actors can be considered as network members (parameter 1a). As Table 28 shows, they all received an average influence rating of greater than 2.75. At the top of the list, the President ranks with a maximum value of 4. After a quite a large gap of 0.5, he is followed by the direction of his Administration (3.5). On the third rank, the Prime Ministry Direction received a rating of 3.4. Seemingly, this actor may be very influential depending on the issue. In this case, it certainly owes its position to Deputy Prime Minister Khristenko, who played a pivotal role.[276] He was technically supported by the Department for Trade Policy and Multilateral Trade Negotiations of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (3.3). This important position of a subordinate unit is interesting, but it certainly underlines the influence of technical expertise with regard to complex issues.

[276] Expert Interview, European Commission, Bilateral trade relations with the Russian Federation, Brussels: 30.10.2006.

Position	Actors			Average influence ratings
1	Presidential actor	President		4
2	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Direction	3.5
3	Governmental actor	Prime Ministry	Direction	3.4
4	Governmental actor	Ministry of Economic Dev & Trade (MEDT)	Department for Trade Policy and Multilateral Trade Negotiations	3.3
5	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Aides of the President	3
6	Governmental actor	Other Federal Ministries	Ministry of Energy	3
7	Governmental actor	Ministry of Economic Dev & Trade (MEDT)	Direction	2.9
8	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Advisors of the President	2.75
9	Governmental actor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	All-European Cooperation Department	2.75
10	Governmental actor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Ambassadors (EU)	2.75

Table 28: CEES network members (parameter 1a-c)

Two additional Presidential actors have gained access to the CEES policy network: the Aides (3) and the Advisors (2.75) of the President. The Ministry of Energy received a ranking of 3, which is remarkable. So far, it is the only Federal Ministry apart the MoD, MFA and MEDT included in decision-making. The MEDT direction at rank seven (2.9) is no surprise, as this ministry coordinated the bulk of the issue's technical aspects.[277] Finally, the two MFA actors – the all-European Cooperation Department and the EU Ambassador (both 2.75) - are considered as network members.

[277] Expert Interview, Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Department for External Economic Affairs, Moscow: 16.02.2006.

The CEES policy network involves two interest categories only (parameter 1b). Thereby, executive interests seem to be predominate, as 40% of the decision-makers belong to the Presidential sphere (parameter 1c). It is astonishing that economic actors remained outside of the policy network. Most economic players participated rather passively in decision-making by restricting themselves to the EU-Russian Industrialists Roundtable. This may be explained by two factors: first, it is possible that the Russian business sector was simply not interested as long as the CEES concept was a piece of paper without concrete implications.[278] Second, as the previous subchapter outlined, the development of the CEES concept was by and large an internal governmental affair.[279] Therefore, most economic actors were insufficiently informed. At best, the biggest enterprises were informally updated by the deputy Prime Ministry or by the Presidential Administration.[280]

Table 29 presents the list of 10 additional influential actors, who were not admitted to the innermost circle. Nevertheless, they attained remarkable average influence ratings.

Position	Actors			Average influence ratings
11	Governmental actor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Direction	2.7
12	Economic actor	Energy Sector	Gazprom	2.625
13	Governmental actor	Prime Ministry	Governmental Administration (Int Coop)	2.5
14	Governmental actor	Prime Ministry	Governmental Administration (Energy & Natural Resources)	2.5
15	Governmental actor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Relations to Federal Regions Department	2.5
16	Economic actor	Energy Sector	RAO UES	2.5

[278] Expert interview, The European Commission's Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 27.01.2006.
[279] See also Vinokurov (2004).
[280] Expert Interview, Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Department for External Economic Affairs, Moscow: 22.06.2005.

Position	Actors			Average influence ratings
17	Economic actor	Financial Sector		2.5
18	Economic actor	Industrial sector	(RusAl)	2.5
19	Economic actor	Service Sector		2.5
20	Governmental actor	Other Federal Ministries	Minitry of Transport	2.4

Table 29: CEES additional actors

Upon reviewing and comparing the CEES network members and non-members, at least three points stand out. First, the CEES case involves four 'other' Federal Ministries. Beside the MEDT and MFA, the Ministries of Energy, Transport and – no longer shown on the list – the Ministries of Finance (rank 23) as well as Communication (position 24) had some influence on the development of the economic space. This fact certainly reflects the complex nature of the CEES. Numerous aspects of diverse state sectors have been addressed by the EU-Russian concept.

Second, the two tables presented above illustrate again that sometimes a specific ministerial department may be more influential than its superior direction. This is the case for the MEDT and for the MFA. This circumstance can be explained by the fact that technical knowledge of apparatchiki is in certain cases more important than the coordinating role of Ministers.

And finally, it is noteworthy that Services such as FSB, SVR or others were apparently not important at all. As these actors by and large lack profound economic expertise, they are less present in decision-making of non-security-related issues.[281]

[281] Expert interview, Independent Analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005.

2. Network integration

The previous paragraph delimitated the CEES policy network in terms of its membership. In this section, it is determined, how and to what extent these ten decision-makers interacted. Table 30 presents the accumulated expert scores. Thereby, it is obvious that no relationship achieved the maximum (10) or the minimum rating (0).

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      1
                                        1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
                                        P P P M P M M P M M
                                        - - - - - - - - - -
  1                          President
  2                      PA, Direction  9
  3           Prime Ministry, Direction  8 8
  4        MEDT, Dep Trade Policy&Negot  4 5 3
  5          PA, Aides of the President  7 9 5 4
  6                  Ministry of Energy  3 5 6 2 3
  7                     MEDT, Direction  7 5 8 9 6 3
  8       PA, Advisors of the President  8 9 4 3 8 3 4
  9          MFA, All-European Coop Dep  1 4 3 3 3 1 3 2
 10                  MFA, EU Ambassador  2 3 3 1 2 1 3 2 7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 16:29:17
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```

Table 30: CEES matrix accumulated

In Table 31, the dichotomized interaction values are shown. As this matrix is relatively easy to read, it is already conceivable that the two MFA actors are hardly linked to the rest of the network. This fact will become even more visible in the network graphic (see 9.3).

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    1
                                       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
                                       P P P M P M M P M M
                                       - - - - - - - - - -
  1                        President
  2                    PA, Direction   1
  3          Prime Ministry, Direction   1 1
  4       MEDT, Dep Trade Policy&Negot   1 1 0
  5         PA, Aides of the President   1 1 1 1
  6                 Ministry of Energy   0 1 1 0 0
  7                    MEDT, Direction   1 1 1 1 1 0
  8      PA, Advisors of the President   1 1 1 0 1 0 1
  9         MFA, All-European Coop Dep   0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 10                 MFA, EU Ambassador   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Output generated:  17 Jan 07 16:38:16
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```

Table 31: CEES matrix dichotomized

The last CEES data set encompassed the categorised interaction values (Table 32). It will be used for visualisation purposes in subchapter 9.3.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    1
                                       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
                                       P P P M P M M P M M
                                       - - - - - - - - - -
  1                        President
  2                    PA, Direction   2
  3          Prime Ministry, Direction   2 2
  4       MEDT, Dep Trade Policy&Negot   1 1 0
  5         PA, Aides of the President   2 2 1 1
  6                 Ministry of Energy   0 1 1 0 0
  7                    MEDT, Direction   2 1 2 2 1 0
  8      PA, Advisors of the President   2 2 1 0 2 0 1
  9         MFA, All-European Coop Dep   0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 10                 MFA, EU Ambassador   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Output generated:  17 Jan 07 16:45:53
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```

Table 32: CEES matrix categorised

What is the average activity of the CEES network members? As Table 33 illustrates the density amounts to 4.4889 (parameter 2a). This represents a medium level of interactivity given the possible range from 1 to 10.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          1
     ------
  1  4.4889
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 16:55:41
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 33: CEES density (parameter 2a)

Similar to the density, the network degree centralisation does not show an extreme result. 23.056% represents a rather low value (parameter 2b).

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Network Centralisation = 23.056%
Heterogeneity = 10.73%.  Normalised = 0.81
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 16:58:32
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```

Table 34: CEES network degree centralisation (parameter 2b)

What is the executive authority's position within the CEES network? Table 35 displays the degree centrality ranking of the ten decision-makers. Obviously, the President and his head of Administration are situated at the top of the ranking and the Presidential Aides and Advisors follow on positions five and six (parameter 2c).

		1	2	3
		Degree	NrmDegree	Share
2	PA, Direction	57.000	63.3333	0.141
1	President	49.000	54.4444	0.121
3	Prime Ministry, Direction	48.000	53.3333	0.119
7	MEDT, Direction	48.000	53.3333	0.119
5	PA, Aides of the President	47.000	52.2222	0.116
8	PA, Advisors of the President	43.000	47.7778	0.106
4	MEDT, Dep Trade Policy&Negot	34.000	37.7778	0.084
6	Ministry of Energy	27.000	30.0000	0.067
9	MFA, All-European Coop Dep	27.000	30.0000	0.067
10	MFA, EU Ambassador	24.000	26.6667	0.059

Running time: 00:00:01
Output generated: 17 Jan 07 17:04:34
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies

Table 35: Executive authority's position within CEES network (parameter 2c)

When studying Table 35, it can be noted that the two MEDT actors changed positions with regard to their influence ranking. Whereas the direction climbs from rank 7 to rank 4, the department for external economic affairs moves in the opposite way. Otherwise, the positions within the network can be considered as pretty stable.

3. Network resources

The resource dimension includes two parameters. The first one covers the quantity of information and other resources available within the network. It equals 63.33% (parameter 3a) according to the maximum normalised degree centrality shown in Table 36. This represents a relatively weak value. Yet, it was reached only by the direction of the Presidential Administration.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          1            2            3
                     Degree    NrmDegree        Share
                ------------ ------------ ------------
  1      Mean         40.400       44.8889        0.000
  2   Std Dev         10.883       12.0922        0.000
  3       Sum        404.000      448.8889        0.000
  4  Variance        118.440     1462.2222        0.000
  5       SSQ      17506.000   216123.4500        0.000
  6     MCSSQ       1184.400    14622.2219        0.000
  7  Euc Norm        132.310      147.0114        0.000
  8   Minimum         24.000       26.6667        0.000
  9   Maximum         57.000       63.3333        0.000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 17:04:34
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 36: Quantity & distribution of resources within CEES network (parameter 3a+b)

The second parameter is an indicator for the resource distribution within the policy network. It is calculated by expressing the spread between the minimum and maximum degree centralisation as a percentage of the maximum value. The Russian EU Ambassador evidently represents the bottom line with 26.6667%, thus the relative spectrum amounts to 57.89% (parameter 3c). This signifies a considerable gap between the highest and lowest amount of resources within the policy network.

4. Network power

The last network dimension addresses the amount and allocation of power within the network. According to the methodological definition, these two aspects are measured by the actor's closeness centrality values. Table 37 indicates the closeness ranking as well as its statistics. The highest number - 90% - is again attained by the direction of the Presidential Administration with (parameter 4a).

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    1            2
                                               Farness   nCloseness
                                            ----------- -----------
  2                        PA, Direction        10.000       90.000
  1                            President        13.000       69.231
  3             Prime Ministry, Direction        13.000       69.231
  5           PA, Aides of the President        13.000       69.231
  7                      MEDT, Direction        13.000       69.231
  8        PA, Advisors of the President        14.000       64.286
  4         MEDT, Dep Trade Policy&Negot        15.000       60.000
  9           MFA, All-European Coop Dep        16.000       56.250
  6                   Ministry of Energy        17.000       52.941
 10                   MFA, EU Ambassador        24.000       37.500

Statistics

                         1            2
                   Farness   nCloseness
                ----------- -----------
  1     Mean         14.800       63.790
  2  Std Dev          3.572       12.983
  3      Sum        148.000      637.900
  4 Variance         12.760      168.569
  5      SSQ       2318.000    42377.328
  6    MCSSQ        127.600     1685.694
  7 Euc Norm         48.146      205.858
  8  Minimum         10.000       37.500
  9  Maximum         24.000       90.000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  17 Jan 07 17:12:56
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 37: Quantity & distribution of power within CEES network (parameter 4a+b)

Equal to the resource dimension, the MFA Ambassador is located at the bottom of the list. His quantity of power 37.5% reflects his isolated position within the network. Between the maximum and the minimum amount of power, a relative spectrum of 58.33% can be calculated (parameter 4b). This value implies that the CEES network is not balanced in terms of power. Some actors have direct links to many other players while others are by and large separated.

Network type assessment

Now as all CEES parameters have been determined and presented one-by-one, they shall be summarized. Table 38 recapitulates all the dimensions, parameters, values and their respective thresholds. How can these numbers be interpreted with reference to the theoretical network types?

Dimension	Parameter	Value	Threshold
1. Membership			
a) Number of participants	Number of involved network actors	10	10
b) Number of interests	Number of involved actor's categories	2	3
c) Types of interest	Percentage of involved Presidential actors	40.00%	33.33%
2. Integration			
a) Frequency of interaction (information and resources)	Network density	4.4889	5
b) Centralisation	Overall network degree centralisation	23.06%	50.00%
c) Executive authority's position	Degree centrality ranking	Ranks 1, 2, 5 and 6	At least two Presidential actors within top three
3. Resources			
a) Quantity of information and resources within network	Maximum normalised degree centrality	63.33%	75.00%
b) Distribution of information and resources within network	Spread between max and min normalised degree centrality in percentage of the highest value	57.89%	50.00%

Dimension	Parameter	Value	Threshold
4. Power			
a) Quantity of power within network	Maximum normalised closeness centrality	90%	75.00%
b) Distribution of power within network	Spread between maximum and minimum normalised closeness centrality in percentage of the highest value	58.33%	50.00%

Table 38: Aggregated CEES parameters

Concerning membership, the CEES network appears at first glance rather like a policy community. A limited number of interests are controlled to a certain extent by Presidential actors. However, the number of actors lies exactly on the threshold between the two network types. A clear statement is therefore not possible.

The same impression may be achieved by analysing the integration dimension. Whereas the density and centralisation values are located on the issue network side, the executive authority's central position is characteristic of policy communities.

Resources are scarce and unevenly distributed relative to the thresholds. This would situate the CEES network on the issue network side of the spectrum. However, the power facet again displays contradictory results. A comparatively high amount of available power is allocated quite unevenly. Hence, it is not possible to compare the CEES decision-making structure with one of the pure network types.

In conclusion, four out of ten parameters reflect a policy community-like structure, whereas five values are more typical for issue networks. Thus, the CEES pattern constitutes a hybrid form of policy network and has to be placed somewhere in between the two far ends of the spectrum. In fact, this finding is reminiscent to sub hypotheses C, that was formulated in subchapter 3.3. If a Russian foreign policy issue is addressed by the far abroad and economic subfields, a classic policy community or issue network according to theoretical assumptions cannot be expected. However, these suppositions have to be verified later on, when all four cases are contrasted in Chapter 11.

9.3 Resulting decision-making procedures and structures

So far, it has been revealed how the CEES concept appeared, evolved and reached an intermediate stadium in the end of 2003. The policy network dimensions were also highlighted and determined. All these findings are considered together here. In this subchapter, the CEES policy network is visualised and interpreted.



Figure 12: Common European Economic Space (CEES) resulting policy network

The above-displayed resulting CEES decision-making structure illustrates basically a core, some attached actors and three single mavericks. At the very centre, the powerful Direction of the Presidential Administration acts as a hinge. It interacts with all actors apart from the MFA Ambassadors. The role of the Presidential Administration in this case

is generally underestimated. Even if it was not involved in the development of the CEES content on a technical level,[282] it may have influenced decision-making by reviewing and adjusting briefing papers and other basic documents.[283] Vladimir Putin is located right beside his Administration. He basically interacted with all other network members apart from the two MFA actors. In fact, the President himself was not immediately involved in creating the CEES on lower levels. However, he initiated the process, determined the strategic course and marked the cornerstones.

The third most important actor in the policy network was the Prime Ministry Direction. This central position can only be explained with the central role of Deputy Viktor Khristenko and his crew. They did not only manage the interface between Moscow and the EU. They also coordinated all activities within the Russian government.[284] Thereby, it is noteworthy that the Prime Ministry didn't interact directly with the appropriate MEDT department. A majority of the information and other resources were apparently vertically processed via the MEDT Direction. Over all, the deputy's role may not be overrated. According to EU Commissioner Chris Patten, Viktor Khristenko is a 'nice guy, but he is completely dependent on Putin'.[285]

The Direction of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade lies a bit further away from the network centre. German Gref and his deputies as well as their administration played an active role as mediators between the strategic and technical level.[286] Also, the MEDT Direction is important due to the active role of Deputy Minister Maksim Medvedkov, who was responsible for WTO accession negotiations. Directly subordinate to the Direction is the highly important Department for Trade Policy and Multilateral Trade Negotiations. This actor actually delivered most of the expertise, negotiated sectoral agreements and submitted documents for the attention of the High

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[282] Expert interview, The European Commission's Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 27.01.2006.
[283] Expert Interview, Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Department for External Economic Affairs, Moscow: 16.02.2006.
[284] Expert Interview, Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Department for External Economic Affairs, Moscow: 16.02.2006.
[285] Personal statement, Zurich: 29.06.2006.
[286] Expert Interview, Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Department for External Economic Affairs, Moscow: 16.02.2006.

Level Group.[287] The department was led by Elena Danilova, who had a strong impact on the CEES concept paper.[288]

Obviously, the Presidential Aides and Advisors had leverage on the issue due to their direct link to Putin. In particular, Andrej Illarionov (economic matters), Viktor Ivanov (national projects)[289] and during the end phase Igor Shuvalov (EU matters)[290] both were influential. In contrast, it is not entirely clear to what extent the Ministry of Energy influenced the CEES decision. It can only be speculated that Minister Igor Jusufov and his apparat negotiated hard within the framework of the EU-Russian energy dialogue, which inter alia influenced the CEES concept. Brussels has for several reasons a strong interest in Russian energy market reforms, whereas Moscow is unwilling to implement major changes.[291]

At the network's periphery, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is represented by two not very powerful actors. Even if the MFA was basically included in all discussions, it only had a limited share in CEES decision-making. Whereas the All-European Cooperation Department technically followed the issue, the permanent mission of Russia to the EU in Brussels under Ambassador Vasili Likhachev acted as a local facilitator.[292]

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[287] Expert interview, Independent Analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005.
[288] Expert interview, The European Commission's Delegation to Russia, Economics and Trade Section, Moscow: 17.05.2005.
[289] Expert interview, The European Commission's Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 27.01.2006.
[290] Expert interview, Independent Analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005.
[291] See Grant and Barysch (2003).
[292] Expert Interview, European Commission, Bilateral trade relations with the Russian Federation, Brussels: 30.10.2006.

10. Single Economic Space (SES)

The fourth and last case study covers the development of the Single Economic Space (SES) between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. This project was initiated at the beginning of 2003 and aimed at further integrating the four economies according to the EU model. Basically, the four CIS members decided to form a free trade area, to harmonize regulatory standards and to liberalize the movement of production factors. The decision-making process ended in May 2004, when the framework agreements entered into force.

This chapter is arranged in the same format as the previous three sections. At the outset, the issue and its events are presented as a general synopsis (subchapter 10.1). This process-oriented examination uncovers the cornerstones of a delicate decision. In subchapter 10.2, the SES policy network dimensions and their parameters will be presented. Based on these results, it shall be determined whether the decision-making structure reflects a policy community, an issue network or a mixed form. Finally, subchapter 10.3 visualises and discusses the policy network. The complex relationship patterns shall be interpreted and explained.

10.1 The issue and its events

In contrast to the previous three cases, the creation of the SES is marked by a more blurred decision-making process. Particularly, the initiation phase as well as the end point are not completely intelligible. This may be explained by two factors: firstly, Russian decision-making with regard to near abroad issues lacks transparency. In addition to the general secrecy of foreign policy-formulation, events by and large take place backstage. Secondly, the establishment of the single integrated economic block gradually became a politicised venture. Instead of adopting a pure economic-related orientation, the four founding states

ended up once again in a highly emotional debate over national, strategic interests. This fact contributed to an additional obliteration and confusion of the decision-making process.

Nevertheless, the main cornerstones of the process were visible enough to provide an idea about the genesis of the project. The following three paragraphs shall trace the appearance, the evolution and the decision of the issue.

Appearance of the issue

The initial idea of the SES can be backtracked to an informal CIS summit in Kiev in late January 2003. On that occasion, the head of states discussed several options to revitalize the Commonwealth by focussing on economic approaches. Yet, the SES as such was not mentioned at all.[293] It took another month until the Presidents of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus met in Moscow. On February 23rd, they signed a short declaration, that stipulated the creation of a single economic space between the four biggest Eurasian economies. As a new stage of integration among CIS-members, they set the target to ultimately form a new regional organisation. Simultaneously, they decided to consign a High Level Group to work out the framework agreements.[294]

The declaration of the four Presidents constituted a highly unexpected announcement. Policy-makers as well as experts in the field were completely surprised by the initiative, which literally came out of the blue. Even the acting Ukrainian Minister for Foreign Affairs Boris Tarasyuk came to know about the project from mass media.[295] Apparently, the idea had been born within Putin's closed Presidential circle without any expert analysis or public discussion.[296]

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[293] T. Kuzio 'Ukrainian President revamps CIS, obtains Russia's backing for 2004 elections', Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 27.02.2003.
[294] Zajavlenie Prezidentov Respubliki Belarus, Respubliki Kazakhstan, Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Ukrainy, 23.02.2003.
[295] Zerkalo Nedeli, No. 15, Kiev: 23.04-06.05.2005.
[296] See Glinkina and Kosikova (2006: 7).

In fact, it is unclear who came up with the initiative first. According to one version, it was the Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, who was personally interested in SES.[297] In the run-up to the Presidential elections, his position on the domestic front by and large depended by and large on Russia's support. His own political survival could only be assured with the help of a closer alliance with Putin.[298] Additionally, it may be assumed that large Ukrainian business sectors could profit from a SES.[299]

The second version tells a different story. It assumes that the idea was brought up by Putin and his administration.[300] Actually, several reasons may be identified to back up this account. First and foremost, the Russian President made many efforts to bring the SES into being. He continuously and personally pushed the initiative.[301] But also, Russia intended to make a symmetric Eurasian response to the EU eastern enlargement, which was decided in April 2003. Apparently, the CEES initiative of the EU Commission did not fully compensate for the isolation felt by Moscow. Further more, the SES project reflected another Russian attempt to involve Ukraine in Eurasian integration processes.[302] The fact that Kiev continuously rejected to join EurAsEC never evoked sympathy in Moscow. After all, Ukraine made up 35.1% of the trade relations with Russia within the CIS space. Last but not least, Moscow had good economic reasons to establish a 'union of the big four'.[303]

Evolution of the issue

Two weeks after the Presidential meeting in Moscow, the Russian and Ukrainian Prime Ministers Kasjanov and Yanukovich held bilateral talks in Kiev. Thereby, they addressed various questions about the SES. In particular, the composition of the High Level Group

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297 Expert interview, Institute CIS countries, Moscow: 15.02.2006.
298 L. Kosikova 'EEP: Byt ili ne byt', Nezavisimaja Gazeta Dipkurer, 27.02.2006.
299 See Glinkina and Kosikova (2006: 19).
300 Expert interview, Committee Russia in the United Europe, Moscow, 17.02.2006.
301 Expert interview, Fonda Politika, Moscow: 01.07.2005.
302 See Glinkina and Kosikova (2006: 5-6).
303 Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Departament Informatsii i pechati, 'Torgovo-ekonomicheskie otnoshenija RF so stranami-uchastnikami SNG', 28.01.2003.

was an urgent task given the Presidential deadline to present the basic documents in September.[304] In this group, the Russian side was represented by Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko, two deputy Ministers for Economic Development and Trade Dmitri Sukhoparov and Maksim Medvedkov as well as other officials from various Ministries and authorities.

The first session of the High Level Group took place in Kiev on March 5th 2003. The representatives thereby addressed organisational and procedural questions and set up a working plan. It was envisaged to draft a blueprint of the SES concept at the end of March.[305] Henceforth, the High Level Group gathered another seven times by September 2003. Its work was supported by technical expertise that was provided by seven different working groups.

Officially these working groups were subordinate to the quadripartite High Level Group.[306] Yet, it is obvious that Moscow provided most of the experts. It goes without saying that the Russian Government profited from the foregoing conceptualization of the CEES. Thanks to this cooperation project with the EU, Moscow had accumulated considerable know how and experience with regard to common economic zones according to WTO regulations.[307] Hence, except the participation of the four Foreign Ministries, the working groups by and large included specialists from the Russian governmental and scientific spheres. They were coordinated and organised by MEDT head Gref and his deputy Sukhoparov and addressed the following seven sectors: customs, subsidies and competition, technical questions, finance, banks, taxes and capital, services, investments and labour.[308]

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[304] 'PM says Russia-Ukraine economic space to boost integration', Prime-TASS, 07.03.2003 (ISI database, 20.05.2005).
[305] 'Ukrainian premier meets top-level delegation on CIS free trade zone', UNIAN / BBC Monitoring, 06.03.2003 (ISI database, 20.05.2005).
[306] 'Spravochnyi material po Edinomu ekonomicheskomu prostranstvu Respubliki Belorussija, Respubliki Kazakhstan, RF I Ukrainy', MERT, 27.06.2005.
[307] Expert interview, Independent analyst, Moscow: 29.04.2005.
[308] Expert interview, MEDT Department for external economic policy, Moscow: 27.06.2005.

On August 11th 2003, the experts endorsed the three basic documents –the agreement, the concept and the implementation plan of the SES.[309] Only four days later, they were approved by the High Level Group in Almaty. According to the MEDT, the pace of the process at that stage reflected the successful coordination among different Ministries. Allegedly, the technical workings were additionally supported by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and by the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.[310]

Decision on the issue

During the first part of September 2003, the four Presidents interacted with each other mainly on a personal and bilateral basis. Seemingly, these contacts at the highest level were necessary in order to sort out the last differences on the common concept. Only the day before the CIS meeting in Jalta had a consensus been reached.[311] On September 19th, 2003, Putin, Kuchma, Nazarbaev and Lukashenko ceremonially signed the agreement on the SES that also contained the other two main documents.

As the SES agreement was subject to ratification, it had to be passed on to the national parliaments. On January 15th, 2004, the Russian Government approved the integration project and handed the issue over to the Federal Assembly. The Duma and the Federation Council then ratified the agreement on April 20th and 21st, 2004. Finally on May 20th, the SES officially entered into force.[312] However, the integration project had so far been a more of a theoretic construct. It now had to be implemented by creating a package of not less than 90 international treaties, which were supposed to contain concrete regulations and measures.

---

[309] 'Eksperty Ukrainy, RF, Kazakhstana I Belorussii utverdjat rjad dokumentov dlja sozdanija edinovo ekonomicheskovo prostranstva', RIA Novosti, 11.08.2003.
[310] Expert interview, MEDT Department for external economic policy, Moscow: 27.06.2005.
[311] 'Russia's Foreign Policy', RIA Oreanda, 20.09.2003 (ISI database, 18.05.2005).
[312] 'Spravochnyi material po Edinomu ekonomicheskomu prostranstvu Respubliki Belorussija, Respubliki Kazakhstan, RF I Ukrainy', MERT, 27.06.2005.

10.2 Policy network parameters

The last section viewed the decision-making events in a process-related perspective. In contrast, this subchapter draws attention to structural aspects. According to the methodological procedures, the SES policy network shall be reconstructed and quantitatively analysed. All four network dimensions are determined by calculating the appropriate parameters. At the end of this subchapter, all parameters are aggregated and assessed in the context of the theoretical policy network typology.

1. Network membership

Which domain actors are part of the SES policy network? According to the average expert assessments shown in Table 39, 19 players achieved an influence rating greater than 2.75 (parameter 1a). They are considered as SES network members and therefore need to be examined more closely.

Position	**Actors**			**Average influence ratings**
1	Presidential actor	President		4
2	Governmental actor	Prime Ministry	Direction	3.8
3	Governmental actor	Ministry of Economic Development & Trade (MEDT)	Direction	3.7
4	Governmental actor	Prime Ministry	Governmental Administration (Dep Int Coop)	3.6875
5	Economic actor	Energy Sector	Gazprom	3.6
6	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Direction	3.5
7	Governmental actor	Ministry of Economic Development & Trade (MEDT)	Department for Multilateral Cooperation with CIS Countries	3.5

8	Economic actor	Energy Sector	RAO UES	3.5
9	Parliamentary actor	State Duma	Duma Council	3.33333
10	Presidential actor	Presidential Administration	Aides of the President	3.25
11	Governmental actor	Prime Ministry	Governmental Administration (Direction)	3.25
12	Governmental actor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	1st CIS Department (General Cooperation)	3.25
13	Parliamentary actor	State Duma	Committee for CIS Cooperation	3.25
14	Governmental actor	Prime Ministry	Governmental Administration (Dep Finance)	3.125
15	Economic actor	Energy Sector	Lukoil	3.125
16	Governmental actor	Minstry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Ambassadors (Kaz/Bel/Ukr)	3
17	Parliamentary actor	Federal Council	Chair	3
18	Governmental actor	Other Federal Ministries	Ministry of Finance	2.875
19	Parliamentary actor	State Duma	Committee for International Affairs	2.75

Table 39: SES network members (parameter 1a-c)

The first position of the President (4) is not astonishing given the above-described regular and personal interventions. It is curious that only 15.79% of the SES policy network is presidentially coloured (parameter 1c). Accordingly, the top of the ranking is dominated by governmental actors. The Prime Ministry direction (3.8) is closely followed by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (3.7) and the Governmental Administration (3.6875). Seemingly, these actors played a coordinating role with regard to the SES establishment.

At position five, Gazprom ranks as the first non-Presidential, non-Governmental decision-maker. It is not surprising that the energy giant is assessed as highly influential (3.6), because it has massive stakes in these three former Soviet Republics. Gazprom is not the only network member representing the economic sphere. The creation of the

common economic space involved additionally RAO UES (rank 8, 3.5) and Lukoil (rank 15, 3.125).

Another feature of the average influence ranking catches the eye. Compared to previous cases, the SES policy network involves four parliamentary actors. The Duma Council (position 9), the Duma Committee for CIS Cooperation (rank 13), the Federation Council Chair (position 17) and the Duma Committee for International Affairs (rank 19). Obviously, the ranking accurately reflects the fact that the constituting documents of the SES had to be ratified by the Federal Assembly. Therefore, the SES policy network involves four interest categories (parameter 1b).

The last remark concerns the Prime Ministry. Seemingly, the subordinated Governmental Administration was influential given the fact that it is listed not less than three times. The involvement of the Direction (rank 11), the Department of International Cooperation (position 4) and the Department of Finance (position 14) probably reflect the important coordination role of the Prime Ministry and particularly of vice-Prime Minister Khristenko.

Table 40 displays the next ten positions encompassing influential non-network members. When considering this list, two facts stand out.

Position	Actors			Average influence ratings
20	Presidential actor	Security Council	Direction	2.66667
21	Parliamentary actor	State Duma	Administration	2.66667
22	Economic actor	Energy Sector	Yukos	2.66667
23	Governmental actor	Minstry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Direction	2.625
24	Governmental actor	Other Federal Ministries	Ministry of Industry, Science & Technology	2.625
25	Governmental actor	Minstry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	2nd CIS Dep (Bel, Mol, Ukr)	2.5
26	Governmental actor	Minstry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	3rd CIS Dep (Central Asia)	2.5
27	Governmental actor	Other Federal Ministries	Ministry of Justice	2.5
28	Governmental actor	Ministry of Economic Development & Trade (MEDT)	Department for Trade Policy and Multilateral Trade Negotiations	2.5
29	Economic actor	Industrial sector (Steel)		2.5

Table 40: SES additional actors

First, it is noteworthy that Yukos obviously had some weight in SES decision-making. However, it has to be assumed that this influence suddenly shrank at an early stage of the process, since the energy corporation started to fall apart after Khodorkovsky's arrest on October 25th 2003. Second, the MFA Direction is listed only at position 23. This is astonishing, because this actor would be expected to find access to the enlarged policy network of 19 members.

After the identification of the network population, the focus shall be turned towards the relationships among decision-makers. The next paragraph presents the interaction matrices and transforms them for various purposes.

2. Network integration

The first data set is presented in Table 41. It opposes the 19 network members and displays the accumulated expert ratings, which indicate the frequency and intensity of the interactions. This matrix will be used for parameter calculations.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
                                1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
                                P P M G G P M R D P G M D G L M F M D
                                - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
  1                   President
  2   Prime Ministry, Direction  9
  3             MEDT, Direction  6 7
  4     Gov Admin, Dep Int Coop  3 7 4
  5                     Gazprom  6 5 5 3
  6               PA, Direction  8 9 5 5 4
  7 MEDT, Dep Mulitlat CIS Coop  1 6 9 7 3 3
  8                     RAO UES  3 4 3 2 6 7 3
  9               Duma, Council  4 4 2 2 5 5 3 4
 10  PA, Aides of the President  8 9 5 5 5 7 4 5 2
 11        Gov Admin, Direction  5 8 3 6 5 4 7 3 4 3
 12            MFA, 1st CIS Dep  6 4 7 6 3 3 8 2 4 6 6
 13        Duma, Cttee CIS Coop  1 1 2 2 1 1 5 1 4 2 4 6
 14      Gov Admin, Dep Finance  2 2 4 4 2 3 6 2 3 3 5 6 2
 15                      Lukoil  3 5 3 3 5 5 3 4 3 4 3 3 1 1
 16            MFA, Ambassadors  2 3 4 2 3 3 4 1 2 1 2 9 3 1 3
 17   Federation Council, Chair  3 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 3 1 2 1
 18         Ministry of Finance  4 5 8 4 4 4 6 3 2 3 4 4 2 4 3 2 2
 19     Duma, Cttee Int Affairs  2 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 3 5 0 1 0 2 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  19 Jan 07 10:33:10
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 41: SES matrix accumulated

Based on the accumulated matrix, the next data set (Table 42) shows the dichotomized values. It is easily readable because interactions are either existent (1) or not (0). This matrix will especially be used for closeness centrality computations.

```
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
                                1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
                                P P M G G P M R D P G M D G L M F M D
                                - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
  1                   President
  2   Prime Ministry, Direction  1
  3             MEDT, Direction  1 1
  4     Gov Admin, Dep Int Coop  0 1 1
  5                     Gazprom  1 1 1 0
  6               PA, Direction  1 1 1 1 1
  7 MEDT, Dep Mulitlat CIS Coop  0 1 1 1 0 0
  8                     RAO UES  0 1 0 0 1 1 0
  9               Duma, Council  1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
 10  PA, Aides of the President  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
 11        Gov Admin, Direction  1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
 12            MFA, 1st CIS Dep  1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
 13        Duma, Cttee CIS Coop  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
 14      Gov Admin, Dep Finance  0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
 15                      Lukoil  0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 16            MFA, Ambassadors  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
 17   Federation Council, Chair  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 18         Ministry of Finance  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
 19     Duma, Cttee Int Affairs  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  19 Jan 07 10:40:44
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 42: SES matrix dichotomized

Last but not least, Table 43 provides the categorised data that will be required for the depiction of the network graphs. Similar to the previous case studies, the content of these data sets will only be discussed in subchapter 10.3.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
                                1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
                                P P M G G P M R D P G M D G L M F M D
                                - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
  1                   President
  2   Prime Ministry, Direction  2
  3             MEDT, Direction  1 2
  4     Gov Admin, Dep Int Coop  0 2 1
  5                     Gazprom  1 1 1 0
  6               PA, Direction  2 2 1 1 1
  7 MEDT, Dep Mulitlat CIS Coop  0 1 2 2 0 0
  8                     RAO UES  0 1 0 0 1 2 0
  9               Duma, Council  1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
 10  PA, Aides of the President  2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 0
 11        Gov Admin, Direction  1 2 0 1 1 1 2 0 1 0
 12            MFA, 1st CIS Dep  1 1 2 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 1
 13        Duma, Cttee CIS Coop  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
 14      Gov Admin, Dep Finance  0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
 15                      Lukoil  0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
 16            MFA, Ambassadors  0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
 17   Federation Council, Chair  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 18         Ministry of Finance  1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
 19     Duma, Cttee Int Affairs  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  19 Jan 07 10:49:19
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 43: SES matrix categorised

At this stage, all matrices are ready to use for parameter computations. The first UCINET operation calculates the SES network density based on the accumulated data (Table 44). The value 3.5614 is rather weak (parameter 2a). It implies that the level of interaction within the network was generally low relative to the maximum of 10 and the minimum of 0.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          1
     ------
  1  3.5614
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  19 Jan 07 10:54:29
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 44: SES density (parameter 2a)

Also, the network degree centralisation of 16.699% is very moderate (parameter 2b). It signifies that the network spreads out without having a clearly conceivable epicentre.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Network Centralisation = 16.699%
Heterogeneity = 5.66%.  Normalised = 0.42
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  19 Jan 07 10:58:46
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 45: SES network degree centralisation (parameter 2b)

Accordingly, the determination of the executive authority's position within the network looses significance. Nevertheless, UCINET software is able to calculate and present a hierarchy based on the degree centrality values (Table 46). Thereby, Presidential actors are located on ranks 5, 6 and 8 (parameter 2c).

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      1           2           3
                                 Degree    NrmDegree       Share
                               ---------- ---------- ----------
  2   Prime Ministry, Direction       91.000     50.5556      0.075
 12           MFA, 1st CIS Dep       88.000     48.8889      0.072
  7 MEDT, Dep Mulitlat CIS Coop       83.000     46.1111      0.068
  3            MEDT, Direction       80.000     44.4444      0.066
  6               PA, Direction       78.000     43.3333      0.064
  1                   President       76.000     42.2222      0.062
 11       Gov Admin, Direction       74.000     41.1111      0.061
 10  PA, Aides of the President       74.000     41.1111      0.061
  4     Gov Admin, Dep Int Coop       68.000     37.7778      0.056
  5                     Gazprom       67.000     37.2222      0.055
 18         Ministry of Finance       64.000     35.5556      0.053
  9               Duma, Council       60.000     33.3333      0.049
  8                     RAO UES       56.000     31.1111      0.046
 15                      Lukoil       55.000     30.5556      0.045
 14      Gov Admin, Dep Finance       51.000     28.3333      0.042
 13        Duma, Cttee CIS Coop       46.000     25.5556      0.038
 16            MFA, Ambassadors       46.000     25.5556      0.038
 17   Federation Council, Chair       40.000     22.2222      0.033
 19     Duma, Cttee Int Affairs       21.000     11.6667      0.017
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  19 Jan 07 10:58:46
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 46: Executive authority's position within SES network (parameter 2c)

Concerning Table 46, two surprising appearances have to be mentioned. It is striking that the President obviously was not very central in terms of his interactions. Compared to the influence ranking, he lost six positions. On the contrary, it is amazing that two technical Departments are situated at the top of the list. Apparently, the CIS Departments of the MFA and MEDT had a significant influence on the development of the SES concept.

3. Network resources

Whereas the last section focused specifically on relationships between actors, this paragraph analyses the amount and distribution of resources within the network in terms of social capital. As shown in Table 47, the maximum achieved level of resources amounts to 50.55% (parameter 3a). Indeed, this value may be considered as modest in light of the maximum of 100%. It demonstrates a relative low quantity of available information and other resources.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         1            2            3
                    Degree    NrmDegree        Share
               ------------ ------------ ------------
  1      Mean        64.105      35.6140        0.000
  2   Std Dev        17.607       9.7814        0.000
  3       Sum      1218.000     676.6667        0.000
  4  Variance       309.989     956.7560        0.000
  5       SSQ     83970.000  259166.6750        0.000
  6     MCSSQ      5889.790   18178.3625        0.000
  7  Euc Norm       289.776     160.9865        0.000
  8   Minimum        21.000      11.6667        0.000
  9   Maximum        91.000      50.5556        0.000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  19 Jan 07 10:58:46
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 47: Quantity & distribution of resources within SES network (parameter 3a+b)

Additionally, it seems that resources are unequally distributed within the SES policy network. The relative spectrum spans over 76.92%, which represents a high value. The next paragraph will perform the same kinds of calculations in terms of the power dimension.

4. Network power

This network dimension is measured and assessed by the closeness centrality numbers. They are calculated for every actor and hierarchically arranged in Table 48.

```
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        1            2
                                  Farness   nCloseness
                               ------------ ------------
 12            MFA, 1st CIS Dep       24.000       75.000
  2   Prime Ministry, Direction       24.000       75.000
 11        Gov Admin, Direction       25.000       72.000
  6               PA, Direction       26.000       69.231
  5                     Gazprom       27.000       66.667
  3             MEDT, Direction       27.000       66.667
  9               Duma, Council       27.000       66.667
  7 MEDT, Dep Mulitlat CIS Coop       27.000       66.667
 10  PA, Aides of the President       28.000       64.286
 18         Ministry of Finance       28.000       64.286
  1                   President       28.000       64.286
  4     Gov Admin, Dep Int Coop       29.000       62.069
 13        Duma, Cttee CIS Coop       32.000       56.250
  8                     RAO UES       33.000       54.545
 14      Gov Admin, Dep Finance       34.000       52.941
 15                      Lukoil       37.000       48.649
 16            MFA, Ambassadors       37.000       48.649
 17   Federation Council, Chair       44.000       40.909
 19     Duma, Cttee Int Affairs       49.000       36.735


Statistics

                        1            2
                  Farness   nCloseness
               ------------ ------------
  1     Mean         30.842       60.605
  2  Std Dev          6.619       10.678
  3      Sum        586.000     1151.501
  4 Variance         43.817      114.026
  5      SSQ      18906.000    71953.602
  6    MCSSQ        832.526     2166.490
  7 Euc Norm        137.499      268.242
  8  Minimum         24.000       36.735
  9  Maximum         49.000       75.000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Running time:  00:00:01
Output generated:  19 Jan 07 11:15:40
Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Analytic Technologies
```

Table 48: Quantity & distribution of power within SES network (parameter 4a+b)

The level of power within the SES network is relatively high, as the normalised closeness centrality of the MFA's CIS Department equals 75% (parameter 4a). It is quite surprising that this administrational unit seemingly possesses the most direct channels to other network members. Yet, this result may reflect the far-reaching technical nature of the issue.

With regard to the power distribution, the result is not very telling. The relative power variation spectrum amounts to 51.02% (parameter 4b). This indicates that power within the SES network can neither be perceived as balanced, nor as un-balanced.

Network type assessment

In the last paragraph of this subchapter, the results shall be summarized. After all, the determination of parameters would not make any sense without a judgment in the context of network types. Table 49 aggregates all ten parameters and confronts them with their appropriate thresholds.

Dimension	Parameter	Value	Threshold
1. Membership			
a) Number of participants	Number of involved network actors	19	10
b) Number of interests	Number of involved actor's categories	4	3
c) Types of interest	Percentage of involved Presidential actors	15.79%	33.33%
2. Integration			
a) Frequency of interaction (information and resources)	Network density	3.5614	5
b) Centralisation	Overall network degree centralisation	16.69%	50.00%
c) Executive authority's position	Degree centrality ranking	Ranks 5, 6 and 8	At least two Presidential actors within top three
3. Resources			
a) Quantity of information and resources within network	Maximum normalised degree centrality	50.56%	75.00%
b) Distribution of information and resources within network	Spread between max and min normalised degree centrality in percentage of the highest value	76.92%	50.00%
4. Power			
a) Quantity of power within network	Maximum normalised closeness centrality	75.00%	75.00%
b) Distribution of power within network	Spread between maximum and minimum normalised closeness centrality in percentage of the highest value	51.02%	50.00%

Table 49: Aggregated SES parameters

Concerning the membership dimension, all three parameters are located on the issue network side. The comparatively high number of actors and interests reflect this network type as well as the low involvement of Presidential actors.

Similarly, the integration dimension is shaped as an issue network. Compared to the according thresholds, the SES decision-making structure has relatively low density and centralisation values. Also, the executive authority is not at all represented within the top three on the centrality ranking.

The resource dimension of the SES network shows the typical features of an issue network as well. Resources are limited and unevenly distributed. However, the power facet cannot be clearly determined with reference to the network archetypes. Whereas the quantity of power lies exactly on the defined threshold, the distribution parameter shows only a minor trend towards the issue network side.

In sum, nine of ten parameters cause the SES decision-making pattern to appear as an issue network. Even if the power dimension delivers ambiguous results, a general trend is clearly identifiable. Therefore, it may be assumed that the creation process of the economic space between Moscow, Minsk, Astana and Kiev was shaped on the Russian side mainly by an issue network. It is characterised by a large number of decentralised and weakly interlinked actors, who deal with a high number of interests with limited and unevenly distributed resources and powers. Actually, this finding stands in line with the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3 of the present study. If an issue is addressed primarily by the near abroad and economic subfields, the policy network is likely to take the shape of an issue network. Yet, this postulation has to be examined more in-depth. The testing of the hypotheses will be carried out only in Chapter 11.

10.3 Resulting decision-making procedures and structures

The preceding two subchapters have traced the SES decision-making process and determined the policy network dimensions. They both gave an idea about the network of actors, which initiated and advanced the issue. These quantitative findings are interpreted in this section.

When examining the resulting decision-making structure as displayed in the graphic below, two features immediately catch the eyes: the SES policy network is large in size and has numerous peripheral actors. This characterises issue networks consisting of near abroad and economic subfields.



Figure 13: Single Economic Space (SES) resulting policy network

The Direction of the Prime Ministry is placed in the core of the policy network. This makes sense as the deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko and his entourage coordinated the SES decision-making process. Coherently, this actor interacted most frequently and intensively with other network members. The central position of its immediate network neighbour, the first CIS Department of the MFA, is perhaps surprising at first glance. However, the important role of this actor can be explained by its strong presence within all working groups.[313] The locations of the two MEDT actors within the network are fully comprehensible. The technical development of the SES agreement, the concept and the implementation plan has been lead-managed by the MEDT Direction and the subordinate Department for Multilateral Cooperation with CIS countries.[314]

Despite Putin's personal commitment, the Presidential actors have been rated and placed slightly outside of the network centre. This finding may be contended, but it also reveals an essential point of decision-making. The Presidential impact is less perceived if the issue is addressed for a relatively long period of time on lower administrational levels. The more technical knowledge an issue requires, the more important is the role of governmental actors. Against this background, it is not astonishing that the President, his Administration Direction and his aides aren't located in the very centre of the decision-making structure.

Obviously, the Governmental Administration was also considerably involved in policy-making. In particular, it seems as if the Department of International Cooperation under Tatjana Volovaja played an important coordinating role due to strong ties to the Prime Ministry Direction and to the MEDT Department.[315]

The three economic actors are all located at the periphery of the network. Nevertheless, they had an impact on the establishment of the SES.[316] On the one hand, they acted as strong lobbyists. On the other hand, Gazprom and RAO UES, in particular, contributed technical expertise for the composition of specific documents. The

[313] Expert interview, MEDT Department for external economic policy, Moscow: 27.06.2005.
[314] Expert interview, MEDT Department for external economic policy, Moscow: 27.06.2005.
[315] Expert interview, Ukrainian Government, Kiev: 21.02.2006.
[316] Expert interview, Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow: 20.02.2006.

involvement of Russian business actors is not surprising, given the remarkable stakes of Russian firms in the Ukraine.[317] They all had a particular interest in market liberalization within the framework of the SES. It is striking that Gazprom is highly interlinked within the policy network, which makes the energy giant very powerful. Of course, other business actors like the industrial sector have been interested in the SES, but they didn't have access to decision-making.[318]

With regard to the MFA Ambassadors, it turned out that the Russian Ambassador in Kiev, former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin played an essential role. Even with only few ties to other network members, he managed to defend the SES idea on the spot in Kiev and pass on information to Moscow.[319] The impact of the Ministry of Finance is less clear. Yet, considering the expert ratings and statements of a well informed source, Minister Kudrin and his crew were also involved in SES decision-making.[320]

Last but not least, the graphic shows the parliamentary actors on the outer edge of the policy network. As the SES documents had to be ratified, the Federal Assembly was highly interested in the issue.[321] Moreover, numerous representatives and senators also have at least emotional bindings to Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

[317] Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 19.05.2005.
[318] Expert interview, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Moscow: 05.05.2005.
[319] Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 29.03.2005.
[320] Expert interview, Ministry of Energy, Department for International Cooperation, Moscow: 22.02.2006.
[321] Expert interview, Committee Russia in the United Europe, Moscow, 17.02.2006.

Summary

This part constitutes the core of the present study. It analyses the four case studies with regard to procedural and structural aspects of foreign policy-making. Thereby, all four issues are examined and evaluated in the same way. The initial subchapters track the decision-making processes and explain events and actors' behaviours in a chronological order. Thereafter, the four policy network dimensions - membership, integration, resources and power - are determined. The computations of the ten specific parameters ultimately allow classifying the policy networks according to Rhodes and Marsh's (1992) typology. The final subchapters present the resulting visualised policy networks and interpret the empirical findings.

With regard to the creation of the NRC, Moscow acted passively for a long time until the issue became concrete prior to a bilateral U.S.-Russian deal. On the Russian side, the decision was made by a relatively small, tight, resource rich, centralised and powerful network of actors that was by and large controlled by the executive authority. Hence, the NRC network clearly represented a policy community.

In contrast to the NRC case, the CSTO and the CEES issues have engendered rather contradictory results. A restricted number of powerful actors obviously did not interact frequently and intensively with each other. Therefore, these cases reflect hybrid policy network types. Process-wise, the CEES case was clearly EU driven, whereas the impetus to establish the CSTO was provided predominantly by Moscow.

Finally, the analysis of the SES decision again yielded clear empirical results. A large number of relatively weak actors from diverse spheres interacted rather sporadically. These findings perfectly match with the issue network characteristics defined by Rhodes and Marsh. The SES issue was by and large propelled by Russian foreign policy-makers.

Part IV. RESULTING INSIGHTS

So far, the present study has developed a theoretical and methodological framework (Part I) and determined the contextual background (Part II) in order to analyse four different cases of Russian foreign policy-making (Part III). Moscow's decisions concerning the NATO-Russia Council, the Common European Economic Space, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Single Economic Space have been examined in terms of structures and processes. The last part of the present study closes the research cycle by raising the following question: *to what extent do decision-making networks vary and fit into a greater structural and procedural setting of Russian foreign policy-making?* The subsequent chapters aggregate and texture empirical findings in order to derive resulting insights. In so doing, they do not only string together outcomes of the previous sections, but attach particular importance to policy-relevant consequences.

The present part consists of three chapters, which draw the present study to a close. In Chapter 11, the four policy networks analysed in Part III will be contrasted. Procedural and structural aspects will be highlighted in a comparative perspective, taking into account the geopolitical and sectoral divides running across the Russian foreign policy domain. Essentially, the network comparison will ultimately allow either a confirmation or the discarding of the hypotheses formulated in subchapter 3.3. Subsequently, Chapter 12 will aggregate and explain the major characteristics of Russian foreign policy-making. Based on findings of the case analysis, general structural and procedural attributes of decision-making will be laid out and discussed. Finally, the closing Chapter 13 will focus on consequences for internal and external players. Given previous findings and conclusions, it will reflect most notably two crucial points. Firstly, potential provisions to improve decision-making shall be revealed for the benefit of domestic actors. And secondly, the chapter outlines some basic principles for international players on how to deal with the Russian foreign policy domain. Questions regarding current trends and potential future developments affecting Russian foreign policy-making will only be addressed in the present study's conclusion.

11. Policy Networks in Comparison

In Part III, the four policy networks have been determined and discussed individually. It was revealed that the NRC and the SES networks were clearly located on the policy community, respectively on the issue network side. Previous chapters also showed that the CSTO and CEES networks corresponded to hybrid rather than to extreme forms. Now, these intermediate findings shall be examined within a larger context and assessed with reference to the hypotheses. This chapter essentially compares all four networks including the different decision-making processes. Initially, subchapter 11.1 contrasts the four policy networks by comparing their different dimensions and parameters. Then, the hypotheses are evaluated in subchapter 11.2 and finally, section 11.3 compares the qualitative findings with regard to the foreign policy-making processes.

11.1 Policy network parameter variations

This subchapter compares the four policy networks in terms of their dimensions and parameters. The following table displays the ten values of all four cases including their appropriate thresholds. Whereas parameters lying on the policy community side are slightly shaded, issue network-like numbers are coloured dark grey. Parameters that are equal to the threshold, cannot be allocated to either side and hence appear without any shading. With the help of these graphic features, the table becomes fairly easy to interpret. Subsequently, the four policy network dimensions will be discussed successively.

Dimension	Parameter	NRC	CSTO	CEES	SES	Threshold
1. Membership						
a) Number of participants	Number of involved network actors	8	9	10	19	10
b) Number of interests	Number of involved actor's categories	2	3	2	4	3
c) Types of interest	Percentage of involved Presidential actors	37.50%	33.33%	40.00%	15.79%	33.33%
2. Integration						
a) Frequency of interaction (information and resources)	Network density	6.1071	4.3056	4.4889	3.5614	5
b) Centralisation	Overall network degree centralisation	25.24%	21.79%	23.06%	16.69%	50.00%
c) Executive authority's position	Degree centrality ranking	Ranks 1, 2 and 4	Ranks 1, 2 and 6	Ranks 1, 2, 5 and 6	Ranks 5, 6 and 8	At least two Presidential actors within top three
3. Resources						
a) Quantity of information and resources within network	Maximum normalised degree centrality	80.00%	60.00%	63.33%	50.56%	75.00%
b) Distribution of information and resources within network	Spread between max and min normalised degree centrality in percentage of the highest value	50.00%	70.83%	57.89%	76.92%	50.00%
4. Power						
a) Quantity of power within network	Maximum normalised closeness centrality	100.00%	100.00%	90%	75.00%	75.00%
b) Distribution of power within network	Spread between max and min normalised closeness centrality in percentage of the highest value	30.00%	46.67%	58.33%	51.02%	50.00%

Table 50: Network parameters in comparison

Membership

Concerning the membership dimension, one point is particularly poignant. Apparently, the SES policy network involves approximately twice as much participants and interests (1a+b) than the other three cases. Which factors may provide an explanation for these findings? Primarily, one can argue that for Putin's circles, economic issues are just not as important as security issues. Therefore, they accept the participation of additional actors and interests. Yet, with this reasoning, the question remains open, why did the other economic issue (CEES) involve merely ten actors and two interests. Another explanation may sustain that near abroad issues simply attract more actors and interests, because post-Soviet matters usually have more direct repercussions on the Russian Federation than far abroad issues.[322] In fact, near abroad policy-making is complicated by the broader range of actors and interests, which have to be taken into account.[323] However, this interpretation would not take into account the closed decision-making circle of the second near abroad issue (CSTO). In conclusion, neither of the two reasons does satisfactorily explained the relative high number of actors and interests within the SES network. However, it is most likely that both factors simultaneously contribute to the enlarged SES membership dimension. In this way, the large SES issue network becomes comprehensible.

Yet, there exists an alternative argumentation. It is not excluded that the 'Ukraine-factor' played a certain role. In fact, the interdependence between Moscow and Kiev quasi automatically leads to a broader range of interested Russian foreign policy actors.[324] However, this aspect should not be overrated as Russia's bilateral relations with Belarus or with Kazakhstan for instance, may just as well be labelled as 'special', tight and particularly marked by common culture and history.

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[322] Expert interview, PIR-Center, Moscow: 22.04.2005.
[323] Expert interview, The Moscow Times, Moscow: 29.04.2005.
[324] Expert interview, JSC 'SOGLASYIE', Moscow: 16.02.2006.

In addition to the number of participants and interests, the comparison of the interest types (1c) raises questions. Once again, it is the SES parameter that stands out. Whereas only 15.79% of all SES network members belong to the Presidential sphere, the executive fraction amounts to at least one third of the network in all of the other three cases. Presumably, this discrepancy has to do with the length of the SES decision-making process and with the technical nature of the issue. Compared to the other cases, governmental officials at lower levels were more intensively involved. As a result, Presidential actors tend to be represented to a lesser degree.

Integration

The comparison of the interaction frequency (2a) exposes a divergence mainly between NRC and SES. The average interaction frequency is relatively high with regard to the first issue and remarkably contrasts against the comparatively low SES value. This gap perfectly reflects the difference between a policy community and an issue network. Whereas policy community actors intensively interact with each other to arrive at a decision, links between issue network members are less frequent and concentrated or sometimes even inexistent.

In contrast to the interaction frequency, the centralisation parameter (2b) is not that suitable for identifying policy network types. Principally, the relative values reflect the difference between policy communities and issue networks. Whereas the NRC network is relatively centralised, the SES structure comparatively lacks a clear midpoint. However, in absolute terms, all four numbers lie well below the defined threshold. Therefore, all four networks have to be considered as decentralised patterns.

When comparing the third integration parameter (2c), it is again the SES index that deviates. The executive authority's position in the SES net is rather peripheral and hence characteristic for issue networks. In contrast, the other three issues are addressed by Presidential actors, who are located at the very centre of their communities. In the degree centrality ranking, they occupy at least the first two ranks. This means that the NRC, CSTO and CEES networks do not only involve a considerable number of Presidential

actors. In terms of activity, these executive players are also centrally located within the decision-making structures.

Resources

With regard to the quantity and distribution of resources (3a+b), the NRC case diverges compared to the other three issues. As it may be expected for a classic policy community, scientific, legal, political or other information and knowledge as well as money, labour power, facilities or other resources are sufficiently available and more or less evenly distributed. Indeed, the NRC issue was addressed by the two small far abroad and security subfields, which were able to contribute and control resources within an exclusive circle of decision-makers. In contrast, information and resources within the CSTO, CEES and SES networks are limited and unequally allocated. It seems as if all other subfield combinations including near abroad – economy lead to heterogeneous and unstable arrangements within the policy network.

Power

When comparing the quantity and distribution of power (4a+b) within the four decision-making networks, the two security issues NRC and CSTO show similar, policy community-like parameters. Even if some actors may dominate the network, there exists a balance of high power between members. They have easy and more or less equal access to each other. The opposite can be stated with regard to the two economic issues CEES and SES. Even if mutual access between network members may be provided sometimes, low and unequal power generally reflects limited and asymmetrical access among actors.

After having examined the power dimension, the comparative analysis of the policy network parameters comes to an end. The extensive and detailed comparison provides a rather confusing and inconsistent impression, because the dividing lines between policy community and issue network coloured values are not congruent. In changing configurations, far abroad or security issues for instance reveal similar parameters, whereas other values highlight a clear distinction of one particular case. However, the

comparison is not as bewildering as it seems. As the next subchapter will prove, regularities may be clearly identified if all parameters or the four cases are considered from a more abstract and distant perspective.

11.2 Evaluation of hypotheses

Taking a look at Table 50 from a greater distance, it becomes clear that the left hand side (NRC) is by and large lightly shaded. In contrast, dark grey dominates the picture on the right hand side (SES). In the middle, both colorations are represented more or less equally. This impression is telling with regard to the present study's hypotheses. Apparently, the policy network type varies depending on the issue and hence on the involved domain subfields. This finding reflects the postulation made by the main hypothesis. The involvement of the far and near abroad, security and economy subfields determines the shape of policy networks dealing with specific issues.

Concerning the NRC network, eight of ten parameters lie on the policy community side, whereas one (3b) is located exactly on the threshold. Only one value (2b) deviates in an atypical manner. However, in spite of this deficiency, it is possible to make a clear statement. The NRC network composed of the far abroad and security subfields tends to take the shape of a policy community. It is characterised by a limited number of actors, a small range of interests, frequent and high-quality interactions of all actors, a central position of the executive authority, a generally high quantity of information and resources, a more or less even distribution of information and resources, a generally high quantity of power and a balance of power between network members. Therefore, sub hypothesis A can be principally confirmed.

In contrast to the NRC case, the SES issue is mainly shaded dark grey. As Table 50 reveals, nine of ten parameters are located on the issue network side. The only thing, which can be called in question, is the quantity of power (4a). Nevertheless, the SES – an issue that has been addressed by the near abroad and economic subfields – was decided by an issue network type. It was characterised by a large number of participants, a wide range of affected interests, the involvement of economic, legislative and other bodies, low interactions fluctuating in frequency and intensity, low centralisation, a non-central position of the executive authority, a generally limited quantity of information and

resources, unequally distributed information and resources and unequal powers between members. Based on these findings, sub hypothesis B can by and large be confirmed as well.

The CSTO policy network may be located somewhere between the two poles and hence be regarded as a hybrid type. In fact, four policy community coloured parameters are balanced by four issue network-like values, whereas two indices (1b+c) lie right on the thresholds. Essentially, the same holds true for the CEES network. The two sides are more or less equally represented (4:5) and one parameter is ambiguous (1a). Therefore, both cases stand in line with sub hypothesis C. If Russian foreign policy issues are addressed by any other subfield combination than far abroad – security and near abroad - economy, the resulting policy network types hardly correspond to the defined extreme patterns. They tend to take the shape of hybrid forms, which may incorporate features from both policy network poles.

In sum, the main hypothesis as well as the three subhypotheses can basically be confirmed. Yet, one major question remains unanswered. Do four case studies suffice to prove a systematic correlation between involved subfields and policy networks? It has not been disregarded that a greater amount of investigated cases could reject the hypotheses of the present study. It may be that regular patterns or systematic relationships simply do not exist in Russian foreign policy-making. Given the vast array of variables and uncertainties, decision-making in Moscow could be compared with mountain creek water randomly finding its way downhill through stones, wood and mud at different speeds. If this metaphor concisely described Russian foreign policy-making, every issue would then have to be regarded as a unique case. However, as numerous expert interviews have revealed, there are plentiful procedures, structures and characteristics, which can be recognized across most decision-making cases.[325] These regular connections and common features back and complement the formulated hypotheses and shall therefore be identified and developed more clearly within the next two sections. Subchapter 11.3 will additionally discuss the wider effects of near abroad, far abroad, security and economy

[325] Representatively: Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 16.02.2006.

subfield involvement. It thereby further clarifies the hypothetical correlations and their repercussions. Subsequently, Chapter 12 will assemble and outline general characteristics of Russian foreign policy-making.

11.3 Policy domain subfields and their wider effects on decision-making

The previous subchapter has evaluated and confirmed the present study's hypotheses with the help of policy network parameters. The testing of hypotheses with reference to mere quantitative data is practical and fully corresponds to the analytical framework according to Chapter 2. Yet, it can give an artificial and sterile impression, because it is ultimately not satisfactory to explain highly dynamic matters on the basis of pure numbers and calculations – even if they are accurate. Therefore, it is necessary to support, balance and interpret statistical findings with qualitative facts. This subchapter is dedicated to precisely this requirement. It discusses the present study's main hypothesis in a qualitative context and thereby explains the wider effects of policy domain subfields on Russian decision-making.

Figure 14 constitutes a remake of Figure 7 (see 3.3) and graphically illustrates the main hypothesis: Russia's foreign policy domain consists of four basic overlapping subfields: near abroad, far abroad, security and economy. The involvement of these subfields determines the shape of policy networks dealing with specific issues. Further on, this relationship shall be discussed with reference to the two dividing lines.



Figure 14: Resulting policy networks in comparison

Near abroad issues versus far abroad issues

First of all, it has to be stated that the 'near and far abroad'-bifurcation does not compellingly demonstrate opposing features. Decision-making (polity and politics) as well as contents (policy) are often interdependent and manifest common traits. Actually, the four case studies perfectly illustrate this point. The NRC issue had a direct effect on the CSTO case. In light of growing NATO influence in Europe, within the Arab world and in Central Asia, Russia basically created a post-Soviet counterpart by transforming the CST into a full-fledged international organisation.[326] Thereby, the Russian administration – the Ministries of Defiance and Foreign Affairs in particular - were inspired by and profited from technical expertise gained thanks to the NRC process (see Chapters 7 and 8). Similarly, Moscow took advantage of the CEES concept when addressing the SES project.

[326] Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 21.02.2006.

Various principle drafts, ideas and procedures were duplicated and implemented within the framework of SES decision-making. Obviously, the Prime Ministry direction – especially vice-Premier Viktor Khristenko - acted as a coordinator and 'transfer unit' between the two issues.[327]

Despite these convergences, an issue immediately receives a distinct coloration as soon as either the near or far abroad subfield becomes involved. Namely, the far abroad issues are by and large pushed by external actors, whereas near abroad matters are usually triggered and moved forward by Russian actors.[328] In fact, all four case studies exemplify this point. Both the NRC and CEES issue were set on the agenda and drafted by Western actors. In contrast, the two post-Soviet integration projects were initiated and implemented by Moscow.[329] Hence, the Russian foreign policy-domain – at least between 2000 and 2004 – is simultaneously exposed to two gravity fields. Actors play a rather passive role in one field, which is mainly dominated by a few powerful far abroad nations. Within this environment, Russia makes every effort to be conceived as an equal partner. Conversely, Russian decision-makers are located at the centre of the near-abroad field. In this surrounding, Moscow usually assumes active leadership as a regional power and noticeably considers former Soviet Republics as junior partners.[330] Due to its broad variety of foreign policy tools, it has more leverage in the near abroad than in the far abroad.[331]

The handling of far and near abroad matters differs also in terms of decision-making style. In this respect, the NRC and CEES cases noticeably diverge from the CSTO and SES issues. On the international stage, Russian actors usually appear in a rational, calm and deliberate way. Particularly if they address Western foreign policy issues, transparency, foreign languages, exposure to the international public, time constraints, fixed institutions, planned processes and other factors to a certain degree force them to

[327] Expert interview, Ministry of Industry and Energetics, Moscow: 22.02.2006. See also Chapters 9 and 10.
[328] Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.
[329] See Part III. This point was also particularly mentioned in an expert interview, Fonda ‚Politika', Moscow: 01.07.2005.
[330] Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 29.03.2005.
[331] Expert interview, The Moscow Times, 29.04.2005.

adapt. Contrastingly, Russian policy-makers change diplomatic behaviour as soon as they deal with 'one's own kind' – with their in many respects close neighbours. Debates, negotiations, official statements and other activities typically contain an emotional, rigorous, temperamental and sometimes captious touch. Clashes between actors are often designed as PR-campaigns for domestic purposes and do not reveal serious disputes about policy contents. For this reason, near abroad policies regularly become highly political issues, even if they mainly address economic aspects that lie in the interest of all involved countries. As a result, near abroad decision-making processes potentially contain a higher number of (open) conflicts and stretch over longer periods of time.[332] The creation of the SES illustrates this tendency. Decision-makers from all four countries did not manage to treat the issue as a non-political tool aiming at economic development. Inter alia, mutual mistrust strengthened the omnipresent 'politics' factor.[333]

An additional diverging element between far and near abroad foreign policy-making has so far not been discussed. Due to the analytical focus on organisations (see 2.2), the present study was not able to trace the involvement of individuals in decision-making. However, qualitative expert interviews have revealed that the influence of individual players is comparatively higher with regard to near abroad issues.[334] Private friendships and personal preferences play a considerable role when Moscow deals with CIS-member states, whereas these elements are mostly absent in Russia's far abroad relations. Primarily, the Russian elite has particular interests and ties within the post-Soviet space that need to be protected, such as Rogozin in Kaliningrad, Fridman in Ukraine, Alekperov in Azerbajian[335] or Vekselberg in Switzerland. But also on lower bureaucratic levels, the individual component may have an impact. Near abroad issues are more often than not addressed by old-fashioned officials who continue to fulfil past administrational functions.[336] All these factors tend to be reinforced by a President who is personally rather oriented towards the far abroad. Putin, as a representative of the young generation, does

[332] Expert interview, Financial Times, Zurich: 19.03.2005.
[333] Expert interview, Ministry of Industry and Energetics, Moscow: 22.02.2006.
[334] Representatively: expert interviews, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 29.03.2005 & 19.05.2005.
[335] Expert interview, The Moscow Times, Moscow: 29.04.2005.
[336] Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 14.02.2006.

not feel very comfortable with near abroad dossiers and Soviet-style conduct.[337] He therefore typically leaves more manoeuvring space for second rate bureaucrats.[338]

All the above-mentioned effects of near abroad subfield involvement contribute to a poorer overall effectiveness and efficiency of decision-making. Often, Russian CIS policies turn out to be more smoke than fire.[339] It is characteristic that SES or CSTO actors, for instance, continuously measure the development progress of the integration issues in percentage of signed documents. Yet, this number is misleading, since it does not reflect the real status of the project.[340] Even if all agreements are in effect, bilateral trade indices, economic figures or concrete military-technical cooperation may remain unchanged.

Finally, the four case studies and the qualitative interviews revealed that near abroad subfield involvement usually results in less transparent decision-making. Contrastingly, far abroad issues are more exposed to the public. The events within the framework of the 300th anniversary of St. Petersburg nicely illustrate this point. On May 30th 2003, no media coverage was allowed when near abroad leaders convened for the CIS summit. Only one day later, Putin himself proposed on the spot to televise the Russia-EU summit.[341]

[337] Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 10.05.2005.
[338] Expert interview, MGIMO, Moscow: 14.04.2005.
[339] Expert interview, Swedish Embassy, Moscow: 02.05.2005.
[340] See, for instance, „Only 75% of CSTO agreements have come into effect“, Kazakhstan today, 27.8.2005, www.gazeta.kz, 09.11.2005.
[341] Expert interview, Financial Times, Zurich: 19.03.2005.

Security issues versus economic issues

Compared to the near and far abroad distinction, the sectoral divide is less obvious. As stated earlier, it is sometimes impossible to clearly determine security or economic subfield participation.[342] Often, geopolitical and economic interests go hand in hand. Nevertheless, it is basically possible to assess the shares of the security and economic subfields. Some issues are more security-related like the NRC or CSTO cases, whereas other issues predominantly address economic aspects like the CEES or SES projects. Yet, there are also issues which are more difficult to judge: Moscow's policy-making with respect to Iran, Russia's position towards the U.S.-led war in Iraq, the gas conflicts with Ukraine and Belarus in 2006 and 2007 exemplify decision-making processes presumably influenced by both subfields.

Doubtlessly, the four case studies demonstrate that the involvement of the two subfields has an impact on decision-making procedures and structures. As the security and economic communities are of quite a different nature (see 3.1) their influence either amplifies or softens features that characterise far or near abroad issues (see above). Issues dominated by the security subfield are generally easier to decide than questions addressed by the economic collective. They can be decided by few actors in a rather 'medieval' manner.[343] Processes are usually more impulsive, personal and less planned. Both cases (NRC and CSTO) also illustrate that security issues can be decided within relatively short time frames. Additionally, the relevant and subtle interconnections between the two issues (see above) and other foreign policy questions[344] clearly expose the fact that security matters are coordinated from the very top of the state hierarchy. Lower governmental levels like the MoD departments would not be able to successfully synchronize foreign policy activities.

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[342] Expert interview, JSC ‚SOGLASIYE', Moscow: 16.02.2006.
[343] Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 16.02.2006.
[344] See, for instance, K. Knox „Russia: CIS Military-Alliance Upgrade Plan Faces Numerous Obstacles", Johnson's Russia List No. 6246, 16.05.2002.

In contrast, economic subfield participation leads towards 'modern' policy-making involving a large number of comparatively skilled, flexible and open-minded officials. Economic-related issues are highly complex and require extensive technical expertise.[345] The CEES and SES policy-making cases both contained relatively institutionalized and planned processes with coordinated group activities on multiple levels. However, it should not be forgotten that this kind of decision-making is not only a result of economic subfield involvement. It also has to do with the Kremlin's relative disinterest in complex economic matters. In fact, the will of the President to streamline and restrict economic policy-making is limited when issues of lesser strategic significance are concerned.

[345] Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 16.02.2006.

12. Characteristics of Russian Foreign Policy-Making

Within the scope of the last chapter, the four policy networks were analysed in a comparative perspective. It has been revealed that policy-formulation adopts specific properties depending on far and near abroad, security and economic subfield combinations. Yet, it would be wrong to interpret Russian foreign policy-making cases exclusively in terms of disparities and variations. Numerous elements may be specified that are to some degree common to all issues addressed by Moscow. This chapter focuses on precisely these characteristics and differentiates between structural attributes (subchapter 12.1) and procedural attributes (subchapter 12.2).

At the onset of this chapter, three crucial preliminary remarks have to be made. First, it has to be reiterated (see introduction) and emphasized that decision-making in Moscow is nothing extraordinary. It basically corresponds to 'international standards'[346] in foreign policy-formulation and does not constitute a sinister system ruled by a ruthless dictator – as it is sometimes portrayed by the international media. Second, it has to be noted that the following listing of characteristics does not claim to be complete and applicable to every single foreign policy issue. Rather, these facets reflect some general properties of Russian foreign policy-making that have consistently attracted attention upon the analysis of the four cases. To some extent, they have also been discussed by existing literature. Thirdly, all of the following structural and procedural characteristics of foreign policy-making are highly interconnected. Often, they are cause as well as effect all at once and are, hence, difficult to present as separate aspects. Nevertheless, they provide a useful synopsis about typical facets of decision-making in Moscow.

[346] Of course, international standards of foreign policy-making as such do not exist, but some features can nevertheless be identified (see Chapter 1).

12.1 Structural attributes

This section presents five structural attributes[347] that characterise Russian foreign policy-making. Thereby, the sequence of the following points has no meaning and does not reflect a special hierarchy or any other systematic arrangement.

Accentuated vertical layout of the political system

One major characteristic of Russian foreign policy-making is the importance of vertical distribution of might. This factor may be observed across central, regional and local governmental levels and across all administrational sectors. It may inter alia be explained by the long authoritarian history and by the strong belief in state institutions that is deeply rooted in Russian culture (Voss 2004: 70-73). Actually, the Russian state can be conceived as a huge pyramid, where President Putin stands lonely on top and the Russian citizens occupy the very bottom. In between these two poles, a massive bureaucratic machinery makes up the substance of the pyramid. It reaches from the presidential administration over endless chains of command to the local and peripheral state offices. Even if decisions in foreign affairs are supposedly taken within the uppermost twentieth part, the vertical layout has considerable implications for Moscow's foreign policy-making.

As the policy network analysis has shown (see Part III), most of the powers are concentrated in the hands of Presidential actors, whereas lower administrational units are strictly submissive and essentially dependent from the very top. Even high officials may be considered as powerless bureaucrats dealing with often futile legal documents, laws, single articles, sub articles and their paragraphs. E. Lucas (2006) tellingly describes this important point. "[The Russian state] may be corrupt, lethargic, and stunningly incompetent in general. But when the man at the top wants something done, it happens

[347] The notion ‚structure' is used here according to the definition presented in subchapter 1.1.

fast and ruthlessly." The top-down approach within the Russian state structures can be observed with all four case studies. Putin and his immediate surrounding usually order and control foreign policy activities - other drives hardly exist.[348] Without doubts, this state verticality has positive effects on decision-making. In particular, the concentration on a single point and the effectiveness on top generally lead to more stringent and coherent foreign policies as well as to shorter decision-making processes.[349] Yet, centralisation also has major negative effects: first and foremost, administrational units have almost no freedom of action to coordinate, negotiate or decide technical matters on a horizontal level. Even if officials bring up good ideas and will – and that's what they often do - their hands are principally tied, as most subjects have to be approved from above.[350]

In addition to these thoughts, it has to be added that particularly the top of the Russian state pyramid has been sharpened under Putin.[351] Between 2000 and 2003, the President was accurately advised by his immediate subordinates, since he consulted different actors and their various information sources. However, after 2004, the top decision-making circle started to shrink as the President lost confidence in some of his comrades. In 2006, foreign policy issues were often discussed just between Putin and his chief of staff Dmitri Medvedev.[352] This constant narrowing of Putin's surrounding created serious problems for the President as he reduced his distinguished bases of decision-making.[353] Misinformation by a few technocrats seems to have played an important role, for example, with regard to the Russian position towards the Ukrainian presidential elections in 2004.[354]

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[348] Expert interview, Ministry of Industry and Energy, Moscow: 22.02.2006.
[349] Korobeinikov (2005: 75). See also Williams (2004) and Gürbey (2005).
[350] Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.
[351] Expert interview, Konrad Adenauer Fond, Zurich, 27.10.2006.
[352] Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005.
[353] Expert interview, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow: 04.07.2005.
[354] Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005.

Substantial impact of bureaucracy

However, despite the vertical layout of the Russian state, lower levels were not completely at the mercy of Putin. The President himself depends on the support of the political elite and bureaucracy.[355] Hence, the Kremlin's wish to create the NRC, for example, was not "fully shared by the foreign and defence officials whom he had to rely on to make the whole thing work".[356] In addition to that, the verticality has insofar a reverse effect as the technical development of foreign policy issues lies mainly in the hands of government officials. This gives them a considerable amount of influence, as the CEES and SES case studies and their policy networks have confirmed. Decision-making basically follows a strong top-down approach. Yet the governmental bureaucracies play a dominant role in both cases.[357] Generally, the bureaucratic impact becomes stronger if an issue requires technical expertise and therefore more time to make a decision. Additionally, bureaucracies are by and large responsible for the implementation of foreign policies, which gives them extra weight. Sometimes, the formulation of policies and their implementation are two separate affairs.[358] A certain policy may completely change face after it has been inconspicuously transformed by bureaucracy and its manifold instruments such as biased expertise, sophisticated communication strategies, crime and corruption.

Shortage of qualified governmental staff

The influence of Russian bureaucracy has somewhat been reduced due to an acute shortage of qualified governmental staff. This factor may be considered as another,

[355] See, for instance, Dresen (2004), who discusses the important role of bureaucracy.
[356] "World politics: NATO's moment of truth", The Economist, 03.05.2002 (ISI database, 18.04.2005). See as well Chapter 7.
[357] See Chapters 9 and 10 and also Vinokurov (2004).
[358] Various sources illustrate the considerable gap between highly compex legal documents and the reality. See, for instance, Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, "Ob odobrenii I predstavlenii Presidentu Rossiiskoi Federatsii dlja vnesenija na ratifikatsiju Protokola o porjadke osushestvlenija kontrolija za tselevym ispolzovaniem produktsii voennovo naznachenija, postavljaemoi v ramkakh Coglashenija ob osnovnykh printsipakh voenno-tekhnicheskovo sotrudnichestva mezhdu gosudarsvami – uchastnikami dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti ot 15 Maja 1992 goda.", 23.07.2003.

separate characteristic of Russian foreign policy-making, because it regularly appeared within the analysis of the four case studies.[359] Within the Russian administration, profound technical expertise is scarcely available, thus causing insufficient support for decision-makers and a general incapability to draft complex documents.[360] It also hinders an efficient coordination and cooperation with internal and external foreign policy actors.[361] The reason for the lack of capable personnel is obvious. At least since 1991, the most talented, skilled and best educated young Russians prefer to work in the private sector, which offers much better wages and working conditions than the Russian state.[362]

Emphasis on Russian idiosyncrasy

The emphasis on Russian idiosyncrasy constitutes a widespread mindset of foreign policy-makers. It implies traditional ideas of political elite members and civil servants.[363] Whereas some may call it a 'backward mentality'[364] or a 'latent preference for Russia's great power status', it shall be understood here as a general actor's preference for 'Russianness'. In at least two respects, the accentuation of Russian peculiarities plays a significant role in foreign affairs. It does not only have an impact on foreign policy contents, but also on policy-making. The far abroad cases NRC and CEES exemplify this point insofar as a considerable part of foreign policy actors were opposed to Putin's Western course.[365] They complicated the decision-making process on a technical level by delaying certain activities or even denying cooperation (see 7.1 and 9.1). Even if

[359] See, for instance, the assessment of D. Trenin, "Sealing a New Era in U.S.-Russian Relations", The Moscow Times, 27.05.2002 (ISI database, 18.04.2005).
[360] Expert interview, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 04.05.2005.
[361] Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.
[362] Expert interview, PIR-Center, Moscow: 14.04.2005.
[363] Decision-making mechanisms continuously contain a strong traditionalist component. See Carnegie (2004).
[364] D. Trenin, "Sealing a New Era in U.S.-Russian Relations", The Moscow Times, 27.05.2002 (ISI database, 18.04.2005).
[365] See, for instance, I. Kobrinskaja „Drop Zone Kremlin: Putin, Russia in the Run-up to Summit", Moscow News, 15.05.2002, in: Johnson's Russia List, No. 6246, 16.05.2002.

ministerial officials rationally comprehend the necessity of cooperation with European or U.S. actors, they cannot understand with their heart.[366]

Influence of individuals

Even if the present study deliberately considers policy-network members as organisational actors (see 2.2) it cannot be denied that individuals play an important role in Russian foreign affairs. The personality and moods of one single policy-maker may have a significant impact on the decision-making process.[367] Of course, this holds true especially for the President, but also on ministerial level, officials with their capacities and interests influence policy issues. Often, Putin assigns a top official to address a specific matter. This special envoy basically receives a 'carte blanche' to solve all problems in connection with the issue. In fact, there are many examples for this mechanism: Dmitri Kosak was entrusted to settle the Transnistria dispute. The CEES and the SES were essentially supervised by Viktor Khristenko (see Chapters 9 and 10) and Dmitri Medvedev mainly handled the Ukrainian Presidential election dossier in 2004.[368] Last but not least, once the CSTO was established, Putin appointed Nikolaj Bordjuzha – a proved and tested Russian comrade with a strong character - as General Secretary to reassert Moscow's influence within the CSTO-space.[369]

[366] Expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005.
[367] Representatively: Expert interview, Fonda ‚Politika', Moscow: 01.07.2005.
[368] Expert interview, MGIMO, Moscow: 05.05.2005.
[369] Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, "Ob itogakh sessii Soveta kollektivnoi bezopasnosti gosudarstv-uchastnikov dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti", 29.04.2003.

12.2 Procedural attributes

After having outlined some major structural attributes of Russian foreign policy-formulation, this subchapter discusses procedural characteristics of Moscow's decision-making. Again, the factors listed below do no reflect a defined order.

Continuous rivalry among elite members

Never ending struggles among elite members are symptomatic for Russian politics in general and for foreign affairs in particular. Even today, as Putin's crew has successfully consolidated its power basis, the rivalry on top frequently absorbs the full attention and energy of the key players, which makes it impossible for them to seriously and accurately care about daily business (Rjabov 2005). The continuous battle for access to key positions and policy networks is not a specific feature of Putin's regime. It has been going on ever since Russia's Czarist times. Of course, the political fight among elites is not exclusively a Russian phenomenon, but happens within every nation around the globe. Yet, it may be that Russia's political culture accounts for the fact that battles are fought out in a more visible, hot tempered, ruthless and sometimes even brutal manner. Against this background, it is clear that Russian foreign policy-making repeatedly becomes hostage of domestic political fights.[370] In these cases, foreign policy options simply can not be evaluated and decided in a serious, objective, rational and coordinated way. Decision-making in Moscow is therefore essentially unpredictable and contains a great amount of incertitude and instability.

In light of these circumstances, it is highly interesting to detect those foreign policy actors who have regular access to decision-making networks. In fact, only Putin and the direction of the presidential administration are members of all four policy networks NRC,

[370] Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.

CSTO, CEES and SES. Consequently, it is reasonable to state that there is principally only one centre of decision-making in Russian foreign affairs: the President and his administration. This finding stands fully in line with statements made by various experts.[371] Conversely, the following foreign policy domain actors have usually no access at all to policy networks: other Federal bodies like banks or the audit chamber, the financial, industrial and service business sectors, regional and judiciary actors, political parties and miscellaneous actors such as religion, academia, media or society. Finally, most actors either fight – sometimes successfully, sometimes unfortunately - for access to decision-making networks, or they simply wait until the President sporadically calls them up to participate in policy-formulation. The following players typically belong to this category: the Security Council, the prime ministry, the MFA, MoD, MEDT and other Federal ministries, Federal services, the State Duma and the Federation Council as well as the energy business sector.

Significance of unwritten rules

Foreign policy-making takes place within the framework specified by the Russian constitution and the Russian legislation.[372] This official perception, however, only captures one part of reality and does not account for two crucial aspects. First, the Russian legislators have not defined every single activity and potential situation with regard to decision-making. Particularly in the field of foreign affairs, there exist relatively few regulations, which are composed by and large in an abstract and cloudy way. This of course leaves considerable room for interpretations (Korobeinikov 2005). Second, laws as written rules do not have the same importance and meaning in Russia as they have within the Western hemisphere. In the context of Russian culture, official regulations are considered as extrinsic restrictions that artificially narrow the scope of life. In the eyes of most Russians, laws do not reflect justice, conscience or moral and therefore do not

[371] Representatively: expert interview, Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow: 24.05.2005.
[372] Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 16.02.2006. See also Schneider (1998).

compellingly need to be respected.[373] Additionally, many Russian citizens have lost confidence in the lawmaker. Over the past decades and centuries, the state and its continuously changing legislation have simply caused too much damage to the Russian society and its individuals.

These specific Russian conditions have a remarkable impact on foreign policy-making. As legal foundations are generally weak, actors resort to solid unwritten rules of behaviour, which are deeply anchored in Russian culture. They can be described as a "system of socially created and learned standards for perceiving and acting shared by members of an identity group" (Sampson 1987: 384-408). Hence, interactions between foreign policy actors correspond to a certain code, which encompasses values like honesty, friendship, mutual trust, faith and personal dignity. The Russian saying "my zhyvjom po ponjatjam"[374] stands for these concepts of conduct, which are stored in Russian collective subconscious. Against this background, it becomes comprehensible that Russian foreign policy-making contains a strong personal and opinionated element.

Short planning intervals

Frequently, Russian foreign policy-making is time-critical. Consequently, planning intervals are short, which leads to crisis management and ad hoc as well as reactive decision-making. This again results in imprudent activities and short-sighted policies (Carnegie 2005). The four cases of the present study are less suitable to back this point, since they represent rather long-ranging institutional issues. Yet, interviews, literature and media coverage clearly reveal last-minute manoeuvres as another characteristic of Moscow's decision-making.[375]

These typically short planning intervals may be explained by two factors. First, it has to be noted that foreign policy-makers all around the world are frequently confronted with highly urgent issues as international relations by nature tend to be time-critical,

[373] These statements are based on thoughts of Lew Tolstoj about Russians and anarchy. See Voss (2004). See also: Gregory Bovt „Why the Rules Don't Rule", The Moscow Times, 21.08.2006.
[374] Expert interview, Carnegie Center, Moscow: 14.02.2006.
[375] Representatively: Expert interview, Financial Times, Zurich: 19.03.2005.

reactive and unpredictable (see Chapter 1). Yet, the second cause is supposed to be self-inflicted. In Russian political culture, last-minute decision-making is nothing bad per se.[376] After all, it leaves space and time for adequate reaction. Even if this reasoning may be accurate, instant policy-making has nevertheless disadvantages that have repeatedly been deplored by involved experts.[377] Namely, it does not contribute to strategically oriented foreign policies that consequently follow national interests. Indeed, decisions made on short notice have the potential to contradict guidelines that were once formulated for the best.[378] Conversely, a certain degree of foresight and strategy reduces the number of ad hoc decisions and therefore result in longer time frames available for preparation and planning of more consistent policies.

Lack of strategy

Both the reconstruction of the four case studies as well as the examination of current expert views have repeatedly revealed a lack of strategy in Russian foreign affairs.[379] In spite of a foreign policy concept, Moscow was not able to pursuit a consistent course and to adhere to it over a longer period of time. It seems as if this verdict is the price Putin pays for increased rationalism and opportunism in foreign matters (see 5.1). What are the reasons for Russia's heading changes?

First and foremost, the determination of national interests and foreign policy strategies is a highly complex political task. The definition of the national individuality and its interests bother all societies around the world. Of course, hardly any country will be able to carry this omnipresent political debate to an end and arrive at a full consent. Rather, the degree of national unity fluctuates by nature over extended time frames. Insofar, the lack of a coherent strategy is not a Moscow-specific problem. Yet, the Russian

[376] Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.
[377] See, for instance, the two round table discussions at Carnegie (2004) and at the Federation-Council (2004).
[378] As a NATO puts it: „You get different signals from different sides several times a day" (expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006).
[379] See Part III of the present study. Consider also, for instance, Carnegie (2004), Carnegie (2005), Federation-Council (2004) and Nikonov (2005).

Federation has gone through turbulent times since the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991. In addition to external impulses, it has been swayed by the drop out of communist ideology, chaotic Yeltsin years, privatisation processes, economic crisis, Chechen wars, terrorism, soaring GDP growth rates, high energy prices and much more. Accordingly, the questions about 'what is Russia?' and 'what should Russia do?' have essentially remained open and hotly contested – at least during Putin's first term. Even nowadays, foreign policy-makers in Moscow seem to lack of 'a certain idea of Russia'.[380] In a globalising world, Moscow struggles with its role which continues to be rather diffuse and ambiguous.[381]

Yet, in addition to these external factors, one part of the Russian disorientation is housemaid. Namely, Putin and the foreign policy domain as a whole have not done enough to bring about a consensus over a foreign policy strategy. Given the generally low number of actors and interests involved in policy networks (see Chapter 11), the course of action can hardly be balanced and backed by a majority. Moscow's zigzag path cannot be straightened out if policy networks change too much depending on the issue while excluding important elements of Russian society. This point is tightly connected to the next characteristic of policy-formulation: the fluctuating coordination mechanisms.

[380] John Coles Coles (2000), an experienced British diplomat, points out that it is of utmost importance to have 'a certain idea of Britain' when making foreign policies.

[381] Lo (2004: 46) has identified „five critical dualities that, in various interlocking ways, inform the world-view of Putin and the Russian elite. See also Carnegie (2004).

Fluctuating coordination mechanisms

Some experts and actors claim that coordination mechanisms in Russian foreign policy-making do not exist at all. In their view, it is even overrated to label decision-making in Moscow with the term 'process', because they conceive Russia's external affairs as a set of random-like actions.[382] Other analysts argue more carefully. Although they can perceive coordination mechanisms, they believe that these efforts are insufficiently institutionalized. According to their assessment, the only functioning and coordinating institution in present-day Russia is the President (Trenin 2005), who doubtlessly managed to stop Russia's multi-voiced foreign policy of the Yeltsin period. Although beside the President, a more specialized, fully authorized and responsible organ on an intermediate level is basically missing (Korobeinikov 2005: 76).

Even if these assessments may be appropriate and true, they are not entirely correct in light of Douglass North's pertinent definition of institutions. Institutions do not only subsume formal rules, but also informal constraints such as culturally derived, stable and path dependent traditions and customs (North 2002: 40). Insofar, Russian unwritten rules, as they described above, have to be understood as institutions. Every single interaction reconstructed between policy network members does ultimately represent an institutionalized coordination mechanism. It provides a functional, flexible, effective and efficient tool to organise and manage foreign policy issues.

However, this kind of coordination mechanism has at least one major disadvantage: interactions based on a traditional Russian code of behaviour are essentially unpredictable, since the access to policy networks and their central actors is not systematically regulated. Thus, decision-making procedures and structures do not guarantee that all available information, expertise, opinions and interests are included and coordinated in the policy networks. Against this background, it would be helpful to enhance the institutionalisation of policy coordination by introducing new mechanisms based on formal and written rules.

[382] Representatively: expert interview, Fonda ‚Politika', Moscow: 01.07.2005. See also Carnegie (2004).

Improvements in this respect are definitely visible on lower administrational levels. Russian administrations, ministerial departments, agencies, commission etc. are relatively well organised and the coordination of issues essentially functions as in Western countries. With regard to the CEES, for instance, the interplay between the high level group, expert teams and interministerial coordination units seemed to be relatively smooth.[383]

Distinctive secrecy and opacity

Another characteristic of Russian foreign policy-making is the pronounced secret and opaque acting of all domain members. Whereas Western states and international organisations provide a massive amount of open source information on all possible issues in world politics, Moscow and its actors are comparatively locked. Although certain Federal Ministries like the MFA or the MEDT make considerable efforts to furnish as many facts as possible, the Russian state remains under seal. This closeness may have two reasons: first, the handling of foreign affairs usually implies negotiations that require a certain degree of secrecy. Actually, no negotiation strategy would lead to success, if positions and options were relinquished to the public. Thus, every world nation treats sensitive political information with care. Second, Russians typically favour discrete and silent action. Mutual distrust between human beings in general as well as between the state and the citizen in particular has grown over hundreds of years and constitutes an integral part of Russian culture.

It goes without saying that secrecy and opacity have considerable repercussions on foreign policy-making. On many occasions, they serve as a convenient tool to mask the political accountability of decision-makers. If only scarce information is made available to the public, it is difficult to hold actors responsible for failures and misconduct. The CSTO issue exemplifies this point insofar as deadlines set by working groups to present certain

[383] Expert interview, The European Commission's Delegation to Russia, Economics and Trade Section, Moscow: 17.05.2005.

documents - in contrast, for instance, to the CEES case - were not published publicly.[384] Additionally, reticence creates surprise and unpredictability, which further exacerbates communication and coordination. This effect is certainly not in the interest of the Russian nation and its people, but it eventually may be beneficial for a few actors who follow their private agenda.

[384] See, for instance: Ministerstvo Inostranykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsi, Departament Informatsii I Pechati, "O pervom zasedanii Rabochei gruppy predstavitelei gosudarstv-uchastnikov Dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti (DKB)", 05.08.2002.

13. Consequences for Internal and External Players

Within the framework of Part IV, two crucial resulting insights have so far been discussed: the comparison of the four policy networks and their variations (Chapter 11) as well as the cardinal characteristics of Russian decision-making in foreign affairs (Chapter 12). These raw cognitions shall not just be deposited and left behind without further thinking. In this chapter, the consequences of the present study's main findings will be deduced and reflected. In particular, ramifications for internal and external actors will be outlined and explained. Subchapter 13.1 tries to identify potentials to improve the Russian foreign policy-making process. Even if decision-making in Moscow is not ineffective, inefficient and unfair, there's considerable room for improvement. After that, subchapter 13.2 addresses external players, who regularly deal with Moscow. It tries to delineate some important principles and advisable rules of conduct which might help to avoid misunderstandings.

It is important to point out that this chapter does not claim to offer fixed recipes and strategies. Given the amount of uncertainties and the dynamic developments in Russian foreign policy-making, it is difficult to provide comprehensive concepts on how to reform decision-making or on how to interact with Moscow. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to draft some relevant points that could be helpful for practitioners.

13.1 Potentials to improve the Russian foreign policy-making process

In his article about Putin's strategy, Vyacheslav Nikonov concludes with the section 'What is to be done'. Thereby, he points out at first, that mechanisms for preparing, making and implementing decisions have to be improved (Nikonov 2005: 80). This certainly holds true for the field of foreign affairs. As the previous sections have shown,

there exist many aspects that hinder smooth and consistent decision-making. Instead of addressing these problems and their potential solutions one-by-one, the present study aggregates them into three different thematic complexes: strategy building, governmental reform and coordination upgrade. Every complex comprehends a set of measures that are suggested in order to improve foreign policy-making in Moscow. As a matter of course, the sequence of the three approaches contributes to the textual flow and does not reflect in any way a certain order of priority.

1) Strategy building

What kind of measures would contribute to a more consistent strategy, to a more visible and predictable foreign policy course, to clear and well defined red bottom lines? One could argue that the main obstacle to strategy building constitutes the diverging ideas about Russia and its role on the international stage. Yet, this fact is nothing bad or unusual per se. Due to its vast geographical size, multicultural society and its mixed historical legacy, the Russian national identity will always remain a disputable and dynamic concept (see 12.2). The relative lack of strategy is the result of insufficient inclusion, absorption and harmonisation of actors, their interests and ideas within the political process. The definition of 'Russianness' requires an exhaustive, open, and less emotional national dialogue about what the Russian Federation actually is and what it realistically can do.

On a smaller scale, this national debate should be led within the domain of external affairs. A foreign policy concept cannot be developed by technocrats within one division of the Foreign Ministry only. It has to be synchronized with a broad variety of other actors. In so doing, objectives and means of the Russian foreign policy have to be limited to a realistic level and brought in a coherent line. This, of course, is a democratic process which needs time, patience, mutual respect and confidence.

Finally, every single issue should be decided in accordance with this foreign policy concept. Yet, as policy networks usually include only a few actors and interests (see Part III and Chapter 11), this is difficult to achieve under current conditions. A greater number of really involved actors and interests would not primarily lead to a broader spectrum of opinions and hence to ineffective policy-making. It would first of all result in a better

anchoring of all activities in the foreign policy strategy. The inclusion of a variety of different actors from diverse sectors would also lead to a broader range of critical opinions, which would sometimes help to keep the predefined track. First and foremost, this would imply a more active role of legislative bodies and non-energy business actors in foreign policy-making (Korobeinikov 2005).

2) Governmental reform

A second approach towards improving foreign policy-making implies another comprehensive governmental reform. It should aim primarily at reducing corruption.[385] Even if this is a highly difficult task, it is not an impossible mission. The following measures could contribute to this end. The reform should diminish the amount of administrational units that do not fulfil immediate and vital public services. Although Russian bureaucracy has been somewhat streamlined by the last governmental reform in 2004, it is still largely oversized.[386] Furthermore, the reform should lead to a better and performance-based remuneration for state officials. As section 12.1 pointed out, Russia lacks proficient civil servants, who are able to effectively solve complex tasks like drafting legal texts for the establishment of free trade areas (see also 9.1 and 10.1). Moreover, transparency should be enhanced by making as much information as possible available to the public. Protocols, concepts and other documents should accessible for the interested audience unless they contain vital contents. In this respect, the MFA and the MEDT provide good examples for ministries that take advantage of the internet and other forms of communication. Additionally, corruption will never drop back if it is not punished by independent judicial organs. The consequent disclosure and pursuit of covert, illegal activities is indispensable for the effective function of the state apparatus.

In addition to the above-mentioned, rather technical measures, the governmental reform should address a problem which is even more difficult to solve since it implies a

[385] This aim stands in line with the assessment of Nikonov (2005), who identifies corruption as the second cardinal problem in Russian politics.

[386] See, for instance, Dresen (2004). Issues and problems of Russia's administration have earlier been discussed by Parison (2000).

partial alteration of Russian political culture: the softening of the vertical state layout. As subchapter 12.1 revealed, the verticality of the Russian state has various negative impacts on foreign policy-making. Therefore, an attempt should be made to place greater emphasis on horizontal mechanisms. In particular, the transition from authoritative to a more participatory style of leadership and command should be envisaged on every state level. If initiatives, creativity and independent problem solving of subordinate unites are accepted and supported from above, blind obedience and passivity can be decreased. This will gradually lead to shared responsibilities, more confidence and better cooperation mechanisms. A general atmosphere of mistrust and fear could be replaced by an ambience of mutual trust'. Admittedly, this all sounds quite unrealistic or even utopian. But if no improvements are achieved in this respect, Russian foreign policy-making will essentially remain a reactive machinery with a gigantic inertia.

3) Coordination upgrade

The third set of measures that might improve Russian foreign policy-making concerns coordination mechanisms. By introducing more formal and binding rules about actor's involvement and interaction, policies would be subject to a fuller and more systematic debate. This is especially required when the President is confronted with conflicting advice on fundamental issues.[387] The coordination upgrade is closely interlinked with the first complex 'strategy building', because enhanced cooperation mechanisms simultaneously also facilitate the formulation of a coherent foreign policy concept. Actually, the better coordination of decision-making is an issue which has already been discussed many times. In 1991, the State Council was created to coordinate inter alia foreign policy. Yet, within a short time frame this body turned out to be ineffective. Then, in 1992, the Security Council was established in order to prepare all Russian foreign and security-related policies. However, the latest under Putin, the highly institutionalized organisation of decision-making was undermined by parallel mechanisms within the

[387] This statement corresponds to the key lesson Hess (2001: 224) draws from different paths to war by three U.S. Presidents: Truman – N Korea, Johnson – Vietnam and Bush Senior – Iraq.

presidential sphere (Carnegie 2004: 19). At an earlier stage already, between 1994 and 1996, the creation of a foreign policy council within the presidential administration was intended. Boris Yeltsin, however, did not approve this idea and insisted on the coordinating role of the Security Council and its General Secretary.[388] Last but not least, a series of additional options to ameliorate the system as a whole have been discussed by the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy.[389]

The most recent initiative to upgrade coordination mechanisms in foreign policy-making has been taken by experts of the Federation Council's international committee. They submitted a legislative proposal[390] that aims at the inclusion and harmonization of a broader range of actors and their interests. Essentially, the project stipulates the creation of a foreign policy council, that would be responsible for preparing and coordinating decisions within the field of Russian external affairs (Korobeinikov 2005: 76). The President, the Prime Minister, the two speakers of the parliamentary chambers, the Secretary General of the Security Council, the Foreign and Defence Ministers and the directors of FSB and SVR would collectively elaborate coherent Russia's foreign policies (Korobeinikov 2005). This would not only lead to a better shielding of the policy-making process vis-à-vis political rivalries, moods of decision-makers and lobbying of big business (Federation-Council 2004: 5). The 'democratisation of foreign policy-making' would also separate powers, assign clear responsibilities and define a minimum of fixed institutional guidelines.

However, the draft legislation received mixed feedbacks in 2005: out of 88 responses, 28 were supportive, 22 declining, whereas 38 had doubts about the project. In particular, the presidential administration did not take notice of the project with enthusiasm (Korobeinikov 2005). Of course, the initiative would ultimately deprive the President of power in a sensitive field, which could also have negative effects. Namely, a

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[388] Expert interview, JSC ‚SOGLASIYE', Moscow: 16.02.2006.

[389] This Russian non-governmental organisation СВОП was founded in 1992 and associates experts and actors of foreign and defense policy.

[390] Projekt sakona „O koordinatsii dejatelnosti zakonodatelnykh i.S.v. isponitelnykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti pri podgogovke reshenii v sfere upravlenija vneshnei politikoi Rossiiskoi Federatsii".

centralisation of foreign policy-making within the governmental orbit could lead to "exacerbated rather than diminished incoherence and inconsistency, by encouraging competition and conflict between the presidency, on the one hand, and the executive branch departments and agencies constituting the permanent foreign affairs government, on the other" (Yetiv 2004: 10-11). Given these circumstances, the draft legislation's prospects of adoption are dusky at best.

13.2 How to deal with Moscow

Given the above-mentioned decision-making characteristics, outsiders often do not understand Moscow's patterns of behaviour. For foreigners, 'reading Russia right' (Trenin 2005) is a highly difficult task as information about contemporary conditions and trends contradict and simply do not match. To deal with Moscow constitutes an even more complex venture, which contains a relatively large potential of misunderstanding and frustration. What kinds of principles and points should politicians, diplomats, political advisors, academics, journalists and other external actors keep in mind when interacting with the Russian foreign policy domain and its players?

The most important principle that should be considered when dealing with Moscow was accurately formulated by Dmitri Trenin (2005):

> [...]Russian politics, still intensely personal and largely nontransparent, should be left to the Russians themselves. The West needs to stop thinking about what is good for Russia and focus on what is good for itself. At some point down the road, there may be a surprisingly large overlap between the two.

Indeed, foreigners and especially Europe and the U.S. too often presume to judge the Russian reality on the basis of their own standards and values. This, however, will not lead to a better mutual understanding and least of all to any changes in Moscow. On the contrary, perpetual deeming and nagging could even have counterproductive effects. As the four cases of the present study have shown, *it is of utmost importance to treat Moscow as an equal partner and not from above nor from below*.[391]

The second major principle is based on the fact that numerous menacing stereotypes or misinterpretations about Russia dominate the foreigner's mindset. From an external perspective, today's Russia continues to be 'a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an

[391] See in particular Chapters 7 and 9.

enigma'.[392] These perceptions are usually accompanied by bequeathed historical experiences, which seem to darken the picture even more. Yet, *there are no reasons to be daunted or even scared when dealing with Moscow*. If Russian actors nowadays occasionally choose a more offensive rhetoric, make increased direct foreign investments or engage in emotional debates with immediate neighbours, it does not signify the rebirth of the imperialist great power. A strong, prospering and globally integrated Russian Federation is in the interest of the state community. External actors, above all, lack a certain amount of sangfroid, tranquillity and relaxation when associating with Russia.

The third principle to deal with Moscow stipulates that external actors should *approach the Russian foreign policy domain at the highest possible level*. The biggest impact on Russia's foreign policy can obviously be achieved by addressing the presidential sphere in a direct, horizontal and personal manner. In fact, leaders of other nations, for example, may have a larger influence on the Russian President than any domestic actor. This can be explained by the distinct vertical nature of the Russian state, which implies that the President is often a lonely man at the top.[393] Some pleasures and solicitudes apparently can only be shared within the solidarity club of state leaders. Especially during his first four years in office, Putin was eager to gain, cultivate and rely upon presidential friendships.[394] However, the amicable leverage of external state leaders on Putin creates political tensions within the domestic arena. At least between 2000 and 2004, it resulted in considerable cleavages between the President and Russia's elite circles. On the long-run, Putin cannot afford to disregard important sub-presidential actors and Russian public opinion in order to ensure his friendship with Western leaders.

Surely, the majority of external actors do not deal with the presidential sphere. Diplomats, governmental officials, academics, journalists, NGO representatives and other

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[392] Famous comment made by Winston Churchill on Russia (BBC, 1.10.1939).
[393] See Aslund (2004) as well as subchapter 12.1.
[394] The importance of the outside world's leaders for Putin was particularly pointed out on the occasion of the expert interview, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Moscow: 05.05.2005. It may also be illustrated by the two far abroad issues (see Chapters 7 and 8). The NRC and the CEES both appeared on the agenda thanks to personal relations and friendships between Putin and Western leaders. Blair, Prodi, Bush, Berlusconi, Chirac, Schröder & Co. managed to commit the Russian President for two ideas, which institutionally engage Moscow on the long-run.

players usually interact with lower levels of the Russian foreign policy domain. In these cases, it is more difficult to come to arrangements, because lower administrational units are largely dependent from above (see 12.1). Since Russian bureaucratic entities normally lack of an appropriate mandate to negotiate directly, even insignificant technical agreements have to be approved from aloft. This, of course, leads to major misunderstandings, especially if the Russian side – intentionally or not - conceals the fact that it is not authorized to sign any documents. During the NRC and CEES decision-making processes, this kind of situation repeatedly appeared.[395] Therefore, it is advisable to tentatively and patiently but nevertheless openly and friendly interact with these units.

As a fourth principle, it is important for external actors to *partially adapt to the Russian foreign policy-making culture*. As Chapter 12 of the present study has revealed, the way decisions are taken in Moscow differs in many respects from other styles of policy-formulation. In particular, the Russian mode can be tagged as 'instant – personal', whereas the Western style could be denoted as 'planned – institutional'.[396] Moscow puts an emphasis on faithful contacts and flexibility while Westerners prefer the rule of law and binding long-term commitments. Indeed, these two approaches are not compatible, which often causes irritation. However, nobody should prejudge about the expedience of the other culture, since both have their strengths and weaknesses. Even if things in Russian foreign policy-making sometimes look chaotic, they follow some specific cultural patterns. Against this background, external actors should most notably be respectful, patient, serious, honest and straight forward. Sometimes, it may even be advisable to circumnavigate the system and take into account the personal factor. This certainly does not mean to play according to criminal and corrupt rules, which should be avoided by all means. Rather, it considers a typical Russian way of interacting.

Nonetheless, the cultural adaptation of external players has to be limited due to at least two aspects. First, the two far abroad issues NRC and CEES have demonstrated the benefits of involving Moscow institutionally. By indirectly including numerous actors

[395] Expert interview, The European Commission's Delegation to Russia, Political Section, Moscow: 27.01.2006 & Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.
[396] Expert interview, NATO Information Office, Moscow: 26.01.2006.

from different sectors and various levels, cooperation with Russia can be remarkably enhanced. And also, these initiatives have additional positive effects as Moscow indirectly continues to apply gained expertise and experience within the post-Soviet space. This has been illustrated by the two other cases CSTO and SES (see 11.3). Second, it is advisable for Russian partners to insist on a maximum amount of transparency. The provision of free and objective information from both sides creates an atmosphere of mutual trust. If facts are openly available for actors on all levels, they often find their way to the top in briefing papers and documents. Transparency also contributes to a livelier and more objective debate among decision-makers, academics and media-players.

Summary

This final part has presented the resulting insights on Russian foreign policy-making. The comparison of the four case studies revealed that decision-making networks in fact vary in dependence of the involved subfields. The NRC network, consisting of the far abroad and security subfields, essentially shows typical features of a stringent policy community. In contrast, the compared parameters indicate that the SES network accounts to a typical, rather loose issue network, whereas the other two cases (CSTO and CEES) may be regarded as hybrid policy network types. Therefore, the main and subhypotheses can basically be corroborated and confirmed by various qualitative findings regarding the effects of near and far abroad, security and economy subfield involvement. Yet, some reservations remain as the small number of analysed issues may not suffice to entirely prove the stipulated correlation.

The analyses and the comparison of the four issues have shown that Russian foreign policy-making in principle corresponds to international standards. Nevertheless, it exhibits a few distinctive characteristics. The accentuated vertical layout of the political system, the substantial impact of bureaucracy, the shortage of qualified governmental staff, the emphasis on Russian idiosyncrasy and the influence of individuals may be regarded as structural attributes of decision-making. Typical procedural properties of policy-formulation encompass the continuous rivalry among elite members, the significance of unwritten rules, short planning intervals, a lack of strategy, fluctuating coordination mechanisms as well as secrecy and opacity.

Against this background, Russian foreign policy-making could be significantly improved by a better harmonization of ideas about Russian's national identity and interests (strategy building), by implementing drastic measures with regard to bureaucracy (governmental reform) and by creating some additional distinct organisational mechanisms (coordination upgrade). External actors dealing with Moscow would be well advised to regard Russia as an equal partner, to keep a certain amount of sangfroid,

tranquillity and relaxation, to approach the Russian foreign policy domain at the highest possible level and to partially adapt to values of Russian political culture.

Conclusion

The present study has aimed at answering the following core research questions: what types of decision-making networks define Russia's foreign policies under Putin and to what extent, how and why do they vary depending on the policy problem? In order to answer this set of questions, four case studies have been quantitatively and qualitatively analysed: the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Common European Economic Space (CEES) and the Single Economic Space (SES). The structural and procedural investigation of these different Russian foreign policy issues allows drawing the following major conclusion: *Moscow's decision-making in the field of external affairs during Putin's tenure is neither a one man show nor the exclusive field of a closed kitchen cabinet*. All four cases have revealed that policy-making in today's Russia is far more complex. It involves networks with changing memberships and fluctuating as well as qualitatively versatile interactions. Whereas the NRC network, for example, involved 8 closely interlinked actors, the SES decision-making community encompassed 19 loosely connected players. Hence, even if Putin reinforced state verticality and narrowed Russia's top political elite over the past few years, Moscow's foreign policy-making has remained a process that includes various competing groups of actors. The following paragraphs discuss the present study's findings and their implications in more detail.

Quantitative findings and their implications

Based on the theories of Knoke and Pappi (1996), Rhodes and Marsh (1992) as well as practical observations, the main hypothesis of the present study has stipulated that Russia's foreign policy domain under Vladimir Putin consists of four basic overlapping subfields: near abroad, far abroad, security and economy. The involvement of these subfields determines the shape of policy networks dealing with specific issues. This supposed correlation has been specified by three subhypotheses: (A) If an issue is addressed by the far abroad and security subfields, policy networks tend to take the shape

of small, tight and homogeneous policy communities holding considerable amounts of resources and power. (B) Conversely, if the near abroad and economic subfields approach an issue, then policy networks have a tendency to constitute large, loose and heterogeneous issue networks with marginal means and potentials. (C) Other subfield combinations produce hybrid forms of policy networks.

The four analysed Russian foreign policy issues confirmed the relationships stipulated by the hypotheses. The establishment of the NRC - a matter addressed by the far abroad and security subfields – was decided by a small and highly integrated network. It was dominated by presidential actors and possessed a considerable quantity of resources and power. Apparently, Putin's establishment makes Moscow's strategic position on the farther international stage a top priority, which results in tense and limited policy networks. This typical policy community stands in contrast to the SES case. The SES network was composed of near abroad and economy subfield members and constituted a classic issue network. It encompassed a large number of decentralised actors and interests with comparatively few resources and power. Moreover, presidential actors played a moderate role. It seems that Moscow tends to neglect economic-related near abroad issues, which leads to slack and frayed patterns of decision-making. In between these two extremes, policy networks addressing geopolitical issues in Russia's neighbourhood (the CSTO case), or far abroad economic matters (the CEES case) exhibit inconsistent characteristics such as a small number of network members coupled with a high quantity of resources.

These findings have implications for the interpretation of Moscow's political arena and its international relations. Two aspects, in particular, need to be highlighted. First, *foreign policy-making in Putin's Russia is not as dictatorial as it is sometimes portrayed by the Western media*. The understanding that policy networks change, depending on policy issues calls into doubt the assumption that the President himself or a small circle of individuals decide upon all major external and internal political questions. Decision-making patterns are not rigid and constant at all. As the four case studies have shown, foreign policy networks significantly vary in terms of actors, their potentials and ties. Continuously fluctuating influences and relative strengths allow players from different

spheres and levels to sway policy formulation. The Russian foreign policy domain is a highly dynamic and fragile environment. Against this background, decision-making in Moscow essentially corresponds to international standards. As in other world capitals - be it Washington, London, Paris, Beijing, Kuala Lumpur or Berne - foreign policy-making is characterised by varying networks, by a limited range of involved actors and interests, by assertive executive bodies and by enhanced concealment. These features lie in the nature of foreign affairs and do not represent Russian peculiarities.

Secondly, the present study's main findings demonstrate that *domestic political factors play an essential role in Russian foreign policy-making.* This aspect has, so far, been generally underestimated. Policies are formulated by domestic networks, their members, interactions, resources and powers, which vary depending on the issue. Consequently, Moscow's distinct policies - whether they address the post-Soviet space, far abroad nations, security or economic matters - cannot exclusively be explained by external aspects such as actions of other nations, macro-economic figures or geopolitical facts and developments. The way Russia handled the gas conflicts with Ukraine and Belarus in 2006 and 2007, for instance, does not only reflect Moscow's strategic interests or ambivalent and emotional relations between sister and mother nations. It also, to a considerable extent, is a sign of a heterogeneous (hybrid) policy network in Moscow that decided incoherently, on short notice and without taking into account a broader range of internal opinions, interests or policy alternatives. Insofar, the present study confirms and validates the sizeable amount of theoretical studies in the field of foreign policy analysis, which emphasize the cross-fertilization and interlocking of exogenous and endogenous variables. Foreign affairs cannot be understood without taking into account domestic matters. This statement applies particularly to Russia's activities abroad.

Qualitative findings and their implications

Beside the above-discussed quantitative findings on policy-networks, the present study has also identified and analysed the paramount qualitative properties of Russian foreign policy-making and its networks. It has revealed that, notwithstanding its normality, decision-making in Moscow features eleven specific structural and procedural attributes:

- Accentuated vertical layout of the political system:
  The Russian political system is characterised by a strong top-down mentality. Whereas superior levels decide and retain power as well as freedom of action, the subordinate units are considered as implementing and fully dependent agents. Since the year 2000, this state verticality has been reinforced under Putin, which lead to an enhanced centralisation in foreign policy-making. Yet, as officials on lower levels are not in a position to decide, even insignificant issues need the approval from above. This complicates cooperation with external actors and hinders creative, self dependent as well as bottom-up activities.

- Substantial impact of bureaucracy:
  However, despite the weakness of lower administrational units, the impact of bureaucracy on Russia's foreign policies is substantial. Especially the CEES and the SES issues have shown that technical expertise highly influences decisions on the top level. In these cases, even specific lower ministerial departments have become network members due to their particular knowledge in economic matters.

- Shortage of qualified governmental staff:
  Nevertheless, qualified governmental staff is scarce in Moscow. As the case studies have revealed, decision-making on the highest level can often not be supported from below due to a lack of detailed expertise. Today, highly skilled Russian graduates prefer to make their careers within private sector, where wages and working conditions are much better than within the Russian administration.

- Emphasis on Russian idiosyncrasy:

Another characteristic of Moscow's decision-making in foreign affairs is the emphasis on Russian idiosyncrasy. It describes a widespread preference for 'Russianness' among members of the elite and bureaucracy. Whereas some call it backward mentality or awareness for culture and tradition, idiosyncrasy has to be understood as a general understanding that Russia has always followed a unique and independent course of action, which makes any comparisons with other nation states impossible. This mindset has noticeable structural and procedural impacts on foreign policy-making. With regard to the CEES issue, for example, many Russian actors were reluctant to adapt parts of Russian legislation to the EU 'acquis communautaire'.

- Influence of individuals:
  Despite the fact that the present study focused on organisational actors, individuals are an important factor in Russian foreign policy-making. Viktor Khristenko, for instance, left his personal imprints on Russia's foreign economic policies. He was fully authorised by the President to personally coordinate the CEES and SES issues. The influence of individuals, their characters and moods, goes hand in hand with a shortage of written rules to make decisions (see below).

- Continuous rivalry among elite members:
  Much disconcertment in Russian foreign policy-making is due to continuous rivalry among elite members. Permanent battles between competing groups for access to decision-making hinder smooth teamwork based on facts and targets. This is, of course, not an exclusive Russian phenomenon. But political fights in Moscow are fought out in a more visible, passionate, rough or sometimes even brutal way.

- Significance of unwritten rules:
  A crucial aspect of Russian foreign policy-making is the significance of unwritten rules. As legal decision-making procedures are either not existent or not respected, culturally determined ways of behaviour

among network members are of utmost importance. Interactions between foreign policy actors correspond to a certain code, which contains values like honesty, friendship, mutual trust, faith and personal dignity. It is often this characteristic of decision-making, which causes a lot of misunderstandings between Russians and Westerners. Whereas policy-making in Moscow may be understood as 'instant-personal', Europeans are used to a more 'planned-institutional' way of taking decisions.

- Short planning intervals;
  This feature of Moscow's foreign policy-making is closely linked to the above-mentioned characteristic: Russian planning intervals are short. It does not only reflect the short-term nature of external affairs. Last-minute decision-making is also rooted in Russia's political culture and is nothing bad per se. From a Russian point of view, decisions on short notice leave capacities and time for adequate reactions.

- Lack of strategy:
  Even if Putin has managed to stabilise and centralise the political system over the past years, Russia's foreign policies continue to lack of a basic strategy. The reason for this lies in Moscow's political system. Although the formulation and assertion of national interests is a difficult task for every nation, the Russian Federation has not yet fully defined its new identity after the collapse of the USSR. A solid consensus about 'what is Russia?' and about 'what Russia should do?' has so far not been reached. Hence, Moscow's internal disaccord about the strategic course remains a characteristic of its foreign policies.

- Fluctuating coordination mechanism;
  The problem of fluctuating coordination mechanisms in Russian foreign policy-making is closely linked to the above-mentioned points. Moscow's system lacks of binding formal institutions to coordinate foreign policies. As there are no fixed rules, coordination mechanisms vary from issue to issue, which makes it difficult to predict policy

outcomes. Actually, two coordinating organs have existed and appointed since 1991: the Security Council and the MFA. Yet, as long as the President and its administration are not willing to share or even delegate responsibilities, important actors such as the parliament remain excluded from foreign policy decision-making.

- Distinctive secrecy and opacity.
  Last but not least, Russian foreign policy-making is characterised by distinctive secrecy and opacity. More than in other capitals around the globe, Moscow keeps its decision-making processes behind the curtain. Hence, policy outcomes are sometimes incomprehensible; not only for outsiders, but also for Russian governmental officials, ministers, diplomats and presidential advisors.

All these factors may be regarded as intrinsic Russian decision-making characteristics. Some of them are rooted in culture, whereas others reflect operational shortcomings. Combined, they create many moments of ineffectiveness, inefficiency and unpredictability. This in turn causes dissatisfaction among Russian actors and confusion for partners and external observers. Although instant and simple remedies do not exist, improvements are feasible. In particular, foreign policy-making structures and procedures should be ameliorated by embarking on a more coherent and robust strategy, by implementing a drastic governmental reform package and by enhancing internal coordination mechanisms.

The qualitative enhancement of Moscow's capacity to formulate effective and coherent foreign policies does not simply constitute an optional or desirable task. If current trends in world politics prove to be stable and enduring, it will be an imperative and urgent step. As Moscow is about to regain assertiveness and influence on the international stage, Russian foreign policy-making and its outcomes are gradually becoming more important. What are the underlying reasons and assumptions that argue for this development? Primarily, Russia's high energy revenues and adept monetary policies have boosted almost all business sectors. Since 1999, constant economic growth has

accounted for the emergence of a civic middle class and for considerable impulses for modernisation. Even if severe problems – especially in the social sphere - persist, Russia's future prospects are promising.

In addition to internal factors, Moscow's role in international relations is also enhanced by external factors. Namely, Russia profits directly from a weakening of the Western powers. The potential failures of the U.S. and NATO in Iraq and Afghanistan, the stagnating EU integration process and smouldering conflicts in the Middle East or in Kosovo are about to bring the Western state community into an uncomfortable situation. This enhances Russia's international leverage, not only rhetorically, but also substantially. Within the forthcoming years, the rise of the Russian Federation could even be accelerated, since Moscow possesses two assets, which may be decisive in global affairs: energy and space. If natural resources and land become scarcer and more contended in the future, Russia's position will be significantly strengthened. In light of these potential developments, Moscow's responsibility for global issues such as climate change, energy security or strategic stability will be enhanced. With rising claims in world affairs, Russia needs to play a more proactive, constructive and consistent role than it did as a marginalized regional power. This requires a foreign policy-making apparatus that is more strategy-oriented, integrative, unemotional and coordinated.

Open questions, analytical difficulties and further research

All of the above-discussed findings, implications and trends have emerged from an analysis that was performed within a restricted theoretical and methodological framework. This, of course, limits the academic outcome of this study. Inevitably, scientific tools, guidelines and processes entail results that are possibly biased and fragmentary. The present study has only covered a small portion of an immense and complex reality. Therefore, the last few paragraphs will be dedicated to open questions, analytical difficulties and further research. They can be subsumed under three main topics: 'evolution of decision-making', 'processes behind closed doors' as well as 'actors' interests and ideas'.

The first topic addresses the question of *how Russian foreign policy-making changes over time*. The present study and the bulk of existing literature have focused on decision-making structures and processes at a particular stage of Russian history. They all took a snap-shot, for instance, of the Czar's court, Stalin's immediate surroundings or Putin's networks in order to derive conclusions about the relative time period. Yet, there exists a lack of longitudinal studies tracking and comparing Russian foreign policy-formulation along the time line. Some of the most interesting open questions are: To what extent and how do elements of Russian political culture evolve? To what extent do state leaders, their personalities and styles have an impact on foreign policy-making? To what extent do policy-networks, the involved actors and relations change over time? How far have coordination mechanisms transformed since the 18th century? These kinds of questions are highly relevant and their answers would be helpful to determine, for example, the practicability of suggested reform projects. They would also contribute to a less absolute interpretation of contemporary activities and developments. In sum, studies tracing the evolution of Russian foreign policy-making would add a real surplus to the academic discourse.

Another topic that needs further academic attention is the investigation of *foreign policy processes behind closed doors*. It has already been mentioned in the introduction of the present study that the analysis of Russian decision-making is a highly difficult undertaking. For the most part, foreign policy-formulation is bound to secrecy. Nonetheless, key players, activities and events should not be described exclusively in intelligence reports, prominent memoirs or journalistic essays. They should also be covered systematically by academic researchers, precisely because these domestic factors are so crucial for the genesis of foreign policies, and hence for Russia's international relations. Thereby, a multitude of open questions wait for answers: what are the social patterns of interactions among decision-makers? What kinds of cultural norms influence the behaviour of key players? To what extent can individuals be decisive for the formulation of foreign policies? Which coordination mechanisms determine human interaction on the micro-level? These types of question require further research, as they are crucial for a better understanding of Russian foreign policy-making. Yet, it goes without saying that such questions are difficult to address by outsiders. The analysis of

processes behind closed doors requires a higher degree of nearness and relatedness to the system. Former officials, close family-members, experienced advisors or well-informed academics and journalists would possibly be able to uncover more details of the Russian foreign policy domain.

The third topic that needs further extensive research is *foreign policy actor's interests and ideas*. Due to the restricted analytical framework, the present study has not been able to tackle this subject. However, it would be highly interesting to determine the network member's interests and ideas in order to reveal the balance of power in Moscow. First and foremost, the following questions have essentially remained open so far: Which factors determine the interests and ideas of Russian foreign policy domain actors? How can actor's coalitions be identified within Moscow's policy networks? What kinds of interests and ideas have dominated Russian foreign policy-making over the last few years? How do actor's interests and ideas interrelate with national interests and ideas? To what extent, how and why do coalitions of interests and ideas vary? Answers to these sorts of questions would not only help to explain Russian foreign policies more in-depth, but they would also bring to light the relative strengths within Moscow's elite circles and especially clarify Putin's position within the political arena. Obviously, the academic investigation of interests and ideas needs close ties to the Russian foreign policy domain, since personal or organisational motives and preferences are mostly kept private.

The preceding three topics certainly do not exhaust the list of potential subjects for further research. They only point out prospective focal points for further research in the field of Russian foreign policy-making. Above all, for a better understanding of the Russian Federation and its external activities, more case studies are required. Whereas general interpretations of Russian foreign policy contents are virtually innumerable, careful examinations of concrete and specific issues have remained scarce. Henceforth, this gap needs to be filled.

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About the author

From 2004 until 2007, Oliver Möhl worked as a researcher at the Center for Security Studies of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. He took responsibility for the field of post-soviet studies and led the specialized network project 'Russian and Eurasian Security' (RES). He worked as an international visiting scholar at Carnegie Moscow Center and as an associated researcher at the Swiss Embassy in Moscow. In 2003, Oliver Möhl finished his studies in political science and international law at the Universities of Berne, Geneva and Moscow, whereupon he specialized in international relations and Russian foreign and security policy.

Before writing his thesis, Oliver Möhl completed other research projects in the field of Russian politics. In particular, he analysed Moscow's foreign policy-making with regard to the Caspian region (Von Obstruktion zu Kooperation: Die post-sowjetische Delimitation des kaspischen Meeres: Rahmenbedingungen, Voraussetzungen und Vollzug des Wandels Russländischer Aussenpolitik) and focussed on Russian federalism (Der Russländische Föderalismus – Erblast, Wandel und Perspektiven).

Oliver Möhl was born in 1973 in Bülach (Switzerland) and speaks fluently English, Russian, French and Italian. Before entering the academic world, he worked as an airline pilot for Swissair.

Appendix I: Systematic list of actors

Presidential actors

President
Presidential Administration
- Direction (Chief of staff and his deputies)
- Aides of the President
- Advisors of the President
- Plenipotentiary Representatives of the President
- Presidential Services
- Presidential Executive Divisions

Security Council
- Direction (Secretary, his administration and the scientific council)
- Members of the Security Council

Governmental actors

Prime Ministry
- Direction (Prime Minister, his deputies and plenipotentiary representatives)
- Governmental Administration (Direction, Departments of International Cooperation, Defense Complex, Finance, Economy & Property, Energetics & Natural Resources)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
- Direction (Minister and his deputies)
- 1st European Department (Mediteranean and Western European countries)
- 2nd European Department (Nortern European countries)
- 3rd European Department (South-Eastern European countries)
- 4th European Department (Central European countries)
- Northern America Department
- Latin America Department
- Middle East & Northern Africa Department
- Africa Department
- 1st Asian Department
- 2nd Asian Department
- 3rd Asian Department
- 1st CIS Department (General Cooperation)
- 2nd CIS Department (Belarus, Moldavia, Ukraine)
- 3rd CIS Department (Central Asian countries)
- 4th CIS Department (Caucasian countries)
- Relations to Federal Regions Department
- All-European Cooperation Department

- International Organisation Department
- Security & Disarmament Department
- Humanitarian Cooperation & Human Rights Department
- Culture & UNESCO Department
- Economic Cooperation Department
- Legal Department
- Personnel Department
- Consular Service
- Leadership issues Department
- Financial Department
- Legal Department
- Abroad Financial capital and property Department
- Ambassadors

Ministry of Defence (MoD)

- Direction (Minister and his deputees)
- General Staff
- Departments

Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT)

- Direction (Minister and his deputies)
- Department for External Economic Affairs
- Department for Multilateral Cooperation with CIS Countries
- Department for Trade Policy and Multilateral Trade Negotiations

Other Federal Ministries

- Ministry of Internal Affairs
- Ministry of Justice
- Ministry of Civil Defence, Emergencies and Disaster Relief
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Labour and Social Development
- Ministry of Health Care
- Ministry of Culture
- Ministry of Press, Telecom and Communication
- Ministry of Agriculture
- Ministry of State Property
- Ministry of Finance
- Ministry of Tax and Duties
- Ministry of Transport
- Ministry of Communication
- Ministry of Railways
- Ministry of Natural Resources
- Ministry of Nuclear Energy
- Ministry of Energy
- Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology
- Ministry of Anti-Trust and Business Support

Federal Services

- Federal Security Service (FSB)
- Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)

- State Courier Service
- Federal Border Service
- Federal Guard Service
- Other Federal Services

Federal Agencies, Committees and Commissions

- Agencies (Aviation & Space, Patents & Trade Marks, etc.)
- Committees (Fishing Industry, Statistics, etc.)
- Commissions (Energetics, Stock Markets, etc.)

Other Federal Bodies

- Bank for Foreign Trade
- Vneshekonombank
- Savings Bank
- Central Bank
- Federal Assets Fond
- Audit Chamber
- Central Elections

Parliamentary actors

State Duma

- Duma Council (Chair and his deputies)
- Administration
- Committee for Security
- Committee for Nationality
- Committee for CIS Cooperation
- Committee for International Affairs
- Committee for Defence
- Committee for Natural Ressources
- Committee for Economic Policy
- Committee for Energy, Transport & Communication
- Commission for Geopolitics

Federation Council

- Chair
- Administration
- Committee for Securty & Defense
- Committee for Economic Policy
- Committee for CIS Cooperation
- Committee for International Affairs

Economic actors

Energy sector
- Gazprom
- Lukoil
- RAO UES
- Transneft
- Yukos
- Other companies

Financial sector
Industrial sector
Service sector

Other actors

Regional actors
- Republics
- Oblasti
- Autonomous Okrugy & Oblasti
- Krai
- Cities of federal importance (Moscow, St. Petersburg)

Judiciary actors
- Supreme Court
- Supreme Arbitration Court
- General Prosecutor
- Constitutional Court

Political parties
- United Russia
- Communist Party
- Liberal-democratic Party
- Motherland

Miscellaneous actors
- Religious actors (Orthodox, Muslim)
- Academic actors
- Media
- Societal actors

Appendix II: Questionnaires

Quantitative questionnaire: working steps 2 and 3

1. Please consider the systematic list of actors (Appendix I) and assess the influence of every actor on the particular case.
   1 = no influence
   2 = minimal influence
   3 = considerable influence
   4 = high influence
   5 = don't know

   Definition 'influence':
   The term influence is defined as the possibility of an actor to manipulate other actors or events.

2. Please consider the matrix showing the most influential actors of the particular case in the first row and column. Which actors were linked with each other and how strong do you assess their interaction during the appropriate decision-making process?
   0 = no or weak/rare interaction
   1 = medium interaction
   2 = intense/frequent interaction

   Definition 'interaction':
   An interaction is defined as any contact (official or informal meeting, conference, exchange of mail, phone call etc.) between actors, which are related to a particular case. Through interactions, actors solve conflicts, exchange all kinds of resources, information as well as opinions and coordinate their positions. Interactions are assessed in terms of intensity and frequency.

Sample of qualitative questions concerning case studies

1. Who brought up the idea to create the NRC/CSTO/CEES/SES?

2. How was this idea brought up and how was it developed further?

3. Which milestones can be identified along the decision-making process?

4. How exactly did the most influential actors interact?

5. What kinds of mechanisms contributed to the coordination of the issue, its actors and events?

6. What kind of role played the presidential, governmental, parliamentary, economic and other actors?

7. Did some actors follow a hidden agenda?

Sample of qualitative questions concerning general foreign policy-making

1. Who informs Putin about a specific foreign policy issue?

2. What kind of role does the presidential administration play within the foreign policy decision-making process?

3. What kind of role do intelligence services play within the foreign policy decision-making process?

4. How do business interests translate into the foreign policy decision-making process?

5. To what extent and how does foreign policy decision-making varies depending on the involvement of the near abroad and far abroad subfields?

6. To what extent and how does foreign policy decision-making varies depending on the involvement of the security and economic subfield?